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  II 
At the basis of the monopoly of the Standard Oil 
Company in the production and distribution of petroleum 
products rests the pipe line. The possession of these 
pipelines enables the Standard to absolutely control the price 
which its competitor in each given locality shall pay.  
(ICC, 1907 cited in Boyce, 2014 pp.5)
 
  III 
Introduction  
 
 
 
 
This study is concerned with Norway’s role in supplying gas to 
Europe through offshore pipelines. One reason for choosing this topic is the 
difference in available research between the number one supplier of gas to 
Europe, Russia, and the number two, Norway, where there is much less 
published research. This study aims to bridge the gap by considering, for the 
Norwegian gas Sector, issues of gas supply, a competitive gas market, a 
sustainable effective, efficient offshore infrastructure and access for all where 
and when it is required. It further explores whether the regulation of the 
Norwegian Gas Sector, through national regulations, the Gas Target Model 
and three EU gas directives is meeting its goals or actually hinders 
development. Another reason to choose this subject is the low volume of 
investments in the Norwegian gas offshore infrastructure, which 
consequently will lead to reduced volumes of supply. In relation to the 
abovementioned, the third reason is to investigate whether current and 
anticipated prices justify further investment in Norwegian natural resources 
and offshore infrastructure. The fourth reason is to explore the possibilities 
and preferences for Europe to support investment in Norway’s most 
promising sector, the Barents Sea, or if competition and pricing do not 
warrant further investment.  
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1. Norway as a Major Gas Transporter  
 
 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The Norwegian gas industry has been affected by challenges and 
opportunities. Chapter 1 will capture the development of the resources and 
the development of what has sometimes been called “the Norwegian 
model”, and elaborates on these encounters and prospects, furthering the 
underpinning for the research. Section 1.2 aims to provide a better 
understanding of the influences, challenges and opportunities which 
affected the Norwegian gas sector before discussing the gas market in the 
period 2016-2017. It portrays a historical background on how the Norwegian 
resource development commenced and details how Norwegian regulations 
were established in a period where much uncertainty existed regarding 
potential resources and the boundaries of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
(NCS). Section 1.3 provides a concise summary of the development of the 
Norwegian Gas Infrastructure and how fields are linked to treatment 
facilities and further to different countries. Section 1.4 describes the 
governmental structure, and the responsibilities of parties involved in 
owning and operating the transmission system from end to end. It also 
explains how gas is discovered and managed by the government through a 
licensing system which allocates acreage for certain areas in a set period to 
optimise the resources on the NCS. It provides an insight on how the 
Norwegian System operated during its “monopoly period” before supra-
national regulation was implemented by the EU and establishes the level of 
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investments in the transmission system to facilitate the market. Section 1.5 
sets out the research questions, methodology and disposition. 
1.2. DEVELOPING NATURAL RESOURCES - A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Norway is the third largest gas exporter in the world and the second 
largest exporter of piped gas to Europe after Russia. Norway exported about 
115 BN Sm3 gas to Europe in 2016 making it the largest volume of gas ever 
exported from the NCS in a single year. In a large part of Europe, gas is a 
critical resource of energy for domestic, industrial usage and for power 
generating facilities.  Most of Norway’s gas sold to Europe is transported 
through the offshore subsea infrastructure to Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and France. Overall Norwegian gas covers about 25 % of 
Europe's gas consumption and makes an important contribution to energy 
security in Europe (NPD, 2017b). 
Efficient planning and utilisation of the natural gas infrastructure has 
created great value for Norwegian society. The Sovereign Wealth Fund 
(SWF), founded on natural resource sales and interest on capital invested, 
amounts1  to NOK 714 BN or $88 BN(NBIM, 2016). The SWF2 at times also 
called “the Norwegian Pension Fund” was set up in 1988 and has provided 
an annual return of 3.79% since then (Reuters, 2017). It is managed by the 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) and reports to the board of 
the Central Bank and the Norwegian Parliament. The fund has restrictions 
in choosing its investments: it is only allowed to invest in real estate, stocks, 
bonds abroad and is bound by an ethical mandate. In addition, it is only 
allowed to return 3% of the fund’s value into Norwegian society directly 
(Reuters, 2017). According to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
                                                   
1 Accessed 10.10. 2016 
2 For in depth reading on the Norwegian oil fund (Lie, 2013) 
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(Regjeringen, 2013a) approximately NOK 3,000 BN ~$370 BN in 2017 money3 
has been invested in installations, pipelines and land facilities. Timely 
development of proved and unproved, natural resources and existing fields 
exploits this resource capacity while extending the producing life of the 
fields. The exploration, production, transportation and supply of natural gas 
is a complex process. It requires substantial capital investment with risk for 
stakeholders involved.  
This thesis will focus on investments in the offshore pipeline system4 
on the NCS and ask if further extension of the offshore pipeline system into 
the northern, Barents Sea sector is a commercially viable option. The pipeline 
transmission system plays a deciding role in the development of natural 
resources on the NCS. Any alteration of the transmission system may have 
a significant impact on the resource management of natural gas and the 
financial requirements to build or expand this complex system. It requires 
long term planning from all stakeholders involved. The Norwegian offshore 
gas infrastructure consists of a myriad of subsea pipelines, platforms and 
onshore process facilities. With the exception of LNG from Snøhvit (5.4% of 
2016’s export equal to 6.1BCM), the major share of natural gas transportation 
from the Norwegian Continental Shelf to customers in Europe including the 
UK is through subsea pipeline systems. Since the first pipeline became 
operational in 1977, transmission system owners have been developing and 
constructing a transportation network that comprises approximately 8,300 
km (Gassco, 2016). To put these dimensions into a comparable perspective, 
the pipeline diameters range typically from 28-inch (~72cm) to 42-inch 
(~107cm) in diameter and maximum internal working pressure is limited to 
approximately 2,800psi (193Bar) over a length approximately equal to that 
from Oslo to Houston. 
                                                   
3 Extrapolated from 2013NOK to 2017NOK 
4 Pipeline, transmission and transportation system will have the same meaning unless explicitly stated 
differently 
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Influences 
The Norwegian natural gas market has continuously been influenced 
by regulatory, economic, societal and physical uncertainties. These four 
types of influences will be briefly discussed and further explained 
throughout the research.  
Austvik (2011) described the Norwegian government as 
entrepreneur and landlord when it adapted to these influences. For instance, 
the government as owner of natural resources used to favour barriers, 
shielding certain natural monopolies from competitive entry. European 
governments however enforced supra-national deregulation schemes5 
opening the market up for new participants, thus influencing economic 
returns. As a result, national policies and ownership changed, making 
Norway “prefer” competition in parts of the value chain at a cost to the 
pipeline owners.  
The long-term life cycle, typical for natural gas development, has 
allowed for new technologies to be developed and applied to optimise 
natural gas recovery. The NOK 3,000BN (~$370BN) depicts the capital-
intensive nature of the industry and makes decisions on long term growth 
targets important. Considering the appetite of the industry for short term 
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and dividends, natural gas prices 
between $5-$8/MMbtu that have been dominant since 2014 combined with 
the high rate of supply of natural gas have put investments under strain. In 
addition, long lead times to actually get gas flowing through the 
transmission system require timely investment ahead of supply decline. 
Consequently, leaving the resources in the ground and thus requiring no 
extension to the existing transmission system has been the outcome on 
several investment decisions on the NCS. Simultaneously, the low 2014-2017 
gas prices suffered by the sector resulted in consolidation between major 
                                                   
5 The process of Norway implementing (European Union) regulations will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
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players E.g. Shell and BG (Shell, 2016; MPE, 2016). Increasing mergers and 
acquisitions in the sector took place to reduce cost, divest and/or return to 
core business, yielding oligopolistic situations with a reduced number of 
players.  
Societal influences on decarbonisation and reduction in the usage of 
fossil fuels creates additional uncertainties in decision making on further 
expanding the transmission system. The 2015 United Nations Climate 
Change Conference (COP21, 2015) further tempers the investment rationale 
for field development with the accompanied transmission system expansion. 
 
Figure 1 The Norwegian Continental Shelf 
 Source: Norskpetroleum (2016a) 
The physical uncertainties are related to the natural resources on the 
Norwegian Continental shelf. The shelf is divided into four geographical 
sectors as depicted in Figure 1 which differ considerably. From South to 
North, the North Sea sector is in a mature state, followed up by the 
Norwegian Sea sector with a higher share of undiscovered resources and the 
most northern sector, the Barents Sea, with the largest undiscovered 
resources and seen as the highest potential source of oil & gas for the future. 
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The Arctic Ocean is not open for activities or schemes, however indicates the 
boundaries of the shelf. For this research only the first three sectors will be 
discussed. 
The offshore transmission system plays an intrinsic role in resource 
management on the NCS. Changes in resource development and operations 
of the transmission systems inevitably affect the resource management 
indicating its importance.   
Reconsidering Norway’s natural resource potential 
It was not until the discovery of gas at Groningen in the Netherlands 
in 1958 that experts revised their thinking on the petroleum potential of the 
North Sea (Ryggvik, 2010). This discovery led to optimism in a part of the 
world where energy consumption to a large extent was based on coal and 
imported oil. Prior to the discovery of Slochteren (Groningen) few people 
believed that the NCS could contain oil and gas deposits. After all, initial 
geological expertise on the NCS was negative to oil and gas deposits. In a 
letter of February 1958 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian 
Geological Survey wrote that: “The chances of finding coal, oil or sulphur on 
the continental shelf off the Norwegian coast can be discounted”. This claim 
was based upon near-shore waters, but it remains a fact that geologists at the 
time did not believe oil or gas could be found on the NCS (MPE, 2013). Part 
of this perception could be attributed to the lack of appropriate data which, 
based upon the then present technology was not readily available or 
accurate. As Al Kasim (2006) described, perhaps the most challenging tasks 
in the petroleum sector at the time were to persuade Oil & Gas companies of 
the need and the right of the State to receive necessary data from E&P 
operations. The desire to obtain data on resources on the NCS became the 
foundation for the government to constitute specific regulations that would 
cover data collection through geological surveys in Norwegian waters. The 
potential for finding natural resources fuelled negotiations with O&G 
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companies who applied for permission for geological surveys on the NCS 
(Ryggvik, 2010). 
The discovery of gas in The Netherlands and further exploration on 
the United Kingdom shelf led international oil companies like Philips, Shell, 
Mobil, Esso and Amoco, to enquire for exploration rights from the 
Norwegian government. The first company was Philips in 19626, asking for 
rights for the complete (yet to become) Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
Norway at that time was not too concerned7 with exploration, considering 
no resources were likely to be found (based on the Geological Survey 
conducted in 1958). The only clearly defined regulation on coastal waters 
was laid down in the Geneva convention of 19588. Norway9 was hesitant to 
adopt the regulations for reasons related to fishery and shipping which were 
the main economic drivers at that time (Norskpetroleum, 2016b).  
Based on an additional aeromagnetic survey conducted in 1959 by 
the Norges geologiske undersøkelse (NGU) Geological Survey of Norway, 
followed up in 1963 with another survey, including seismic surveys, the 
Norwegian government realised it needed to establish a legal basis for oil 
and gas activities on its to be defined Norwegian Continental Shelf.  This 
resulted in a royal decree and was followed by the law of 1963 specifically 
not naming the NCS, however indicating the State’s right to natural 
resources through the King. This allowed the King through the government 
                                                   
6 This was seen by the Norwegian government as an attempt to obtain an exclusive concession for the 
whole shelf. This had happened in Denmark with Danish ship owner A P Møller and through meetings 
in Copenhagen with the A.P. Møller concern, it became clear that all doors there were closed. The concern 
had signed a 50-year contract for all of Denmark including the continental shelf. Besides, the company 
was already associated with several larger oil companies through D.U.C. (Dansk Undergrunds 
Consortium). 
7 In 1971 Norway ratified the Geneva convention. The Barents Sea southeast became a part of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf after the Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents 
Sea and the Arctic Ocean between Russia and Norway entered into force on July 7th, 2011. In 2013, the 
Norwegian Parliament opened the Barents Sea southeast to petroleum activity. 
8 Geneva Convention states the 200 metres criterion – see next footnote. 
9 See Geneva Convention on jurisdictions on continental shelfs regarding 200-metre water depth criterion 
from the coast or in-depth Al Kasim page 11-12. 
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to issue licenses10to oil and gas companies wanting to explore petroleum 
resources on the shelf.  
The next step on the road to develop a legal natural resources 
framework was the median line negotiation11and agreement of 1964-1965 
between the United Kingdom and Denmark. The agreement meant that 
boundaries in the North Sea had been agreed upon before exploration began, 
clarifying the division of resources in fields which might later become 
debatable12. Due to the lack of a Ministry of e.g., Energy in those countries 
before 1965, these negotiations were conducted by the ministries of foreign 
affairs and the ministry of Industry, who prepared the first allocation for 
exploration (NPD, 2015b).  
Realising the need for specific expertise, The Norwegian Petroleum 
Council (NPC) was appointed by “the royal decree of 1965” and provided 
its experience and advice to parliament on petroleum issues in the capacity 
of advisory board. The NPC approved the spudding of the first well by Esso 
in 1966 opening the Norwegian North Sea for development. The absence of 
clear rules and policies on what was considered data to be shared for 
exploration purposes, made it near impossible to develop the regions.  In 
that same year (1966), the Petroleum Section13 was appointed as a separate 
unit at the department of mines in the Ministry of Industry (Moses&Letnes, 
2017), the unit that was tasked with the requesting of data from the 
international oil companies, eager to explore the Norwegian North Sea 
sector (Kvendseth, 1988).  
                                                   
10 In the earlier years, there used to be a reconnaissance and production licence (1965) The production 
licence gives a company or a group of companies a monopoly to perform investigations, exploration 
drilling and recovery of petroleum deposits within the geographical area stated in the licence. The 
licensees become owners of the petroleum that is produced. A production licence may cover one or more 
blocks or parts of blocks and regulates the rights and obligations of the participant companies with 
respect to the authorities. Production licences are awarded by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 
numbered licensing rounds for the least explored parts of the shelf (frontier areas), or awards in 
predefined areas (APA) for mature parts. 
11 Agreement between Norway, the United Kingdom, and Denmark followed later, see below. 
12 This proved valuable considering certain fields that were discovered post 1965 are located on the 
borders e.g. Sleipner, Cod, Blane, Varg, Flyndre and Ekofisk became de facto Norwegian fields, see Figure 
4. 
13 The term petroleum Section and Oil Office are assumed to be interchangeable. 
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The discovery of the Cod field in 1968 gave the Government a further 
stimulant to expand the Petroleum Council and the petroleum 
administration subsequently prepared specified regulations for licencing 
and exploration purposes (Earney, 1982). The licensing14of blocks is an 
important part of the regulation in relation to managing natural resources. 
The regulations described exploration and exploitation rights which 
incorporated block size, duration, production and tax. These rules and 
regulations were combined and applied to 10 licences. 
An interesting fact related to the establishment of tax legislation was 
that the Norwegian Government was determined to set a more attractive tax 
rate for international Oil & Gas companies than its neighbouring countries 
(Al-Kasim, 2006). The taxation and royalties were initially 42% and 10% in 
1965. The rates increased to 76% in 1975 and increased further to 85% in 1985. 
The system gradually moved to one petroleum taxation form consisting of 
corporate income tax, special petroleum tax and royalties. The latter was to 
be phased out in 1986 and 1992 (Lund, 2014). Changes to the tax regime have 
been made for various reasons e.g. special taxation arrangements were made 
between the licensees and the government for sharing technological risks15 
involved in project developments. 
All licenses that were awarded in the first allocation round in 1965 
were of the concession type16. With the introduction of state participation in 
the following licensing rounds, joint venture17 contracts were incorporated 
with subsequent taxation rights and obligations. Several tax revisions have 
been introduced in 1972, 1975, and 198618.  
The main driver for the revisions was the rise and fall in oil prices 
and the consequent changes in risk and exposure. Starting in 1986 there has 
                                                   
14 See appendix for full layout of a license (Statoil) 
15 Water flooding became operative in Ekofisk in 1987 
16 Concessionary agreement is based on the conventional basis of a license whereby the licensee is entitled 
to carry out petroleum operations against the payment of royalty and tax to the resource owner 
17 Joint venture has two types: incorporated (equity) and unincorporated (Al-Kasim, 2006) 
18 For a detailed discussion see (Lund, 2014) 
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been a deliberate move towards a neutral system of state participation and 
taxation. Following the first licensing round in 1965 twenty-three rounds 
have passed, the last round being announced on 13 March 2017. The 
licensing rounds that made significant changes and impacts in relation to 
national regulation and ownership will be discussed in the next section 
(NPD, 2016c). The first licensing round represents an image of the situation 
and paradigm at the time.  
The earlier mentioned median line agreement was signed by Norway 
in March 1965 (with the United Kingdom) and December 1965 (with 
Denmark) and limited allocation of blocks north of the 62-degree parallel. 
Furthermore, International Oil Companies (IOC) had an interest in exploring 
acreage in the southern sector of the North Sea close to the Dutch and United 
Kingdom sector. These two issues19and the lack of experience were 
foundations of the gradual move from south (North Sea) to the Norwegian 
Sea and later on the Barents Sea. This principle remained in place throughout 
the sixties and seventies. The licensees were selected on operational 
experience, financial strength, and to what extent the company would 
contribute to the Norwegian economy through local content and asset 
utilisation e.g. Norwegian vessels and construction companies (Austvik, 
2011).  
Another important factor was that only IOCs were involved. At the 
time, the government was cautious about participating and taking risks in 
oil and gas projects. In 1968 the NPC wrote a letter to the ministry raising the 
question of state participation.  
There were two reasons for participation in future licensing. The first 
reason was the find of the Cod field and the second reason was related to the 
founding and control of OPEC (Ryggvik, 2010). The recommendation to 
participate was carefully pointing out that the state should not take risks 
with its own funds in drilling investments on the shelf. This consequently 
                                                   
19 NPD, (Al-Kasim, 2006) 
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meant that the international oil companies would carry the weight, which in 
the following negotiations revealed resistance from the IOCs. Prior to the 
second allocation round the IOCs were free to draft their own agreements. 
The outcome of the second licensing round was that there would be state 
participation of 17.5% and the government recognised that it should draft 
the agreements from then on (NPD, 2016d). By the time the third license 
round was due, the issue of state participation was solved through the 
establishment of Statoil as the national oil company (NOC) and the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) in 1972. Statoil had a minimum 
share of 50% in all blocks and had the option to further increase20 this to 70%-
80% in case of a commercial find depending on size, while the international 
licensees were carrying large parts of the cost 21 throughout the exploration 
period (Al-Kasim, 2006).  
The reason for an increase of participation was the size of discoveries 
that were made in the first half of the seventies22.The importance of and the 
connection between licensing and revenues was discussed in the 
Governmental Report No.25 of 1974. It discussed the regulation of the pace 
of resource development, the issue being that a rapid surge of development 
and consequently revenues could have a negative impact on Norwegian 
society. Specific targets were set to avoid a level of petroleum resource 
production and sales which could result in what has been called the Dutch 
disease23.  Several production levels were discussed in parliament, whether 
e.g., 90 Mtoe could be argued as a moderate volume to capture unwanted 
excessive economic growth. A general agreement formed that the tempo of 
development should be regulated downwards (NPD, 2016d). Tempo 
                                                   
20 In some licenses, Statoil’s ownership share had been increased according to a “sliding scale” based on 
the amount extracted. (Lund, 2014) 
21 When it concerned a complete Norwegian setting, e.g. Statoil, Norsk Hydro or Saga. Statoil’s role in 
resource development and infrastructure ownership took precedence. 
22 1970 Ekofisk, Eldfisk, The Tor, 1971 Frigg, 1972 Heimdal, 1974 Statfjord 
23 The Dutch disease received its name from the increase in services in the petroleum industry after the 
find of the Groningen field in 1959 at the expense of other industries such as industry and agriculture  
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regulation came first through capping production and later through a cap on 
investment. The years of tempo down regulation had an impact on field 
development and restricted uncontrolled growth until the fifth licensing 
round in 1979 that was more liberal. Specific targets were set by the NPD. 
The most promising blocks were to be allocated to get an indication of the 
resources on the NCS, with “the golden blocks” to be allocated to Norwegian 
companies (NPD, 2016c).  
 The main motive for the tempo regulation change was to reduce 
investment and development. Two years after the fourth round in 1981 the 
fifth licensing round opened up the area above the 62nddegree, the 
Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea (Regjeringen.no, 2011). The strategy was 
and still is to some extent to gradually move north and diversify the 
exploration effort. From 1979 onwards till 1985 rounds 6-10 followed the 
same licensing principles of small blocks well diversified over the three 
regions (NPD, 2016c). Figure 2 displays licenses awarded from 1965 till 
present over the three regions. In years when no allocation took place no data 
is presented. 
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Figure 2 Awarded licenses from 1965 onwards 
Source: NPD (2016c) 
Several changes occurred post 1985. The NPD recognised that the 
quantities of remaining resources had decreased year on year. The findings 
were based on annual growth rate and the sizes varied from small to 
medium (Al-Kasim, 2006).  
Gas recovery, distribution and the demand for gas in Europe was 
slowing down and the oil price was fluctuating and dropping significantly 
from $26 to $9/barrel in the period end of 1985 till mid-1986. This had an 
impact on the eleventh allocation round, in which the cost and taxes were 
reduced significantly (40%-15%) with the intention of accelerating oil 
discoveries. In the short term this resulted in considerable activity in the 
North Sea in 1988, as can be seen in figure 3. Most of these allocations were 
in the vicinity of existing offshore oil and gas platforms (Al-Kasim, 2006). 
The sixteenth round in 2000 increased the allocation in the North Sea and 
Norwegian Sea. In that same year, the NPD introduced a different approach 
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and distinction in licensing (NPD, 2016c). Two types of licensing round with 
equal status were introduced on the NCS: Awards in predefined areas (APA) 
covering mature areas, and Numbered Rounds concentrating on frontier 
areas (NPD, 2016c). Mature areas are characterised by known geology and 
well-developed or planned infrastructure. In addition, they usually offer a 
greater probability of making discoveries than frontier areas, where 
geological knowledge is limited and infrastructure lacking. Frontier areas 
are likelier to yield larger discoveries than mature ones (Norskpetroleum, 
2017c).  
Increased availability of acreage has led to more licence awards 
(Figure 3). In the period from 2000-2017 the government has strengthened 
the predictability of the allocation system by holding APA rounds annually, 
while the numbered rounds generally take place every other year 
(Norskpetroleum, 2017b). Furthermore, the companies know in advance 
which principles govern the kind of acreage and the general work 
commitments for production licences in the APA rounds compared with 
“the numbered ones” (NPD, 2016c).  Another metric that contributes to 
regulations and licensing is the acreage per license. As depicted in Figure 3 
the acreage has dramatically decreased since the first round, while the 
number of block sizes has increased, and more participants were allocated 
and combined per block (NPD, 2016c). An additional indication that can be 
derived from the acreage figure is the sentiment of the licensees in years of 
high oil price and large find potential compared to lack of interest based on 
available acreage not being awarded.  
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Figure 3 Licencing rounds and Acreage 1965-2015.  
Source: NPD(2016c) 
In connection with the 20th licensing round on the Norwegian shelf 
(2008), a new scheme was introduced involving a broad-based public 
consultation regarding proposed blocks. The Minister of Petroleum and 
Energy wanted to promote more transparency so that various stakeholders 
among the general public could voice their opinions before the Ministry 
makes its decisions, as well as to ensure critical examination of both social 
and technical consequences of the proposal (NPD, 2016c). From this period 
onwards, the licensing requirements have stayed the same and in line with 
a recommendation by the NPD, whether awards were in the pre-defined 
APA areas, which included acreage in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and 
the Barents Sea, or in numbered rounds (NPD, 2016a).  
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1.3. FIELDS AND INFRASTRUCTURE EXPANSION 
After the allocation of licenses comes the discoveries and the 
development of fields. The US oil company Phillips Petroleum was first to 
apply for licences on several locations on the NCS (Ryggvik, 2010). Amongst 
the other international companies who applied for a license was Esso, which 
in 1966 towed in The Ocean Traveller from New Orleans, the first semi-
submersible rig to enter the Norwegian Continental Shelf (North Sea). 
Although no resources were found, cores drilled indicated potential. The 
first commercially viable discovery was not until 1969 which went into the 
Norwegian oil and gas history as “The Christmas Present” due to the 
massive discovery that was plugged the day before Christmas eve.24 Phillips 
had discovered Ekofisk25 which contained oil and gas. With the discovery 
came the need for transportation. First oil was produced in 1971 initiating 
Norway’s career as a producer and first gas was piped through the 440 km 
Norpipe to Emden in Germany in 1977 marking the beginning of gas exports 
to Europe. Figure 4 depicts the complete Norwegian offshore gas 
infrastructure in 2016 (Gassco, 2016). 
                                                   
24 1969 – First commercial discovery. 
25For an in-depth account of the discovery of Ekofisk (Norsk Olje og Gass, 2016) provides a historical 
time line. 
 
Norway as a Major Gas Transporter 
 
 17 
  
Figure 4 layout of the NCS  
Source: Norskpetroleum (2016a) 
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Most if not all discoveries consist of several natural resources, e.g. oil, 
gas, NGL and/or condensate. Depending on the recovery strategy and 
resource management perspective, gas is at times used to lift the oil reserves 
out of the reservoir only to recover the gas at a later stage of the field’s life. 
This research will focus on gas finds which are projected to, are being or were 
transported through an offshore gas pipeline system. 
The first field of this kind was the Frigg gas field, discovered in the 
North Sea in 1971 and started producing in 1977 up till 2004. It was the first 
field were a Norwegian company (Norsk Hydro) was represented in the 
ownership through the Petronord Group26. The gas from the field was sent 
through the 351 km Frigg pipeline to St. Fergus in the UK (Ryggvik, 2010).  
The Statfjord field is located on the boundary of the United Kingdom 
and Norway and started producing oil in 1979 and gas in 1985. This field 
required 880 km of pipeline, the Statpipe system, and the Kårstø processing 
plant where rich gas27 transported from the field was separated into 
condensate and dry gas28 which was shipped through Statpipe into Norpipe 
to Germany. Later Kårstø would receive and send gas from several pipelines.  
The Statpipe project represented a major technological breakthrough 
as it led to the first crossing of the Norwegian trench by a pipeline. Ekofisk 
and the Frigg field received significant criticism in Norway, due to the fact 
that neither field landed the gas resources on Norwegian soil first but piped 
them directly to the United Kingdom. The reason for this approach was the 
depth of the Norwegian trench, which prevented an offshore pipeline 
reaching a Norwegian shore-based facility. In the early 70s depths of 300 
                                                   
26 Petronord group consisted of Elf Aquitaine, Total Oil Marine Norsk, and Norsk Hydro and the 
Norwegian State. 
27 Rich gas is any blend of dry gas (methane) and NGL (ethane, butanes, propane and naphtha) (Gassco, 
2016) 
28 Dry gas is natural gas which contains no liquid hydrocarbons under pressure. It consists largely of 
methane, but can also contain ethane (Gassco, 2016) 
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metres onwards were not technically possible for pipe lay operations. Diving 
operations29 to repair possible calamities were even further away from this 
“magical” number. Thus, gas was transported to Britain and Germany 
through the Ekofisk-Emden, Ekofisk-Teesside and Frigg-St Fergus pipeline 
Systems (Dunn, 1975). 
 
 
Figure 5 North Sea Water depths and the Norwegian trench 
Source: Dunn (1975) 
In 1985 the technical obstacles were overcome and both the 308-km 
rich gas pipeline from Statfjord to the Kårstø terminal and the terminal were 
ready to transport and process gas from Gullfacks and Statfjord. The dry gas 
from Statfjord is transported through three pipelines: a 228 km from Kårstø 
to the Draupner riser platform (installed in 1984 as part of the Statpipe 
system) (Norskpetroleum, 2017c) as depicted in Figure 4; a second dry gas 
pipeline installed in 1985 from Draupner to Ekofisk (203 km), and in 1986 a 
                                                   
29 Deepest commercial dive in 1969 was ~185 meters 
Chapter 1 
 
 20 
155km pipeline installed from Heimdal to Draupner S. The Draupner 
platform and the later installed Sleipner platform are hubs where gas is 
distributed and monitored for pressure, quality and volumes (NPD, 2016d).  
The Sleipner field (Ost and Vest) was discovered in 1981 and contains 
gas, condensate and NGL.  With the building of the offshore processing 
facility mentioned a riser facility was installed to connect the 814 km Zeepipe 
I pipeline from the field to Zeebrugge (see figure 4). At the time in 1993 this 
was the longest and largest (40 inch) offshore pipeline in the world. In the 
1990s developments of the infrastructure accelerated. In the same year 1993, 
an agreement was signed between Norway and Germany for the 
construction of Europipe I. It became operational in 1995 connecting the 
Draupner platform to the Dornum terminal in Germany.  
The giant of the North Sea, Troll was discovered in 1979, and started 
producing oil in 1995 and gas in 1996 (Norsk Olje og Gass, 2016). With this 
field on line Norway became a major producer of gas for Europe and has 
played a significant role in the development of the NCS. In order to transport 
and process the gas from Troll, three 36-inch pipelines run from the field to 
Kollsnes where a treatment plant was built. Later the Kvitebjorn and Visund 
gas fields would also transport gas to the plant for processing  
(Norskpetroleum, 2017d). The plant separates NGL, gas and condensate and 
initially transported the gas through the 303 km Zeepipe II-A to the Sleipner 
platform in 1996 (Norskpetroleum, 2017c). 
In that same year, the Haltenpipe was installed from Heidrun to 
Tjeldbergodden opening up the Norwegian Sea for gas to shore. It was 
followed in 1997 by Zeepipe II-B pipeline from Kollsnes to the other hub 
Draupner, now providing gas from Troll to both hubs. A year later, in 1998, 
a pipeline was laid from the Draupner platform to France. The 840 km 
Franpipe transports (figure 4) gas from Sleipner and Troll to Dunkirk taking 
over the title of longest offshore pipeline from Zeepipe I. To meet natural gas 
demand in Germany Europipe II was installed directly from the Kårstø plant 
to Dornum in 1999 (Regjeringen.no, 2013b). 
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Although the Haltenpipe in the Norwegian Sea became operational 
in 1996, it was not until 2000 with the Åsgard Transmission System that gas 
from the Norwegian Sea could be treated at Kårstø and from there 
transported to the Draupner and Sleipner hubs to continue transmission to 
Europe (NPD, 2016). In that same year, 2000, the Oseberg Gas Transport 
system was connected to the Heimdal gas centre from where the gas is 
transported through the Statpipe system. The recovery strategy of the 
Oseberg field required initial gas injection to recover oil before the gas cap 
could be developed. The Heidrun field was also connected to the Oseberg 
system in 2001 (Regjeringen, 2013a).  
The Frigg field was at the end30 of its life cycle when the Frigg 
pipeline built in 1977 was tied in to the Vesterled system in 2001 connecting 
the Heimdal centre to St. Fergus. Through this configuration, Vesterled now 
has the ability to transport gas from Oseberg, Frigg and Heimdal (MPE, 
2013). 
The longest subsea pipeline in the world is the Langeled system 
which became operational in 2006. It is ~1200 km long, 42-inch diameter and 
provided the United Kingdom with approximately 20% of its peak demand 
for natural gas. The system was developed in two Sections (North, South), 
the Southern Section connecting the Sleipner platform to the Easington Gas 
terminal in 2006 (figure 4) and Langeled north installed in 2007 to run gas 
from the treatment facility at Nyhamna to Sleipner (Gassco, 2016).  
Nyhamna gets its gas from the Ormen Lange field in the Norwegian 
Sea. Its significance will later be explained in the management of gas 
resources in relation to treatment on Norwegian soil and delayed 
development of resources in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the 
Barents Sea. Two more pipelines were installed to meet United Kingdom 
natural gas requirements, the Tampen link which connected the Statfjord 
                                                   
30 Shut down in 2004 
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field with the United Kingdom FLAGS system in 2007 and the Gjøa gas 
pipeline tying into the FLAGS in 2010 (Norskpetroleum, 2017c).   
1.4. RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
To further explore the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders 
involved in the offshore transmission system, a concise description is 
presented together with Figure 7. 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) in coordination with 
the Government, sets out policies to maintain a roadmap which delivers the 
natural resources in a timely, efficient manner taking the utmost 
consideration for the environment. The MPE is responsible for the execution 
of the activities as set out by Parliament (Storting) and the Government. The 
MPE established and maintains the framework for all Norwegian petroleum 
activities, including the opening of new areas for petroleum activities and 
major development projects. The Storting supervises the Government and 
the public administration through executive power over petroleum policy 
and is responsible to the Government for this policy. The Government 
applies its policy through the ministries and subordinate directorates and 
agencies, inter Alia the MPE. The MPE fully owns Petoro AS, Gassco AS, and 
partially owns Statoil. Additionally, it allocates and arranges the licensing 
(MPE, 2016). 
The regulations and management of the resources is then monitored 
and implemented through the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), 
which has the main responsibility for resource management. In addition, the 
NPD collects fees from the operators (IOC, NOC), and is responsible for 
geological and geographical data collection, compilation and analysis of the 
natural resource data on the NCS (NPD, 2001). 
The state through its holdings in assets and licenses on the NCS is 
responsible for the State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) and is responsible 
for the highest possible value creation for Norway. Petoro was created for 
this specific task and inter alia, decides in which field developments it will 
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partake in the name of the Norwegian State (Norskpetroleum, 2017e). 
Gassco operates and maintains the transmission system on behalf of the 
pipeline owners, Gassled, ships gas through the system for buyers and 
sellers and charges tariffs payable to Gassled  (Gassco, 2016). 
Gassled is a joint venture of companies owning rich and dry gas 
facilities that are currently in use or are planned to be used by parties’ other 
than the owners. New pipelines and transport- related facilities are also 
intended to be included in Gassled (NPD, 2001). The fourth branch (Figure 
7) under the MPE responsibility is the National Oil Company (NOC) Statoil. 
Statoil is the commercial segment of the “Norwegian model” and is a 67% 
state owned international public traded company. Statoil operates globally 
and executes, inter alia, exploration and production (E&P), research and 
development (R&D), pipelines, and decommissioning activities. In 2015, 
39% of Statoil’s production was from international equity, 61% was from 
domestic equity (Statoil, 2015).  
Figure 7 provides an oversight of the structure of roles and 
responsibilities in 2017 (Norskpetroleum, 2017e). All roles have a part to play 
in the recovery and selling of natural resources. However, this research will 
focus predominantly on the left side of Figure 7 from parliament down to 
Statoil.  
The approach as displayed in Figure 8 on the role and division of 
responsibility31 in recovering natural resources has become a part of “the 
Norwegian Model”. The Norwegian Model has been discussed and to a 
certain extent replicated in other resource rich countries (Al-Kasim, 2006). 
As depicted in the figure there are other participants directly involved in the 
recovery of resources e.g., Gassled and the PSA (how these arrangements 
evolved is discussed later in this section). How these parties interact and 
how the different stakeholders have evolved in particular roles, 
                                                   
31 A detailed explanation of the Roles and Responsibilities see ibid, p.61 
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responsibilities and relationships to each other, will be detailed from a 
historical perspective.  
Ownership and Control 
Economies of scale play a significant part in the functionality of 
transporting natural gas and IOCs have just as much interest in control as 
governments. This appears applicable for producing countries as well as 
transit countries where the transit country is in a position to negotiate 
favourable terms on the delivery of the oil or gas in question. The control of 
pipelines has been equally important for Norway as producer of natural gas. 
Arve Johnsen (Statoil’s first director) became fully aware of this fact during 
a trip to the US in the early sixties32.  
In the mid-sixties, the Norwegian government had relatively little 
say in the negotiations of the first license round e.g. the first two fields, Frigg 
and Ekofisk. The Frigg field33 was on the median line (Norway-United 
Kingdom) and there was no immediate impetus to negotiate terms between 
the United Kingdom and Norway (Ryggvik, 2010), inter alia due to 
uncertainty about the geographical beginning and end of the continental 
shelf. In the development of the Ekofisk field (Norskpetroleum, 2017c) the 
Ekofisk license did not explicitly indicate where the potential pipeline 
should be laid and who should operate it. It was not until renegotiations 
(1973) started with the participation of Statoil, that the ownership structure 
of Ekofisk changed from 10% state participation after 2 years to a 50% 
operatorship of the infrastructure and potential takeover.  (NPD, 2014). The 
thought behind this incentive was the potential significance of the Ekofisk 
infrastructure at a later stage in the development of the North Sea.  
                                                   
32 Johnsen identified the upsides of Rockefeller’s strategy to own rail freight and pipelines to control 
Pennsylvania oil fields (Ryggvik, 2010). 
33 Since the Frigg field stretched into the British sector, it was feared that the British might drain 
Norwegian gas if agreement was not reached on a development strategy which led to Elf as operator in 
1974. 
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When Norpipe was built (Ekofisk field to Emden in Germany) it still 
lacked the requirements set out in “the Ten Commandments” (NPD, 2010a). 
This was partially due to technological constraints in relation to the crossing 
of the Norwegian trench34 to be able to reach Norwegian shores. Thus far 
subsea pipelines were laid in relatively shallow water gradually reaching the 
shore/surface over a natural seabed slope. This would have been an issue 
for Frigg as well however, where swift agreement with the United Kingdom 
was no longer on the table. The pipeline was laid to land on the English coast 
rather than the Norwegian, thus avoiding the crossing of the trench. 
This issue of the crossing of the Norwegian trench resurfaced with 
the development of Statfjord and the then to be laid Statpipe infrastructure. 
Statoil as operator, in conjunction with Mcdermott and Comex-Seaway 
installed the pipeline across the trench to Kårstø, where gas would be 
processed and shipped back across the trench again to be connected to 
Norpipe (Norsk olje museum, 2015),  in which the government, through 
Statoil, now had the majority share as a result of the negotiations of 1973. 
The building of Statpipe was a significant turning point for Statoil.  It had 
implemented the parliamentary resolution by constructing and operating an 
actual pipeline independently of foreign IOCs. None of the many major 
petroleum-related industrial projects along the Norwegian coast, such as 
Kårstø, Kollsnes, Stura, Mongstad, Tjellbergodden, the Snøhvit plant near 
Hammerfest, could have been realised if the Statpipe project had not 
succeeded (Ryggvik, 2010). 
The gas transmission system ownership changed several times. 
Initially the pipelines of the system were owned by “private35 firms” with 
the (oil company) under the supervision? of Statoil-GFU, later Petoro. The 
GFU-SDFI owned 55% of Zeepipe, Europipe I and Norne, 60% of Europipe 
II and Franpipe, 46% of Åsgard, 51% of Oseberg. 65% of Heidrun and 58% 
                                                   
34 As displayed in Figure 5  
35 The Norwegian government owns a share of the system 
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of Draugen. Statoil and Norsk Hydro each held 10-15% ownership shares. 
Norpipe and Statpipe were established before the SDFI arrangement was 
activated (NPD, 2014).    
Owners of the gas transmission system charge users for the transport 
of gas in the form of a tariff. In general, the individual “Norwegian” gas 
transportation companies who owned part of the transmission system, based 
the calculation of the invoices to users of the transmission systems on a cost-
plus principle. Expenditures on infrastructure, operational costs, interest 
payments and profits were important components of this principle (Austvik, 
2016a). Third parties wishing to make use of the pipelines in order to get 
produced resources to market, had to negotiate terms and would pay a 
higher tariff than the owners. 
The change of operator-ownership from GFU-SDFI to Gassco-
Gassled took place in 2003 with Gassco the 100% state-owned operator and 
Gassled as owner36 of pipelines, platforms, onshore process facilities and 
receiving terminals abroad (Gassco, 2016).  
The planning of changes in ownership was not initiated on a 
voluntary basis but as the result of formal anti-trust proceedings based on 
rulings in 2001 by the EU Directorate-General Competition. In the gas sector, 
DG Competition’s antitrust activities focussed on two issues: (1) anti- 
competitive barriers to competition between suppliers and (2) anti-
competitive obstacles for effective and non-discriminatory third-party access 
(Directorate-General Competition unit A-4, 2004).  
The DG Competition was involved in several natural gas 
infrastructure cases e.g., GasNatural-Endesa in Spain and DUC System in 
Denmark. Marathon had two encounters with DG Comp on the NCS when 
it requested access to the pipelines. Marathon had a stake in the Heimdal 
field in Norway which it had explored and from which it produced gas but 
was not able to sell or transport through the Statpipe system at a cost (tariff) 
                                                   
36 A joint venture that owns the majority of the gas infrastructure on the NCS 
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higher than the profit margin. The first case, in the early nineties involved 
three German gas companies, Ruhrgas, BEB37, Thyssengas (today part of 
RWE), the Dutch gas company Gasunie38 and the French company Gaz de 
France (Fernandez, et al., 2004). These companies refused access based on 
the desire to buy Marathon's uncommitted gas directly. After some further 
attempts to obtain access Marathon decided to sell the gas to the European 
gas companies directly rather than transport it through the transmission 
system (Directorate-General Competition unit A-4, 2004).  
Marathon once more requested access to the gas pipelines of the 
European companies. The companies refused again on the ground that the 
contract was not terminated in a valid manner. (Fernandez, et al., 2004). 
Following the second attempt to obtain access to pipelines, Marathon 
eventually lodged a complaint with the European Commission arguing that 
the behaviour of the parties had amounted to a violation of European 
competition law (Directorate-General Competition unit A-4, 2004). Further 
investigations into the Marathon Third party access to gas networks, 
resulted in TPA improvements, but demonstrates the dynamics involved in 
offshore pipelines.  
The GFU case was considered even more high-profile. The GFU, 
consisted of Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS (Statoil, 100% State owned) 
Norsk Hydro AS (100% State owned) and Saga Petroleum AS (50% State 
owned), and negotiated all sales contracts on behalf of Norwegian operators 
with privileges on tariffs, capacity allocation and priority on delivery 
(Austvik, 2011).  
The court argued that all gas sales from Norway were made through 
the GFU resulting in manipulation of trading conditions e.g., price fixing and 
volume control. The European Commission started an investigation in 1996 
and in 2001 initiated formal proceedings, arguing that the GFU scheme was 
                                                   
37 A joint venture between ExxonMobil and Shell 
38 Owned by the Dutch State, ExxonMobil and Shell 
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incompatible with European competition law (EU, 2001). The GFU as well 
as the Norwegian Government claimed that European competition law 
should not be applied, since the GFU scheme had been discontinued for sales 
to the European Economic Area (EEA) as of June 2001 following the issuing 
of a Royal decree by the Norwegian Government (Austvik, 2011).  
It was also argued that European competition law could not be 
applied, since the Norwegian gas producers had been compelled by the 
Norwegian Government to sell gas through the GFU system established by 
the Norwegian Government itself. Whilst maintaining Norway’s legal 
position, GFU and the EC investigated common ground for a settlement 
(Directorate-General Competition, 2002). A division was made between  
(1) the permanent members of the GFU,  
(2) six groups of companies actually selling Norwegian gas through 
contracts negotiated by the GFU, 
(3) all other Norwegian gas producers.  
All companies, except those listed under (3), submitted commitments 
to the Commission to settle the GFU case (EU, 2001). Based on these 
commitments, the Commission decided to close the case. (Directorate-
General Competition, 2002). The settlement resulted in the closure of sales 
and marketing of gas through one agent (Statoil, Norsk Hydro) unless it was 
compliant with Europe law. The other result was the abolition of reserving 
volumes for customers and preferential allocation.  
With the departure of the GFU came Gassco. Gassco is a neutral and 
independent operator of the gas transmission system and has both special 
and normal operatorship. The special operatorship is regulated through the 
Petroleum Act and Regulations, and includes tasks such as developing new 
infrastructure, managing the gas transmission system's capacity and 
coordinating and managing the gas streams through the pipeline network 
and to the markets (Gassco, 2016). In addition, it sets tariffs, regulates 
capacity, manages resources, plans network expansion and potential 
investments required in association with expansion.  
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The transformation of independent offshore pipeline owners to a 
uniform single Gassco-Gassled transmission system was requested by the 
Storting in 2001. The MPE invited ConocoPhillips, Norsk AGIP, ExxonMobil, 
Dong, Norsk Hydro, Total, Shell and Statoil to participate and negotiated the 
consolidation of Gassled, representing nine of their pipelines into a single 
partnership (Austvik, 2003b). Each of these pipeline owners charged 
different tariffs39. Additionally, the assets had different values resulting in 
significantly different amortisation values.  
The partnership agreement establishing Gassled was signed on 20 
December 2002 and came into effect on 1 January 2003. Gassled’s licence runs 
to 2028 (Regjeringen, 2004). The Norwegian government’s intentions to 
maintain control over its resources and sales came in the form of Petoro, in 
the form of 1) state participation in projects and 2) managing the SDFI 
(Statoil’s share, ex-post privatisation) in the assets, resources and licenses 
Petoro secured itself a position in the Norwegian natural gas value chain. 
  
Figure 6 Gassled ownership ex-ante and ex-post 2010 
Source: Adapted from Gassco (2016) 
                                                   
39 Tariffs will be further explained in Chapter 3 
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In 2010, the benefits of Gassled ownership for the gas shippers were 
abolished. Until then, the owners had preferential access rights in the 
primary market. One year prior to the benefit reductions, Statoil, 
ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Eni sold a significant number of shares in 
Gassled as displayed in Figure 6. This opened up possibilities for external 
investors aiming to get a fixed long-term 7% return (Njord Gas Infrastructure 
AS, 2015). The 2013 reduction of tariffs (ex-post selling of stakes in Gassled) 
without the accustomed discussion between owner and government was ill 
received by a significant part of the Gassled owners. This was an example of 
national regulations influencing ownership (GFU-Gassco-Gassled) and 
financial returns (tariff reduction) in the natural gas value chain, driven by 
national policies, whilst the unbundling of the GFU was of supra-national 
origin. 
The supra-national European40 Gas Directives and Gas Target Model 
(GTM) have several goals; security of supply, accessibility, sustainability and 
competition. With the introduction of the Gas Directives and the GTM 
competition has been introduced into Norwegian gas infrastructure. 
Competition is supposed to shorten contract duration, ultimately resulting 
in a supply of gas at its lowest possible price. A downside of this incentive is   
the potential for a larger number of competitors to lead to lower prices and 
a reduction of incentives to invest. The gas directives have gone through 
several changes and have increased unbundling, access and coordination. 
However, some differences between the directives and Norway are still 
apparent from a Norwegian context, e.g., the distinction between the gas 
directives written for shore-based infrastructure/transmission systems and 
third-party access whilst Norway has an offshore subsea transmission 
system. 
Modifying an offshore transmission system is demanding and costly 
thus investments need solid justification. Decisions on where to build new 
                                                   
40 The supra-national regulations will be further discussed in Chapter 3 
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pipelines, compressors, or platforms, in what sequence, and when to phase 
out fields near depletion, influence the ability to exploit the transmission 
system’s capacities. Due to different compositions in the various fields, 
network modifications have substantial impacts on the TSO’s ability to 
maintain the required quality specifications (Gassco, 2005). Factors such as 
growing gas demand based on economic growth of the European market 
(customers) and decline of natural resources of indigenous European 
countries with different types of gas, influence investment for expansion of 
the infrastructure. Gas demand uncertainty as seen from 2011-2017, an 
oversupply of LNG and the Paris Agreement COP21 have had additional 
influences on the directives (IEA, 2017; ACER, 2015). 
Following the COP 21 agreement, the European Commission 
presented legislative measures and framework, founded on three 
overarching goals:  
• Energy efficiency   
• Europe as the global leader in renewables  
• A fair deal to consumers  
Natural gas could play a part in the transition to a “clean sustainable 
energy infrastructure” from e.g. coal and lignite to renewable energy 
sources41 in addition to compensating for the currently still intermittent 
nature of these renewable resources (COP21, 2015).  
A primary objective of the Norwegian MPE in order to meet both 
resource development and COP21 agreements, is to ensure high value 
creation through efficient and environment-friendly management of 
Norway’s energy resources. This can be seen from a social public good 
perspective where the “pension fund” and e.g. the development of the 
                                                   
41 The discussion of renewables being capable of supplying 100% of customer needs is an important topic 
however outside the scope of this research. Key points will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Northern Norwegian region to support Barents Sea development play a part. 
In addition, MPE aims to ensure efficient market outcomes by supplying 
natural gas to its customers at a “reasonable return”.  
This is a balance between economics and security of demand. 
Investment in the Norwegian offshore gas transmission system is capital 
intensive, project specific and has long payback periods. In the 2017 market 
with natural gas prices between $4-$6/MMbtu, the industry as a whole is 
marked by cost containment. Norway has historically been the leader in high 
cost operations, which presents this specific segment of the gas value chain 
with significant investment risk. If gas prices of $4/MMbtu are prolonged, 
new transmission system investments may be delayed or terminated.  
The set-up of the Norwegian gas infrastructure is interdependent e.g. 
gas from potential new tie-ins in the Polarled (Norwegian Sea) or higher up 
north (Barents Sea) will travel through the southern part (North Sea) of the 
offshore pipeline system to its end customers. Investment decisions in the 
Norwegian transmission system may have significant implications from an 
internal-national perspective as well as external-international (non-
Norwegian) perspective in relation to Norway’s GDP and end-
users/customers. 
 From an internal perspective investment, in e.g. The Norwegian Sea 
and Barents Sea region comes with social economic growth in the northern 
provinces and potential ripple effects42 which require logistic support, 
infrastructure and personnel to support construction and operation. To 
which extent the 201443 alterations of Norwegian tax composition provide a 
                                                   
42For an in-depth review of the Ripple effect in the Norwegian Sea, Aasta Hansteen and Polarled (Jenssen, 
et al., 2015) 
43 Ordinary business tax was reduced from 28% to 27%, special tax is increased from 50% to 51%marginal 
is constant at 78%. 
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competitive investment climate or result in the lowest possible cost factor for 
an offshore transmission system remains to be seen.  
From an external perspective, additional investments secure future 
supply and promote competition. The liberalisation process of the gas 
directives redirected the security of supply responsibilities to the market 
participants, and could potentially result in more competition, with 
incentives for lower prices, reducing cost. Alternatively, there are suspicions 
of reduced investments, excessive production levels, low quality and supply 
shortages (Spanjer, 2008). 
Regulations stimulating security of supply, competition and 
sustainability might not contribute to optimal efficiency and reduce 
incentives for investment in the offshore infrastructure. Which key drivers 
influence the option to expand the infrastructure and how are these drivers 
influenced by regulatory restrictions? Historical data appears to indicate that 
investments were highest in the GFU44 period. To which extent this was over-
investment or over-dimensioned or efficient requires further investigation 
and explanation.  
The emphasis of this research is on the Norwegian offshore 
transmission system, future investments and how these are affected by 
regulations, operators and owners. The different stakeholders, e.g. owners, 
(national and supra-national) regulators, operator, government have 
different interpretations, objectives and incentives when confronted with 
investment choices and regulations.  
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND 
DISPOSITION 
Based on the introduction and influences in relation to providing gas 
as a resource to Europe from Norway, the main question is “Can Norway 
maintain economically viable, operationally and technically efficient natural 
                                                   
44 Norwegian Gas Negotiation Comity, further explained in Chapter 4 
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gas transportation to Europe45 under the European regulatory framework46 
and Norwegian regulatory regime(s)?” 
This research question could be unfolded further by stating two sub-
questions: 
1. Do the European regulatory framework and hub prices provide 
sufficient incentives for new investments in Norway’s offshore 
pipeline export infrastructure? 
2. Do Norway’s national policies and regulations support investment 
in offshore gas infrastructure?  
To answer these questions, the following judgements need to be 
made: 
A. Which specific Norwegian offshore pipeline cost characteristics and 
regulations are most important for Barents Sea decision makers? 
B. Which specific European Union regulations will be most important 
for Barents Sea decision makers? 
Research Methodology 
In order to answer the research question, sub-questions and come to 
judgements on A and B, the research draws on a dual discipline 
investigation. (1) A descriptive study portraying an accurate profile of events 
and situations. (2) An explanatory study, establishing relationships between 
neo-classical economic theory and Transaction Cost Economics, Principal-
Agent Theory and Financial Analysis.   
The research investigates potential investment in subsea 
infrastructure expansion and identifies economic and political 
                                                   
45 Unless indicated specifically Europe, European Union and EU are the same region. E.g., Norway, 
although part of the European continent will be seen as part of the European Economic Area (EEA). 
46 The European Union regime being the Gas Target Model, three gas directives and four network codes. 
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argumentation within decision making about the Norwegian offshore gas 
infrastructure. In order to achieve the objectives of this research, the 
economic theories have been applied and adapted to a conceptual 
framework aiming to differentiate the various drivers and barriers which 
accompany investment decisions in the gas transmission system. A case 
study analysis will be applied to discover factors influencing investment 
choices. The theoretical underpinning will be further detailed here in 
Chapter 2. 
There is a notable amount of literature available on the regulation of 
natural monopolies, but where a narrower focus on infrastructures and 
regulations is present47 they provide limited indications on efficient 
investments in offshore natural gas transmission systems to provide security 
of supply and demand (Hirschhausen, 2008). The subject of this thesis is 
quite unusual in relation to general utility monopoly literature which 
usually discusses situations where an onshore vertically integrated 
monopoly, gas or power, is the incumbent controlling the assets and sales to 
customers. A situation where a country has a set of offshore gas pipelines 
without onshore pipelines or deliveries to end users in its own market is 
unusual, and quite likely unique in the world (Stern, 2017c). The motivation 
for regulatory decision-making as publicised in practice and displayed in the 
various databases e.g. European Union, NPD, MPE is approached from a 
practical rather than an in depth juridical perspective.  
Research Outline 
This research is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the 
relevant theoretical background for the research and explains the reasoning 
behind the approach. 
                                                   
47 (Joskow, 2006)(De Joode 2012)  
Chapter 1 
 
 36 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Research Outline 
Chapter 3 explores the supra-national regulations and the 
implications for Norway as a gas producing and exporting country before 
with specific focus on offshore gas transmission systems. Chapter 4 
continues this discussion from a national perspective and explores the 
implications to natural gas infrastructures from a Norwegian standpoint. 
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Chapter 5 continues the research and explains Norway’s position in the 
global natural gas market and the influences the market has on Norwegian 
gas transport on its subsea transport system. Chapter 6 and 7 provide case 
studies on the Norwegian and Barents Sea Gas Infrastructures and apply 
theory to empirical examples. Chapter 8 concludes and addresses theory, the 
research question and sub-questions, case studies and further research. 
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2. Theoretical Perspective 
 
 
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
A substantial amount of literature relates to capturing monopolistic 
behaviour and has a focus on the European gas directives and onshore gas 
pipelines. The latter have end-users that are affected by monopolistic 
behaviour and its influence on the commodity directly. However, the 
research has not been able to identify a theory specifically applied to the 
regulation of offshore gas pipelines. In addition, limited literature is 
available related to offshore gas transmission systems. 
Norway has a subsea offshore network and serves shippers who buy 
capacity in this transmission system, selling it further downstream to 
onshore facilities and end-users. This might imply that theories applied to 
onshore facilities are less relevant to the Norwegian transmission system. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to support the discussion on theory and 
literature applicable and available on Norwegian offshore gas pipelines. 
The European natural gas market has been based on neo-classical 
theoretical assumptions, however, the natural gas market and infrastructure 
fail48 due to subadditivity, lack of investments, cross-subsidisation, price 
discrimination and externalities. For this reason, the gas directives (and 
other regulations) play their regulating part.   
This chapter departs from economic assumptions that there 
could/should be a perfect market with perfect competition. In order to 
                                                   
48 Market failure is where scarce resources are not put to their highest valued uses. (Hertog, 2010) 
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answer research sub-questions and judgements, the theoretical foundations 
of the regulations are discussed and reviewed. Historical examples are 
provided, highlighting inefficiencies and providing a foundation for the 
debate of mitigating options.  
Chapter 2 continues with an explanation of the theoretical 
foundation. As indicated by (Stern, 2002; Stern, 2017c) due to the absence of 
generic theoretical foundations for energy security studies in offshore 
transmission systems, the basis for this research will be founded on concepts 
of neoclassic economic theories and Transaction Cost Economics as 
discussed by (Williamson, 1998; Joskow, 2002b; Joskow, 2006).  
Section 2.1 provides insight and discusses the implications of the 
neoclassical economy approach which served as the foundation for the 
regulation of transmission systems with monopoly characteristics. In 
particular the interaction of monopoly rent, market power and competition. 
Section 2.2 elaborates on the identified market failures and countermeasures 
e.g., Rate of Return Regulation, price and or production cap regulations and 
explores the validity and appropriateness of neo-classical economic theories 
based on work from (Joskow & Tirole, 2002a; Joskow, 2007; Joskow, 2009; 
Joskow, 2013). Section 2.3 provides an alternative approach to the neo-
classical theory in the form of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), which is a 
theory concerned with understanding how variations in certain basic 
characteristics of transactions lead to the diverse organisational 
arrangements that govern trade in a market economy (Joskow & Tirole, 
2003). The Section portraits the various approaches that have been applied 
to natural gas monopolies in the past and the particular shortcomings, 
through TCE, as discussed in work from (Williamson, 1998) (Joskow, 1987)49, 
(Spanjer, 2009), (Glachant, 2011), and (Haase, 2008) further supplementing 
                                                   
49 (Joskow, 1987) demonstrates a positive relation between contract duration and investment size in the 
coal industry. (Neumann & Hirschhausen, 2004) confirm a similar result in European natural gas 
contracts.  
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the rich discussion on the TCE foundation50. Section 2.4 elaborates on the 
Principal-Agent Theory and how this is seen in the case of the Norwegian 
offshore gas infrastructure and regulatory policies. Discrepancies exist 
between Gassco as an agent of the government, and Gassco serving the 
owners of the infrastructure Gassled. The European Union regulations and 
resultant directives are based on the believe that the market will become a 
perfect market with perfect competition in a neo-classical economic sense, 
either through competition or regulatory intervention. Section 2.5 concludes. 
Review of Economic Theories on Regulation 
Several theories have been advanced to explain the observed pattern 
of a government’s regulation of the economy. These include the "public 
interest" theory and versions of the "interest group", proposed either by 
political scientists, economists, or "capture" theory (Posner, 1974). This 
research will divide the theories into two bodies of Economic Regulation 
Theory. The first is “Public Interest Theory”, in which information regarding 
e.g., cost, supply, demand, and quality is abundant and implementing 
authorities and regulators support public interests. Market failures and 
efficient government intervention are key to Public Interest Theory, 
regulation is expected to increase social welfare. However, curing market 
failure by regulatory intervention generates costs as well as benefits (Joskow 
& Noll, 1981). 
The second body of theory assumes deficient information about the 
factors mentioned above. As a consequence, the regulators have limited 
powers to impose public interest. This body of theory is frequently called 
Private Interest Theory” of regulation (Hertog, 2010). The exchange of 
information and cost have an influence on other “agents” involved in the 
market. It is assumed that the economic agents may pursue other interests 
and objectives than the public interest. Private Interest Theory explains 
                                                   
50  (Williamson, 1988)  
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regulation from interest group behaviour. Interest groups in this context 
could be e.g., consumers, operators, producers. Transfers of wealth to the 
more effective interest groups could potentially reduce social welfare 
(Hertog, 2010). 
Within both bodies of theory, several strains of regulation are 
discussed, e.g., social, conduct, structural and economic regulation. 
Economic regulation is mainly focussed on imperfect markets and 
monopolies. Because this research involves both imperfection and monopoly 
it is economic regulation that will be discussed. Within economic regulation 
literature a distinction is made between normative economic regulation, 
which investigates efficiency and effectiveness of regulations. There is also 
positive economic theory of regulation, which provides effect analysis and 
explanation (Joskow, 2009). Another description suggests that positive 
theories of regulation examine why regulation occurs. These theories of 
regulation include theories of market power, interest group theories that 
describe stakeholders’ interests in regulation, and of governmental 
opportunism based on Principal-Agent theory. 
General assumptions within these theories include that regulation 
occurs because the government is interested in overcoming information 
asymmetries with the operator and in aligning the operator’s interest with 
the government’s interest, Customers desire protection from market power 
when competition is non-existent (Body of Knowledge on Regulation, n.d.). 
Normative theories of regulation suggest regulators should encourage 
competition where feasible, minimize the costs of information asymmetries 
by obtaining information and providing operators with incentives to 
improve their performance (Body of Knowledge on Regulation, n.d.).  
Regulations have aimed to remove or reduce “monopoly power” 
with perfect competition as a goal whilst considering technological barriers 
and the high investment cost of creating offshore natural gas pipelines. 
Several options have been put into practice in the natural gas industry and 
will be discussed in this section, with theoretical underpinning.   
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It could be argued that the regulation of a monopoly, e.g., a subsea 
gas infrastructure, to achieve perfect competition should provide, as a 
minimum, a return to cover the cost to sustain the voluntary supply of 
service and resource. In addition, it should provide an incentive to invest in 
the infrastructure. Whether a market is regulated, deregulated, or hybrid, a 
price mechanism must be in place to provide incentives for the (de- or semi-
) regulated transmission system owner to provide goods or services against 
reasonable returns (Joskow, 2007).  
The making of a monopoly    
The high cost associated with investments in transmission systems 
results in subadditivity and plays a dominant role in defining a natural 
monopoly. The concept of subadditivity is a precise mathematical 
representation of the natural monopoly concept (Baumol, 1977) and is 
realised if no combination of multiple firms can collectively produce 
industry output at lower cost than a monopolist (Berg & Tschirhart., 1988). 
To balance the argument, it could be proffered that the Gassled transmission 
system possesses the characteristics of subadditivity, considering the cost 
factor of replacing the transmission system. In addition, there is a lack of 
another combination of firms willing to invest in a potential alternative 
system. Thus, the transmission system should be regarded as a natural 
monopoly.  
Often, monopolies exist because governments create market power. 
Governments might, as in the case of Norwegian gas, offer the market 
powerful incentives for investments that might otherwise not occur. The 
profit from such investments may well outweigh the deadweight losses51 
from underproduction that arises due to the granted market power. As an 
example, the social welfare of developing a remote northern region in 
Norway might well outweigh deadweight loss for a set period. Another 
                                                   
51 Total (consumer plus Producer) surplus. For a detailed explanation on deadweight loss see Appendix 
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example is when the Norwegian Government did not allow such market 
power in the case of Philips52. In 1962 the oil company had the intention to 
obtain a license for a significant section of the Norwegian shelf bestowing 
“concentrated benefits” (Austvik, 2010c). Although the company did not 
receive the license for the complete Norwegian Shelf, it did manage to obtain 
a license and constructed the first international gas pipeline. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, natural gas was not the preferred 
commodity to begin with, oil was. This changed in 1973 when Philips 
constructed Norpipe, transporting natural gas from the Ekofisk field to 
Emden. The selling price of gas53 through this pipeline was indexed to the 
heating oil price for a 30-year period (Norsk Oljemuseum, 2017) and was 
contracted under “Take or pay” principles. Furthermore, due to the size of 
the fields the sales were based on complete depletion of the field in question.  
To capitalise on potential natural resources the Norwegian 
government increased its participation in exploration and production, 
creating incentives that outweighed loss of market power. The further 
development of the Norwegian Continental Shelf resulted in the 
transmission system becoming a natural monopoly. This deserves further 
explanation about how, through increase in discoveries, production, 
economies of scale and high oil prices, gas sales increased. Although the 
definition of a natural gas monopoly could be applied to a multiple-product 
natural monopoly, e.g. dry gas, liquids, refining, in this particular case54 this 
Chapter will address the transmission system as one system and natural gas 
as one commodity.  
                                                   
52 See section 1.5 above 
53 For detailed explanation of gas sales on the NCS, Chapter 4. 
54For this purpose, multiproduct firms are firms that have technologies that make it more economical to 
produce two or more products within the same firm than in two or more firms. Production technologies 
with this attribute are characterized by economies of scope. 
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That a pipeline system can function as a monopoly was recognized 
in 1907 when the US Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which 
regulated pipelines and rail roads, stated: 
At the basis of the monopoly of the Standard Oil 
Company in the production and distribution of petroleum 
products rests the pipe line. The possession of these 
pipelines enables “the Standard” to absolutely control the 
price which its competitor in each given locality shall pay. 
(Boyce, 2014, p. 443) 
The same condition was recognised by the Norwegian authorities in 
1973 when Phillips applied for permission to build Norpipe. The 
government realised that a transmission system with the capacity to 
transport third parties’ gas could provide the owner of the pipeline system 
a monopoly position, allowing it to demand high tariffs from shippers of gas 
lacking access to alternative transmission solutions (Regjeringen, 2017c).  
Several economic principles have been applied to monopolies, aimed 
at improving social welfare by controlling the monopolist charging 
monopoly rent. Considering the unique nature of the infrastructures it is 
plausible for several reasons that pipeline monopolies should be regulated 
in a unique manner. As De Joode pointed out, transmission systems have 
different physical and economic characteristics, thus regulators may make 
different trade-offs, for instance between the objective of economic efficiency 
and achieving an affordable gas price (De Joode, 2012).  
There is a substantial base of theory and practice available to address 
the negative effects of a monopoly, less used principles are e.g., outsourcing 
as an alternative to privatisation. A government has the option to create a 
competitive playing field through auction or tendering for the right to 
operate the monopoly in question for a predetermined time period (Laffont 
& Tiróle, 1993). This incentivises interested parties to bid on a contract whilst 
the aim of the regulator/state would be to reduce monopoly rent to zero. 
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Another form identified was “User management” in which managers of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have profit incentives. Chongwoo 
investigates optimal managerial decisions under the enterprise reform in 
China and poor performance relative to enterprises with other ownership 
forms (Chongwoo, 2000). Although these methods have a place in the body 
of economic theory on monopolies, for the purpose of this research four main 
principles to be used in addressing a monopoly will now be discussed in 
historical order. 
Nationalisation 
Possibly the most radical approach is to nationalise a monopoly. The 
regulator and/or government set a level of production at a socially 
acceptable price. In this way, the profit incentive can be removed, and the 
monopolist must adjust production levels to the level where the marginal 
willingness to pay equals the marginal cost (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2012). 
Commercial insufficiency as a result of average cost exceeding the price of 
the good or service under government ownership is directly or indirectly 
distributed over the taxpayers.  
State ownership was frequently used in the past (1950s to 1980s) by 
utilities in continental Europe. Instead of having a privately-owned 
monopoly with profit-seeking shareholders one could institute a publicly 
owned enterprise with less concern about profits. In addition, governments 
tend to have a longer payback period for financial returns, suggesting 
adverse selection and diminished effectiveness. This poses the question what 
objective replaces the profit incentive? Imposition of vague incentives often 
results in diminished accountability which imposes the risk of inefficient 
results (Depoorter, 1999). Privatisation and competition are trends that 
appeared to occur more from 1990 onwards. A distinction can be made 
between Europe, where natural oil and gas monopolies have predominantly 
been organised in public enterprises, and the USA where monopolies were 
regulated by authorities. When the change to privatising the public gas 
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companies came in Europe, politicians and regulators argued that a form of 
regulation was needed to control the monopolist, until effective competition 
was established. The US method of “fair rate of return regulation” of the 
monopoly firms was introduced (Hertog, 2010). A distinction is made 
between regulation of assets (i.e. pipelines) and regulation of commodity 
prices to different classes of customers. This research investigates pipeline 
regulation, given that offshore pipelines are the subject of the thesis. 
Rate of return regulation 
Rate of return was historically the first attempt to capture monopoly 
power and pricing. It was first introduced during the US civil war when a 
growing stream of farmers felt they were suffering unfairly (Sherman, 1989). 
The first case on which the Rate of Return principles were applied in the gas 
sector was the Hope Natural Gas Company (later to become Standard Oil) 
in 1944. The supreme court in the USA decided that: 
The fixing of prices, like other applications of the 
police power, may reduce the value of the property which is 
being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does 
not mean that the regulation is invalid. The heart of the 
matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair 
value' when the value of the going enterprise depends on 
earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated.  (Brown, 
1944, p. 399) 
Regulation of a monopoly through a return on capital (6.5% in the 
case of The Hope Gas Company) has been used in utilities such as water, 
telephone and railroads in the USA. The principle of rate of return regulation 
is less used now and was partially replaced by cap regulation,55 starting in 
the United Kingdom in the 1980s. One of the downsides of this mechanism 
                                                   
55 See Cap regulation  
Theoretical Perspective 
 
 47 
was that the monopolist under such a regime had little reason to make an 
effort to reduce cost. Rather, there was an incentive for the monopolist to 
increase production capital to a higher level than the socially optimal, in 
order to obtain a higher regulated income. Averch & Johnson56 provided 
arguments why a company with regulated returns could choose to 
accumulate too much capital relative to other inputs (Averch & Johnson, 
1962). Rate of Return Regulation Basic Formula combines a company’s costs 
and allowed rate of return to develop a revenue requirement. This revenue 
requirement then becomes the target revenue for setting prices. Introducing 
return regulation might therefore result in a higher level of capital in the 
company than would otherwise be the case. Return regulated monopolies 
were shown to prefer high capital levels to receive higher profits. A 
monopoly could set relatively low prices in situations of high demand to 
justify major capital investments. Alternatively, the monopoly would set 
monopoly prices for earning profits on low demand. As a result, price 
disruption would occur in constrained and open market situations. Other 
issues that were identified were over-estimation of asset value and slower 
amortization of capital than real values of asset and replacement cost. 
Despite its shortcomings and critical reviews in the economic literature e.g. 
(Averch & Johnson, 1962) rate-of-return regulation functioned until the mid-
1980s.  
Norwegian variant on Rate of Return Regulation     
The Norwegian government makes use of Rate of Return regulatory 
principles, albeit with different constituents compared to the “traditional” 
Rate of Return regulation. Through a framework of laws, regulations and 
licensing systems the state, as owner of all the natural resources, governs oil 
and gas activities on the NCS. A concise description will be presented to 
relate the regulatory principles to the topic of the research “Norway’s 
                                                   
56 For further details on the mathematical underpinning see appendix. 
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offshore gas pipeline system”. The origins, establishment and implications 
of laws and regulations will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
As an owner of natural resources Norway’s main interest is to 
explore and produce gas from the fields. The transmission system is seen as 
a means to support this objective as discussed in e.g., Report to the Storting 
No 28 (2010–2011). To support this objective, the returns from the gas 
transport infrastructure are regulated by the government, thus ensuring 
earnings are extracted from the fields and not in the transmission system 
(Regjeringen, 2017c). This return is set at approximately 7% before tax on the 
total capital and provides the transmission system owner(s) with a 
reasonable return, locking in any potential for monopoly rent. The basis for 
calculating the rate of return (total capital) is the historical investment in the 
physical gas infrastructure (Regjeringen, 2017c). 
Cap regulation 
Until 1986 the state-owned British Gas held the monopoly for the sale 
and distribution of natural gas to end-users, controlling the complete value 
chain. There was no gas-to-power market until the 1980s (Webber, 2009). 
With Prime Minister Thatcher coming into power, one of the first measures 
put into place to counter British Gas’s power was the Gas Act of 1986 
resulting in the privatisation of British Gas. Littlechild’s principles, which 
provided the cap regulation for the telecom sector were transferred to the 
natural gas industry in 1986. It was also known as RPI-X regulation, the idea 
being that the monopolist was allowed the rate of inflation minus an 
efficiency factor the incentive being that if the monopolist could find greater 
efficiencies then it could increase its profit margin (Littlechild, 1983). 
This was fundamentally different to the US system which, before 
deregulation, was cost-plus for wellhead prices, and rate of return for assets  
(Stern, 2017c). Public Utility Company prices e.g. in the US made use of a 
system that sets a pricing cap on a product or service with periodic 
calibration of the cap to reflect changes in cost of product or service (Joskow, 
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2007). A similar approach is a cap on revenue. The advantage of this model 
is that it creates an incentive for the monopoly to reduce cost, which would 
otherwise offset against revenue, thus leaving more profit (Hirschhausen, 
2008; Bhattacharyya, 2011). Drawbacks of these incentives are that the 
government, or regulator, needs to be aware of potential cost increases or 
decreases, and there is a potential for the monopoly to charge premium 
prices with excess profits in low cost periods. This emphasises the need for 
adequate information streams. Furthermore, revenue capping does not 
address the monopoly problem of charging monopoly rent. For instance, a 
monopoly under revenue cap regulation has an incentive to reduce 
production levels and thus raise prices above monopoly levels. Dalen et al. 
suggest that price cap regulation, provides a punishment system if prices 
increase above an accepted level (Dalen, et al., 1998). It has been argued that 
the regulator and its regime in implementing price cap mechanisms could 
be seen as a function of acceptable rates of return and sets a cap accordingly.  
An example is a sliding scale in combination with capped prices. In 
the United Kingdom price cap regulation had immediate benefits in the ex-
post privatisation era as a relatively simple system which could be swiftly 
implemented by a small regulatory authority. However, as the regime 
evolved and particularly as price cap regulation was extended to 
transportation charges, it became increasingly complicated and for instance, 
started to incorporate a rate of return (Stern, 1997).  
Both regulations have commonalities with return regulation and 
leave room for economic inefficiencies. It could be argued that price cap 
regulation is better suited for cost efficiency solutions of a transmission 
system owner. However, if investment incentives are a condition, price 
regulation might not be the preferred incentive, on the grounds that 
investments are more commonly thought to be motivated by profits rather 
than by prices (Hertog, 2010). 
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2.2. FACTORS ON MARKET FAILURE 
Section 2.1 set out several methods to limit monopoly power through 
regulation incentives. That an economic regulatory theory approach does 
not always or continuously meet the intended requirements is explained in 
this Section. From a theoretical perspective, the European directives aim for 
a perfect competitive market with economic efficiency. Whilst exploring the 
competitive capacity of the Norwegian infrastructure several definitions 
require explanation in the context of the research.  
Perfect market, perfect competition and subsequent economic 
efficiency will be briefly described. A perfect competitive market57 is the 
theoretical optimum in which the market achieves economic efficiency58 
(assuming no externalities59). This does not imply that an infrastructure 
monopoly cannot be competitive, however for the purpose of this section the 
monopoly competition’s price is assumed to exceed marginal cost, indicating 
inefficiency and creating deadweight loss60. As a result, the value to 
consumers of additional units of output exceeds the cost of producing those 
units. This consumer and or producer surplus can be used to demonstrate 
the efficiency of a competitive market and the implemented directives. 
Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2012) suggest that perfect markets fail for four reasons, 
market power61, incomplete information, public goods and externalities. To 
highlight the issues that are applicable to the gas infrastructure, this will be 
further explained. 
                                                   
57 A perfect market should meet the following characteristics: 1) Fragmented: Many small firms, none of 
which have market power, 2) Undifferentiated Products: Products that consumers perceive as being 
identical. 3) Perfect Pricing Information: Consumers have full awareness of the prices charged by all 
sellers in the market. 4) Equal Resource Access: All firms have equal access to production technology and 
inputs. (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2012). 
58 Maximisation of aggregate consumer and producer surplus. (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2012) 
59 Situation in which each individual’s demand depends on the purchases of other individuals. 
60 Total (consumer plus Producer) surplus. 
61 Market power according to the OECD refers to the ability of a firm (or group of firms) to raise and 
maintain price above the level that would prevail under competition and is referred to as market or 
monopoly power. The exercise of market power leads to reduced output and loss of economic welfare. 
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The argument for regulatory intervention, as discussed in this 
research, is to move to a perfect competitive market through controlling 
monopoly power which would be applied by the monopolist on the market. 
Authors in favour of monopoly rent seeking argue that a monopoly 
might well be minimising cost, allocate all resources available and optimise 
efficiencies. Empirical data suggest that the amount to be gained by 
increasing X-efficiency62 is significant, as is further described by (Leibenstein, 
1966; Depoorter, 1999). If a firm fails to anticipate or match the cost 
reductions of its competitors, it might suddenly find itself in a market 
dominated by its competitors. 
Incomplete Markets 
Another possibility contrasting a market dominated by competitors 
with a complete market with a perfect pricing mechanism, is an incomplete 
or missing market in which the market, despite willingness of clients to pay 
e.g., premium price, does not facilitate the availability of the good or service. 
An example is a spot market function or hub for Eastern Europe with perfect 
communication and transactions. Whilst North-Western Europe has 
established a significant presence with e.g., NBP, TTF, the interaction 
between East and West Europe is to an extent missing and incomplete.  
Incomplete Information 
The first factor that can influence market failure is the earlier 
mentioned incomplete information, otherwise defined as symmetric 
information.  
The essence of asymmetric information is the benefit that it might 
give to a producer or owner. E.g., a pipeline operator might have better 
insight into the cost function than the owner or regulator and thus benefit 
from this advantage in information. Game theory has produced rich 
                                                   
62 ‘X-efficiency’ indicates the internal wastes that occur when a firm acquires monopoly power and is no 
longer pressured by strong competitors to keep its costs at the competitive minimum. (Depoorter, 1999)  
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documentation regarding strategies with incomplete/asymmetric 
information. To establish an optimal cost-strategy can be rather complex 
with symmetrical information, resulting in optimal cost-price equilibrium 
and competitive positions in the international market. Determining the same 
task with asymmetric information is increasingly more complex. 
(Fundenberg & Tirole, 1983) studied a two-person extensive-form 
bargaining game with incomplete information, and (Gasmi & Oviedo, 2010), 
(Gasmi, 2012) investigate how asymmetric information affects capacity 
planning for a given control scheme and provide a framework, introducing 
adverse selections by assuming that the local monopoly privately knows its 
marginal cost and that the regulator has only some beliefs about it described 
by a probability that it takes on either a low or a high value. Joskow adds to 
the debate through its rationalisation in extensive form games with 
incomplete63 information (Joskow, 2007). Although game theory and its 
applications have been used for forecasting purposes, further research 
suggests that this differs from reality due to the significance of assumptions 
that have to be made. Asymmetric information will be further discussed as 
part of Transaction Cost Economics, in which information plays a significant 
role related to excess cost. 
Public goods    
Public goods in economic theory are subdivided into four broad 
categories, exclusive, non-exclusive, rival and non-rival goods. Additionally, 
they must meet criteria of marginal cost of provision, e.g., adding an 
additional consumer should equal zero cost and people cannot be excluded 
from consuming the good. The public interest theoretical approach64 justified 
state intervention on the basis of the concepts of market failure and public 
                                                   
63 For further reading on the topic (Freixas, et al., 1985) discuss the central planning of production 
performed under asymmetric information and the use of an incentive schemes. 
64 See Section Interest theories on regulation 
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goods under which Pareto-optimal decision-making65was not to be expected 
in the gas sector. 
Public services, such as safety or security of supply (SoS), were 
assumed to be public goods (Spanjer, 2006). Ultimately, security of supply 
cannot be divided into sub-sections and sold off for a price. Furthermore, 
securing one customer for supply does not have an influence on the other 
customers, suggesting that SoS is non-rivalrous (Goldthau, 2013). In order to 
support SoS, gas pipeline transmission capacity could be recognized as a 
public good. It provides the infrastructural foundation upon which a 
liberalised market can function.  
That regulatory intervention has been applied to counter market 
failure and transfer from private to public goods is demonstrated with, inter 
alia, the European Union gas directives. Examples include the transition of 
natural gas from a utility (public good) to a market commodity. 
Furthermore, with the implementation of ownership unbundling and third-
party access to pipeline systems the status changed from exclusive to non-
exclusive. From a supranational perspective, the European Commission 
supported the establishment of pipelines, interconnectors and other 
transport infrastructure that exhibit public goods characteristics (Goldthau 
& Sitter, 2014). Because of the public goods characteristics, the natural gas 
infrastructure projects typically involve national or European financial 
institutions, leveraging risks or supporting the investment. (Environmental) 
policies or incomplete information may impact the amount of public support 
available for crucial infrastructure projects in Norway to connect additional 
regions with the infrastructure. Additionally, supranational (European) 
bodies exert power thus influencing investments in critical infrastructure. 
Boersma (2015) takes this a step further by suggesting that “in essence the 
investments in the infrastructure required are a public good, yet the 
European Commission counts mostly on private financial means to make 
                                                   
65 See Section 2.2. Efficiencies 
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them happen”, adding to the debate that although the European 
Commission has implemented gas directives, and investment bodies 
supporting Projects of common Interest (PCI), market failure is still 
apparent. 
Externality 
The third factor is the cost or benefit that affects a party which did 
not choose to incur that cost or benefit. Morey (2015) states that there is an 
externality if an economic agent(s) does something that directly influences 
(albeit not indirectly through market prices) some other economic agent(s) 
and there is the potential to make one of the parties better off without making 
some of the others involved worse off.  
Industrial organisation economists have studied a variety of other 
market failures, involving information problems and a range of externalities 
such as environmental damages (Tirole, 2014). In relation to gas 
infrastructures network externalities are “two-sided” in the sense that the 
value of the network platforms depends on getting buyers and/or sellers on 
both sides of the market to use them effectively through pricing 
arrangements and market rules. While these kinds of problems may be 
solved by regulation, the more typical solution is for the network 
participants and the networks to negotiate access pricing arrangements and 
market rules to deal with the potential inefficiencies created by network 
externalities and market power (Joskow & Tirole, 2003) (Laffont & Tiróle, 
1993). This plays a significant role in relation to the Norwegian gas 
infrastructure and especially relates to the abolition of the GFU, FU, and 
Norwegian resource management66 establishment to address European 
competition law. Externalities in gas marketing have had a significant 
                                                   
66 Dahl (2001) and Sunnevåg (2000) discuss this topic in more detail.  
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impact during the GFU period where the GFU controlled small producers’ 
market shares instead of allowing them to market gas individually and thus 
potentially maximise profits independent of decisions of other parties on the 
NCS. As a consequence, prices did not drop, due to the lack of increased 
competition, which resulted in an increase in revenue for the SDFI, but 
reduced resources available for public goods. 
Sunnevåg (2000) defines three kinds of externalities, exploration, 
development of field infrastructure and gas marketing externalities as 
described in the GFU case. Whilst exploration externalities have affinity with 
infrastructure as earlier discussed, it is out of the scope of this Section. 
Network externalities however could pose a problem in the gas market as a 
result of the total size of supply and demand. As a network expands to meet 
demand, extensions to connect to the network will become shorter and thus 
theoretically cheaper. 
The intention of the liberalisation to close the gap from the perfect 
market was to create smaller firms through equal access thus invoking 
perfect competition as a result. Perfect competition relies on three basic 
assumptions, price taking, product homogeneity, and free entry and exit 
aiming to get the price of gas to equal the marginal cost. This was the 
objective of the third-party access to the infrastructure, more firms 
competing upstream and utilising the system compared to a controlled 
single source e.g., the GFU system. With all firms having equal access this 
would create competition and lower prices.  
Cross subsidisation  
Cross subsidisation has been described by Joskow (2007) as “the 
notion that one group of consumers subsidizes the provision of service to 
another group of customers by paying more than it costs to provide them 
with service while the other group pays less”. Posner (1969) referred to cross 
subsidisation as taxation by regulation.  
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Examining cross subsidisation of a sustainable natural monopoly in 
the light of cost function, it is highly likely that the price will be above margin 
for all consumers. At least, it has to be more than one to meet an above break-
even price for the service or commodity. To take a practical example, if the 
European Union wanted to implement a policy of keeping regulated gas 
prices low in order to promote total European service/distribution, and 
provide subsidies for the remote countries, it would have to maintain a 
higher price to cover the cost for additional remote customers, which would 
be above the marginal cost of the existing closer network customers. A side 
effect of this higher price would be an inefficient market, attracting entrants 
for a “high margin, remote customer base”. Thus, “when a firm has natural 
monopoly characteristics, an objective definition of “cross-subsidisation” is 
not straightforward” (Joskow, 2007). Several types of cross subsidy can occur 
in the natural gas industry; cross subsidy of prices, usually industrial 
customers cross-subsidising residential; and cross-subsidy of tariffs i.e. 
postalised tariffs which do not take distance into account. The latter is the 
focus of the research relating to offshore pipeline tariffs. 
Price Discrimination 
The traditional classification of the forms of price discrimination is 
based on work from (Pigou, 1920) cited in (Schmalensee, 1981) who classifies 
price discrimination in three degrees. 
First-degree (perfect price discrimination) involves the seller 
charging a different price for each unit of the good in such a way that the 
price charged for each unit is equal to the maximum customer willingness to 
pay for that unit.  
Second-degree price discrimination, (nonlinear pricing) suggests 
prices differ depending on the number of units of the good bought, but not 
across consumers. That is, each consumer faces the same price schedule, but 
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the schedule involves different prices for different amounts of the good 
purchased. Quantity discounts or premiums are examples.  
Third-degree price discrimination suggests different purchasers are 
charged different unit prices, but each purchaser pays a constant amount for 
each unit of the good bought (Pigou, 1920). 
Efficiencies 
Investigating efficiency and effectiveness of regulations is part of the 
normative economic regulation (Joskow, 2009). With the competitive factors 
such as externalities, cross subsidisation and price discrimination in mind, it 
is imperative to identify efficiency as intended by the energy directives. In 
the neoclassical understanding, optimal economic efficiency is achieved 
when goods are produced in the least costly manner (productive efficiency) 
and distributed to those who value them most (allocative efficiency) (Haase, 
2008). The European gas directives discuss two main areas of efficiency, one 
being energy efficiency considerations related to optimal usage and saving 
of energy for environmental reasons, the second relating to the operation, 
maintenance and development of a secure, efficient and economic 
transmission system of natural gas. The latter will now be discussed. 
The ulterior motive for economic efficiency is cost reduction and 
optimised utilisation of the infrastructure. This can be achieved through 
various objectives.  
Dynamic67 efficiency measures the response to market changes. Due 
to the long lead times in the development of fields and infrastructure there 
are limited changes and new inventions. Gas infrastructure is characterised 
by large sunk cost; any new technological changes appear to be deployed at 
the end of the product life. In pipelines this can range from 15-50 years. This 
is most applicable for green fields where competition might play a part in 
the design of new infrastructure, when technological changes might prove 
                                                   
67 For an in-depth analysis (Gilbert & Newbery, 1994) 
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an advantage leading to cost reduction in the short, but most likely long 
term. (Dahl, 2001) states that static efficiency concerns two objectives, 
optimise the depletion of Norwegian natural gas resources and maximise the 
profit from the natural gas exports. This might not necessarily be the case in 
connection to liberalisation and competition. 
Allocative efficiency according to (Dahl, 2001) suggests that all 
customers who are willing to pay a price equal to or above marginal cost of 
production and transportation shall be supplied with gas. When it comes to 
transportation services in isolation, the aim is to have sufficient capacity to 
serve all shippers who are willing to pay a tariff equal to or above marginal 
costs of transportation. With the energy directives, this might become more 
relevant when competition on the selling-side provides options to different 
providers other than the Norwegian Gas Infrastructure.  
Rationing efficiency in relation to the infrastructure suggests that 
distribution of services between customers is efficient, i.e. transportation 
services are given to those shippers who earn the most by using the service. 
Through the energy directives this has changed to equal distribution and 
access for all. This appears fruitful for the short run, however long run issues 
such as cost, and investment might suffer to some extent. It also ties in with 
cost efficiency which entails providing services at the lowest possible cost 
including managerial efficiency. According to  (Dahl, 2001) this criterion is 
relevant in a short-term perspective when it comes to variable operational 
costs as well as for fixed operational and maintenance costs. The measure is 
also applicable in a long-run perspective related to minimising the cost of 
new capacity. This means that a pipeline company and a (large) customer 
will bargain over the tariff, given that the tariff should not give the pipeline 
more than a normal rate of return (Rosendahl & Kittelsen, 2004).  
Several forms of efficiencies and the effectiveness of the implemented 
regulations on market failure have been described. Efficiencies play a 
substantial part in the discussion between neo-classical theory and 
Transaction Cost Economics. For instance, the counterintuitive relationship 
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between long term contracts resulting in more efficient investments in 
offshore transmission systems versus multiple preferable hub-priced 
contracts, incentivised through the gas directives will be further investigated 
in Section 2.3 Transaction Cost Economics.  
Interest Theories on Regulation  
As part of the overarching principle of the interest of the stakeholders 
in a market, the research investigated the foundation of public and private 
interest theory. Whilst the public interest theory offers explanations and 
reasoning for regulating and correcting market failures e.g., externalities, 
market power, natural monopoly and asymmetric information, the approach 
of public interest theory has been criticised for several shortcomings. 
According to Hertog (2010), criticism has been directed at the theory because 
of market failure as model failure. Monopoly power, externalities, cross 
subsidisation and price discrimination are indications of inefficient 
allocation of resources, suggesting that the public interest theory and the 
model applied, did not take into account the transaction costs involved. In 
practice, it appears that the market mechanism itself is often able to 
compensate inefficiencies (Cowen, 1988). With the criticism of public interest 
theory came private interest theory, suggesting that regulation can function 
through prioritisation of the most effective (private) interest group in the 
allocation of wealth sharing and directing influential lobbying parties for the 
cause of the private interest group. This theory has been disputed by several 
critics, inter alia, (Posner, 1974; Stigler, 1971). As Den Hertog (2010) suggests 
“Private interest theory consists of strong incentive for a single entity to 
lobby for regulation. In the presence of market failure regulation is likely 
because of the large losses this inflicts on some interest groups”. The body of 
private and public interest theory is broad. Although there are some 
connections for the research on offshore transportation of Norwegian gas 
other theories and regulations provide a more suitable foundation. 
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2.3. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
Transaction Cost Economics excels in agreements beset with high 
investment cost for at least one of the participants in the contract and with 
the potential of getting locked in ex-post agreement by the high sunk cost.  
Several cost functions are involved when investing in a transmission 
system. A distinction is made between financial cost, production cost i.e., 
CAPEX, operational cost (OPEX) and transaction cost. The latter is 
concerned with ex-ante contract coordination up until ex-post execution. 
Haase (2008) further defines ex-ante transaction costs as arising in the 
contract set-up phase, including drafting and negotiating the contract. Ex-
post transaction costs arise after the contract has been agreed. 
The possibility of ex-post opportunistic behaviour suggests the 
requirement for an ex-ante governance arrangement that mitigates the ex-
post holdup potential. Joskow& Tirole (2002a) describe outcomes of such an 
agreement as a relationship “that supports efficient investments in specific 
assets, lower costs, and lower prices”. However, hierarchical contracts are 
incomplete and alterations to the contract, needed to overcome the 
inefficiencies, may result in opportunistic behaviour. These Transaction 
Costs should be included in the comparative economic assessment of 
contracts (Joskow & Tirole, 2002a).  
Inefficiencies as discussed in Section 2.2 identified gaps between 
perfect competitive markets and empirical evidence. Transaction Cost 
Economics suggests that these inefficiencies can be explained by not 
identifying the specific cost. The benefits of transaction cost economics 
derive from the identification of factors that influence or conflict in the 
transaction. Williamson discusses four factors: 
1) Asset specificity,  
2) Frequency,  
3) Uncertainty, 
4) Complexity. 
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Asset specificity has been the most discussed factor in the literature 
and the four have been seen as interrelated. The extent of the fit of the 
factors/attributes supports the optimisation of the governance design choice 
(Williamson, 1998). The first of the four factors, asset specificity, has been 
differentiated into 6 different varieties namely, site, dedicated asset, physical 
asset, temporal, human and brand specificity. The applicable type of 
specificity will be further discussed in Chapter 6 and 7. A brief explanation 
of the other factors will now be provided.  
Frequency is in Williamson’s framework (see adapted version table 
2-1) depicted in years for each level and indicates the frequency with which 
transactions occur. If there is a low frequency of transactions it may prove 
ineffective and inefficient to alter a governmental structure. Vice versa, for 
high frequency, it might prove cost efficient to manage the transactions 
accordingly (Tadelis & Williamson, 2010).  
A remarkable distinction between neoclassical economics and TCE 
are the assumptions on risk versus uncertainties. The neo-classical approach 
suggests that contracts foresee all risks and mitigate accordingly, ergo 
market exchange is the most viable option. Whilst TCE suggests that 
uncertainties with an ex-post contract implication cannot be determined 
perfectly. Spanjer (2009) describes contractual completeness as “Even if we 
assume the possibility of contractual completeness, writing, monitoring, 
verifying and enforcing a complete contract will likely be prohibitively 
expensive”. The fourth and final factor, complexity, as described by 
Williamson, indicates the intertwining character of the influencing factors by 
stating “Complex contracts are incomplete, by reason of bounded 
rationality” (Williamson, 1998). For this research, it will be assumed that all 
contracts related to transmission systems are incomplete and complex. 
Transaction Cost Economics proves to be a viable theory for 
capturing or opposing some of the identified market failures. Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE), is the product of two complementary fields of 
economic research. The first field is the New Institutional Economics, the 
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second field has been described as the new economics of organisation 
(Williamson, 1998). A brief summary of the framework, founded on the two 
fields of economics, will be provided in this section with more detail in 
Chapter 3 and 4.  
The Transaction Cost Economics model of Williamson has been 
applied in the arena of natural gas by inter alia, (Correljé 2008; Haase, 2008; 
Spanjer, 2008; Arora, 2012). The model has been adapted by the authors for 
specific research rationale. For the purpose of this research the adapted 
Williamson model of (Haase, 2008) is modified and used.  Williamson’s 
model distinguishes between four different levels. The model provides the 
opportunity to separate national from supra-national decisions and the 
influences the decisions might have on price, market structure and 
investments in the Norwegian transmission system. 
The model as depicted in Table 2-1 has been adapted from the work 
of Williamson cited in (Haase, 2008). The purpose of the model is to divide 
the regulatory framework into conceptual parts and show the interaction 
(contract)between the stakeholders involved. 
 
Level 
 
   Chapter 
Level 1 
Social 
Theory 
10-30 years 
Informal 
institutions 
Broad values, 
norms, 
technological 
and physical 
characteristics  
Broad (energy) 
policy objectives 
and balance 
between 
security of 
supply, market 
and 
environment 
1, 2 
Level 2 
Economics
/ property 
rights 
10-20 years 
 
Formal 
institutional 
environment  
Laws and 
constitutions  
Regulatory 
models and 
market design  
2,3,4 
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Level 3 
Transaction 
Cost 
Economics 
1-10 years 
Institutional 
arrangements  
Organisations, 
contracts 
andhybrids 
such asPublic 
Private 
Partnerships  
Actual 
regulatory 
instruments and 
decisionsForms 
of PP 
cooperation 
Firms’ tariff 
structures and 
trading practices  
Public and 
private 
evaluation and 
sharing of risk, 
profit, market 
etc.  
2, 4 
 
Level 4 
Neo-
classical/ 
Agency 
Theory 
Continuous  
 
(Market) 
behaviour  
 
Interaction 
between actors 
with different 
objectives, 
strategies  
 
Market 
strategies, 
investments 
lobbying, R&D, 
cooperation and 
conflict  
 
3 
Table 2-1  Transaction Cost Economics framework 
Source: Adapted framework from Williamson cited in Haase (2008) 
• Level one, is the level where social awareness finds its roots. It 
establishes society’s view on, inter alia, energy policy. For gas, these 
informal institutions are concerned with issues such as the 
perceptions about sovereign energy resources, resource markets and 
energy policy objectives. 
• Level two is concerned with regulatory design e.g. Gas Directives, 
Network codes that follow a transformation of European directives 
into national regulations and laws.  
• Level three is the result of level 2 transformation and results into 
actionable regulation, such as contracts, guidelines policies and 
tariffs. This is the emphasis of the Transaction Cost Economics and 
will be further explained in Chapter 2, 3 and 4. 
• Level four concerns the stakeholders’ and shareholder’s reaction in 
the gas value chain on regulations as indicated in Levels one-three 
and how this reaction affects investments in the infrastructure for the 
purpose of this research. 
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The function of the model in this research is to offer a structure to 
analyse regulations affecting the Norwegian gas infrastructure in the 
market.  
The institutional environment impacts on the relative severity of the 
problems of coordination and transaction costs (Williamson, 1998). Political 
and legal governmental bodies determine the risk of governmental 
opportunism (Warshaw, 2012) and thus the contractual and regulatory 
arrangements between government and regulator in which the transmission 
system owner may be regulated. (Rossiaud, 2014). The research realises the 
limitations of the model but the interaction between the various stakeholders 
can be established on representative assumptions deducted from the 
Transaction Cost Economics model. Different periods in time, different types 
of infrastructure and variable forms of expansion can be explained through 
the application of the framework. Transaction Cost Economics, which makes 
the transaction the main focus of the analysis, appears well-equipped to 
assist in explaining regulatory influences on market functioning, based on 
earlier research and empirical data. The TCE has been complimented with 
Principal-Agent (PA) theory values, to capture the interaction between 
stakeholders with different objectives and, in the case of Norway, potentially 
with a similar objective, adhered to by e.g., Gassco, Gassled, Statoil, Petoro 
and the Government.  
2.4. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
As a consequence of the potential gap between regulator and 
government, the Principal-Agent Theory investigates the relationship 
between these two organisations through analysis of ex-ante delegation and 
ex-post delegation relationships. This approach, its models and purpose are 
used to identify relationships between the various stakeholders and discuss 
regulatory incentives and effectiveness. The principal-agent theory is 
involved with the explanation of three issues in agency relationships. 1), the 
incentives of principal and agent may be different or conflicting. 2), the 
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principal is not able to verify completely what the agent’s execution of 
operations entails. 3) The potential difference in risk perception, e.g., risk 
loving, risk averse. 
Principle-agent theory is applied in incentive regulation and 
multipart tariffs (Body of Knowledge on Regulation, n.d.). A significant 
body of economic theory has been published on variations of the principal-
agent theory, inter alia in the arena of game theory. The models are 
mathematically based. Between the principal-agent theoretical foundations 
of (Laffont & Tiróle, 1993; Laffont & Martimort, 2002) and the game 
theoretical approaches of e.g., (Fudenberg, 1991; Ferreira & Trigeorgis, 2009), 
the former are more fitting for the research. The consensus of the principal 
agent theory for this research is to identify generally behavioural 
assumptions relative to principal-agent relationship which meets the 
principles of Laffont et al. Three behavioural assumption have been 
identified by the authors in relation to Principal Agent Theory:  
1) actors are rational68 utility optimisers,  
2) principal and agents may develop different preferences  
3) there is an informational asymmetry between principal and agent  
(Héritier, 2005) cited in (Haase, 2008) 
Whilst the traditional agent theory departs from agents behaving 
opportunistically and taking advantage of e.g., asymmetric information, the 
concept could be seen in a broader perspective. Zardkoohi et al. (2015) 
expand this approach with a multidirectional framework contemplating,  
1) agents behave opportunistically against the interests of principals, 
2) principals behave opportunistically against the interests of agents, and 
3) relationships between agents and principals representing confluence of 
interests affect the interests of third-party stakeholders (Zardkoohi, et al., 
2015). The underlying motivation for this approach is the change of 
ownership from GFU to the Gassco-Gassled construction and, in addition, 
                                                   
68 See Section 2.4 For the definition of rationality applied in this research 
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the court case between the Gassled owners and the Norwegian government. 
In the GFU-Gassled construction, the principal-agent concept was a new 
way of organizing transportation of natural gas. In 1993 the proposal came 
from the European Union to promote enhanced competition which was to 
be accomplished by unbundling (Golombek. Rolf, 1994). The initiative was 
that pipeline companies should agree to carry gas - which is owned by 
another agent - in return for payment (to the extent that there is capacity 
available). Other principal elements were a transparent and non-
discriminatory licensing system and separation within vertically integrated 
undertakings of the management and accounting ("unbundling") 
(Golombek. Rolf, 1994). Controlling a pipeline transmission system 
resembles functions of this theory and touches upon factors identified in 
practice.  
Just as in economic and political theory, asymmetric information 
creates challenges in the relationship between the principal and a 
performing party, referred to as the agent. Another empirical example is the 
production and development licence for Goliat which is shared between 
Statoil, ENI and Petoro. The Norwegian state as a principal via Petoro and 
Statoil allows ENI to participate in the operational and financial contractual 
agreements whilst the resources remain with the state. This requires a 
contract that satisfies all stakeholders involved. Other examples are 
employer-employee or a regulator and the regulated organisation. A typical 
asymmetric information situation consists of the agent possessing 
information that is difficult to obtain for the principal. Two main issues are 
identified in relation to asymmetry, moral risk and adverse selection.  
Moral risk is related to the agent's active choices, not observable for 
the principal. E.g., the design of the contract between the principal and the 
agent could stimulate the agent to provide less effort than the principal 
anticipates and or provides (Joskow, 2009). This is an endogenous, or a 
“model internal" factor, which is not limited to the transmission system 
owner as agent only. The infrastructure operator has the ability to conceal 
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information about its cost structure, thus enabling it to exact higher tariffs 
than are strictly necessary (Arts, et al., 2008). Furthermore, the shipper of 
natural gas who has to pay a tariff for the transport of gas may have an 
opportunity to pressurize the infrastructure owner to accept a low fee, again 
because of the sunk nature of the investment (Arts, et al., 2008). 
Conversely, the regulator may have the possibility to pressure the 
transmission system owner’s ex-post investment when it has become 
definitive and is sunk. The transmission system owner will have little room 
to move and is defenceless against a regulator that leaves too little room in 
the tariffs that it considers permissible for the operator of infrastructure to 
charge to the infrastructure users (Arts, et al., 2008). Guthrie (2006)  argues 
this to be a frequent occurrence for transmission systems due to the 20-25-
year depreciation period common in infrastructures. Regulatory 
opportunism is, of course, not without risks because of the negative effect it 
might have on the regulator/government’s reputation.  
The second issue that has been mentioned in relation to the principal-
agent theory is effort aversion. For example, the agent possesses an 
information advantage regarding external factors that could affect the 
development of the contractual relationship (Law, 2014).  
In the case of Norway and its gas transmission system, the MPE, the 
Parliament is regarded as a principal with Gassco and Gassled as its agent. 
That interaction between stakeholders with different objectives can become 
complex has been demonstrated in the Court case of Gassled owners against 
the Norwegian state for the abrupt reduction of tariffs charged for 
transmission of gas. The case was built up out of inter alia, “the lack of 
information” about such key aspects being a breach of what the private 
parties could reasonably expect of the Ministry in the situation in question 
(Regjeringen, 2017c). The government added to its defence that profits 
should be taken from the production segment rather than the transmission 
of natural gas. In addition, there was a lack of any systems for monitoring 
and measuring the return in Gassled and thus calculate the correct tariff 
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amendments (Regjeringen, 2017c). The court case has demonstrated in depth 
how Norway regulates its transmission system and will be explored in 
Chapters 4 and 6. Several weak links have been highlighted: 
* European gas regulation is founded on theories which assume perfect 
market competition.  
* Asymmetric, imperfect or incomplete information plays a role in the 
principal-agent framework present in the Norwegian gas value chain, in 
particular the transmission system.  
* The cost factor is not taken into consideration inter alia in the principal 
agent concept.  
This research will further, through its investigation of the export of 
Norwegian gas to Europe through the transmission system, apply theories 
of the Principal-agent framework to identify inefficiencies in information 
and Transaction Cost Economics to complement each other. 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
Due to lack of applicable real-world gas transmission system theories 
a framework adapted from (Stern, 2002) will be used to capture relevant data 
which are commonly utilised by established institutes including IEA, BP 
Statistics, NPD, OIES, Statistisk sentralbyrå69(SSB) and Gassco to arrive at a 
Cost Benefit Analysis which will be applied to Gassco’s report on the Barents 
Sea Gas Infrastructure (Gassco, 2014a). An adapted form of Stern’s data set 
framework will take into consideration analysis of reserves, gas price, 
construction cost, uncertainty about the economic outlook, developments in 
environmental policies, depletion in producing regions; changes to legal, 
fiscal and regulatory regimes, delays in infrastructure and shipping capacity 
which will be deduced from empirical evidence (Stern, 2002). Within the 
boundaries of Transaction Cost Economics, several criteria have been 
identified to measure effectiveness. For the purpose of this research Cost 
                                                   
69 Norwegian Statistics Bureau 
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Benefit Analysis will be applied to identify a positive, alternatively a 
negative quantifiable outcome. 
Limitations of the theories 
TCE provides an appropriate level of analysis and separation, 
displaying the factors and variables involved. However, as Haase pointed 
out “transaction cost economics is able to explain how governance structures 
relate to economic performance; but fall short in incorporating the political 
process into the theory” (Haase, 2008). Furthermore, in depth rationalisation 
of the stakeholders involved is not accounted for. 
Rationality 
Neo-classical theories assume rationality from stakeholders and that 
they possess complete information to act on the task set out. Similarly, as 
discussed in Section 2.2, humans are deemed never to be fully rational in the 
economic theory sense. Harbison described individuals as motivated by 
drives, hopes, desires, fears and frustrations (Harbison, 1956). Kahneman 
takes this a step further stating, “psychological theories of intuitive thinking 
cannot match the elegance and precision of formal normative models of 
belief and choice” (Kahneman, 2011). For the purpose of this research 
bounded rationality as described by Kahneman and Williams will be 
applied. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 started with economic assumptions of a perfect market 
with perfect competition and the role of monopoly. If perfect competition 
was in place, there would not be a need for regulations. Implementing 
regulations would add cost to the process, resulting in a sub-optimal perfect 
condition. Because the natural gas market and the transport of gas from 
Norway to Europe is not perfect, regulation is required. The market failures 
that are present in the gas value chain, incomplete information, price 
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discrimination, externalities, have been highlighted. The shortcomings of 
regulatory interventions on such market failures have been discussed from 
a theoretical and historical perspective through rate of return, cap regulation 
and outsourcing. A first conclusion that can be drawn is that Norway 
regulates the offshore pipeline system with a variant of rate of return in 
which a fixed return of 7% is applied. This concept will be further explored 
in Chapter 4. The second conclusion that can be drawn is that from the 
review of theories, no direct practical relevant theory has been identified as 
being applicable to the Norwegian offshore pipeline system. 
The chapter followed with theories that have proved to be capable of 
analysing shortcomings in regulation. Transaction Cost Economics were 
discussed, and key issues identified, including that relationship-specific 
investments have a significant impact on contracts. Other factors were that 
the potential increase in buyers and sellers reduces transaction contract cost. 
(Arora, 2012) furthermore indicated that there appears to be little theory to 
explain how strategic national behaviour influences will impact the global 
natural gas market. This research will investigate Norway’s strategic 
national behaviour in perspective of the North Western European gas 
market through its offshore transmission system.   
Principal-Agent Theory is qualified considering the Norwegian 
government as a principal has several agents in the natural gas value chain, 
from production (Statoil and Petoro), transmission (Petoro and Gassco) and 
gas sales (Statoil). The influences of national and supra-national regulations 
affected contract lengths. E.g., the move from long term gas contracts to hub 
price contracts add more risk to the process resulting in an increase in 
contract duration. From a Principal–Agent Theory perspective and TCE this 
can be explained.  The final part of the Chapter discussed a realistic approach 
to investigate the cost and upside benefits of regulatory intervention on 
investments in the transmission system for this particular research.  
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3. Regulations and Investment Decisions 
 
 
 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
To make a distinction between regulations initiated by a supra-
national rather than the national Norwegian authorities, this Chapter starts 
with the European Union regulations related to natural gas divided into 
three sections, Energy Regulation (specifically the Gas Directives), 
Competition Regulation and Security of Supply. Within the three sections, 
the emphasis will be on offshore gas pipelines, or as described in the 
European Union Gas Directives, “Upstream pipeline networks”. 
Chapter 2 discussed several methods to regulate a monopoly from a 
theoretical perspective, however there needs to be an incentive to own, 
operate, and where needed, develop the transmission system as the 
monopoly. This Chapter will focus on sufficient investments in gas 
transmission systems to be able to secure supply. Investments in gas 
transmission systems can be differentiated between short and long term. 
Short-term investments are applied to operations on the transmission system 
whilst long-term investments aim to develop the transmission system. This 
Chapter will focus on the latter.  
Chapter 3 starts with the national regulations and how these evolved 
in Norway under the influence of the European Union gas directives. Section 
3.1 discusses historical attempts at regulating energy monopolies and how 
Norwegian sales to the European Union created displeasure that inter alia 
started the ground work for the European gas directives. Section 3.2 
describes the history of Norwegian regulations and how it established sales 
Chapter 3 
 
 72 
in the natural gas market ex-ante and ex-post GFU-GU and the returns it 
made and invested in the transmission system. Section 3.3 starts and 
discusses the challenges the investors in the Norwegian offshore 
transmission system are encountering. It explains the tariff system applied 
on the NCS and the impact changing supra, and national regulations have 
on investors and the earlier identified gaps in communication and 
incentives. Tariffs can be seen as the return on investment for pipeline 
owners and are taken into consideration in financing offshore pipeline 
systems. Section 3.4 explains how investments in infrastructures are initiated 
in Norway, which procedures are applicable, and highlights gaps between 
Neo-Classical and Principal Agent Theoretical principles. The section 
highlights the responsible parties in initiating investments on the NCS and 
highlights contradicting situations where e.g. Gassco wears two different 
hats: one to advise the government on managing natural resources and two, 
to advise the Gassled owners on how to maximise returns on the 
transmission system. It then discusses the investments that have been made 
and potential investments that are under pressure due to financial 
challenges. Section 3.5 concludes.   
3.2. EUROPEAN UNION REGULATIONS 
In 1988, the European Union70 drafted a working paper “The Internal 
Energy Market” (EU, 1988) with the aim of establishing a single European 
Union Member States market. By 1992 new initiatives like harmonisation of 
taxation, price transparency and interconnection of grids further structured 
this aim. It became clear that the position of the Commission from the mid-
eighties, largely excluding the energy sector from the Single European 
Market, had changed (Rosendahl & Kittelsen, 2004). This change lead to the 
first gas directive from 1998 (EU, 1988) and was followed by two more gas 
                                                   
70 A complete list of EU regulations and directives can be found in the Appendix Section 8.6 
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directives in 2003 and 2009, in addition to four network codes and two gas 
target models71.  
Gas directives 
To arrive at a correct judgement, it is essential to reiterate the 
terminology used in the Gas Directives and relate this to a Norwegian 
offshore pipeline context in the research. For example,   
upstream pipeline network means any pipeline or 
network of pipelines operated and/or constructed as part of 
an oil or gas production project, or used to convey natural 
gas from one or more such projects to a processing plant or 
terminal or final coastal landing terminal (EU, 1998, p. L 
204/5) 
Through the upstream high-pressure network gas is conveyed with 
the purpose of anything other than delivery to end-users. This contrasts with 
distribution which delivers gas to customers. In a similar manner supply has 
been described as the delivery and/or sale of natural gas to customers, 
suggesting that it could involve transmission and distribution. Within the 
three gas directives the articles and requirements concerning access to 
upstream pipeline networks remained the same, albeit under a different 
Article number72. Contents consist of the ability to 1), obtain access to the 
upstream network, 2) in accordance with relevant legal instruments taking 
into account security, quality and regularity of supply, 3) have in place 
dispute settlement procedures and 4) have in place cross border dispute 
settlement procedures.  
The implementation of the first gas Directive(98/30/EC) took place 
in 2002. A substantial part of the Gas Directive related to distribution and 
                                                   
71 For a summary of the three gas directives, four network codes and two gas target models see Appendix 
Section 8.7 
72 First directive article number 23, second directive number 20 and third directive article number 34 
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thus downstream and processing, as a consequence the impact for the 
Norwegian offshore transmission system was minor73. A Royal Decree was 
implemented to include a new Chapter to the Norwegian Petroleum 
Activities Act. Norway does have a distribution network and low-pressure 
pipelines onshore however these are less trivial (Regjeringen, 2017c).  
TPA and unbundling 
There are several descriptions and terms in relation to the concepts 
of access/entry and competition on the natural gas infrastructure, the most 
commonly used is Third Party Access (TPA), The first directive (EU, 1988) 
introduced the concept of TPA and unbundling of services. The second 
directive (EU, 2003) focussed on national regulations and legal unbundling. 
The third directive (EU, 2009a) concentrated on unbundling and introduced 
ACER74 a European regulator. Unbundling according to the Gas Directive, 
Member States shall at least ensure that integrated companies unbundle 
their internal accounts and do not abuse commercially sensitive information 
(EU, 1998). Open Access (OA) is a term used in the United States, in a quite 
similar way as the European Commission uses TPA. Finally, common 
carriage is a system whereby when the capacity of a pipeline system is over-
subscribed, the requirements of all shippers are scaled back on a pro rata 
basis. The most common system is 'contract carriage' where capacity is 
(commonly) allocated on a 'first come first served' basis. (Stern, 1997). 
                                                   
73 In 1991 the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy concluded that the EU directives adopted to 
date had little or no consequences for Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 1991:105). In the electricity 
section the prospect of open transit is discussed but not regarded as consequential for Norway. In the gas 
section, the price and transit directives are not even mentioned. (Claes, 2002) 
74 Agency for the cooperation of energy regulators, building upon the sustained efforts of National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and the continuous support of all stakeholders, ACER's Gas Department 
is working towards meeting all the challenges associated with creating a well-functioning, competitive, 
integrated, secure and sustainable European gas market, delivering tangible benefits to European 
consumers. Work still to be done includes aligning national market and network operation rules for gas 
as well as making cross-border investment in energy infrastructure easier.  ACER's Gas Department is 
divided into three key areas of work, all aiming to support the achievement of the above-mentioned goals: 
Framework Guidelines & Network Codes, including the Gas Regional Initiative TSO Cooperation and 
Infrastructure & Network Development Market Monitoring 
Regulations and Investment Decisions 
 
 75 
Although several terms have been described, TPA has been the most 
common denominator in the literature.  
For the Norwegian government, the implementation of TPA and 
unbundling may have come at a convenient stage. Throughout the period of 
1976-1995 a significant number of offshore pipelines were laid and had 
become operational. The pipelines were operated by different owners, each 
with different tariffs, terms and conditions. This resulted in a complex, 
inefficient arrangement to convey gas from a field to e.g., a treatment facility. 
A need arose for a coordinated transmission system, which came with 
restructuring of the Norwegian Gas Management System and included a 
unified access regime and the establishment of Gassco as operator 
(Regjeringen, 2017c). The government, initiated the negotiations between the 
relevant pipeline owners with the objective to consolidate the multitude of 
owners and JVs into one ownership structure. This resulted in the 
establishment of Gassled as transmission system owner and the “winding 
up of the GFU” (Regjeringen, 2017c). The latter will be discussed in Section 
3.2 Competition.  The restructuring of the gas management system was done 
through regulatory implementation of access, based on the new transport 
system. This included Gassled as owner with a separate regulation for tariffs. 
Furthermore, the regulation of the gas transport system reiterated that the 
return should be taken out on the fields and not in the transmission system 
(Regjeringen, 2017c). This proved to be an imperative sentence in the court 
case that followed in relation to tariff reduction.  
Competition and Regulation 
In the natural gas industry during the eighties a “public interest” 
view on price and entry regulation was discussed in the paper from the 
European Union (EU (83/230/EEC), 1983) “The internal energy market- 
energy for the Community”. It became apparent that certain segments of the 
gas market in the European Union and in particular in Norway were so far 
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vertically integrated that its natural monopoly characteristics might need 
alternative/additional regulation.  
There are several descriptions of a monopoly e.g., by Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld (2012) “A Market with only one seller” or as Posner (1969) stated 
“does not refer to the actual number of sellers in a market but to the 
relationship between demand and the technology of supply”.  
A method to eliminate or reduce monopoly power is through the 
introduction of competition. The OECD (2016) provides a history of reform 
models for regulated industries, in addition (Joskow, 2009; Joskow, 2013) 
describe the typical elements of reform models as” 
• To separate (structurally or functionally) the potentially competitive 
segments from the monopoly/oligopoly network segments that 
would be regulated,  
• To remove price and entry regulation from the competitive segments,  
• To unbundle the sale of regulated network service from competitive 
services,  
• To establish transparent tariffs for access to and use of the network, 
and  
• To allow end-users (local distribution companies or consumers in the 
case of gas to choose their suppliers of competitive services and have 
them arrange to have it “shipped” to them over an open access 
network with a regulated cap on the prices for providing 
transportation service” (Joskow, 2009). 
The removal of national gas monopolies and opening up free market 
access to the infrastructure was seen as a condition for improving economic 
and environmental efficiency (Estrada, 1995). In theory, the rationale for 
effective regulatory intervention is to provide economic efficiency under 
perfect competition. However, efficiency in pricing, providing signals75 from 
                                                   
75 Incomplete information, as discussed in Section 2.2, can have a significant influence on monopoly 
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and to consumers and producers to support decision making proves to be a 
difficult process (Tirole, 1999; Sappington, 1981; Joskow, 2009).  
Due to the lack of a competitor, a regulator determines access/entry 
and a tariff. Joskow states:  
Firms with de facto legal monopolies that are subject 
to price and entry regulation inevitably are eventually 
challenged by policymakers, customers or potential 
competitors to allow competing suppliers to enter one or 
more segments of the lines of business in which they have de 
facto legal monopolies. (Joskow, 2007, p. 1230) 
The literature on the liberalisation process, the introduction of 
competition through network access and pricing is extensive. However, in 
order to improve the functioning of the market, “notably concrete provisions 
are needed to ensure a level playing field and, inter alia to reduce the risks 
of market dominance” (EU, 2003).  
Economists have long concluded that companies with market power 
have an incentive to control competition in that particular market, thus using 
the market power, which could be translated to, predatory behaviour 
(Haase, 2008). Competition policy aims to prevent such activities.  
Norwegian gas production, sale and transportation possessed several of 
these trademarks across the value chain with concentration of market power. 
This market structure originated from the concept of long term Take or Pay 
contracts (TOP) and field depletion contracts, required to build and operate 
the natural gas infrastructure. The natural gas value chain in its 
completeness left customers at times in the undesirable position of having 
either excess gas or the cost for non-used excess gas. This supports the 
                                                   
prices for regulated firms and the regulator.  
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natural monopoly argument in which a transmission system, in theory, will 
exercise market power and collect monopoly profit if left unregulated. The 
transmission system will aim to maximise profits at a throughput level 
where at a minimum the marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Leading to 
a situation where a single firm (or a small number of firms) emerges in 
equilibrium and may have market power and charge prices that yield 
revenues that exceed the breakeven level for at least some period of time. 
Which could subsequently lead to lower output and higher unit costs than 
is either first-best or second-best efficient (Joskow, 2006). 
In Norway before 2001 and the implementation of the first Gas 
Directive, the ownership and sole access to the infrastructure was through 
the national transmission companies on the up-midstream side and local 
distributors on the downstream side. This situation provided Norwegian 
sales and transport committees/agents, GFU and FU, with considerable 
market power vis- a-vis customers. Monopolistic price discrimination 
became a practice in which a price was charged close to the price of available 
substitutes resulting in customers paying the maximum price they were 
willing to pay for gas. In addition, implying potential underutilisation of 
productive resources by the monopolist.  
With the implementation of the Directive 98/30/EC by the Storting, 
the restructuring included the abolition of the GFU76. As a result, from 2001 
onwards companies were able to sell natural gas individually, reducing the 
monopoly power of the seller as well as the downstream distributors in e.g., 
the Netherlands and Germany. The implementation had a considerable 
impact on gas sales, however a limited effect on natural gas transportation. 
A notable effect of the directives is the gradual exchange of long term 
contracts and introduction of a fixed tariff for a third-party shipper. This had 
an effect on the risk taken by investors. Ex-ante 2001 long-term Norwegian 
“take-or-pay” contracts have mitigated investor risk. Ex-post, contracting 
                                                   
76 A detailed explanation is provided in Chapter 4, Norwegian regulation on gas sales 
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arrangements are governed through e.g. gas-on-gas competition, gas re-sale 
contract clauses and TPA in line with European requirements. Thus, creating 
new market structures with different forms of risk. The major upstream 
producers identified the perceived threat to long-term contracts as a major 
risk to their business.  Conversely, the introduction of competition could 
create issues for offshore transmission systems affecting European supplies 
in the long run, unless provisions are made to secure long-term investments 
(Austvik, 2010c). 
A note on Cost 
Under perfect competition the price should equal the cost, a price too 
high indicates excessive profits, a price too low would ultimately result in 
negative financial outcomes. The installed regulatory agent should 
determine access to the infrastructure and a price that should be charged. In 
its most basic form revenue minus cost equals profit. The challenge for the 
agent is to determine the efficient cost structures for production. An 
important issue that will reoccur in the thesis is the sunk cost factor that is 
present in infrastructure investment. According to Joskow & Noll (1981) 
sunk costs have not been considered directly in technological definitions of 
natural monopoly that turn only on cost sub-additive grounds. However, 
theoretically and empirically sunk cost have been a significant factor in the 
development of the gas infrastructure as a monopoly. Other information 
relevant for the regulator concerns demand, investment, management, 
financing, productivity, reliability and safety to regulate effectively.  
Due to asymmetry in information the regulator/agent has to propose 
cost options. Arguably the regulatory intervention should as a minimum 
improve pricing and adequate supply over the monopoly which has 
advantages of economies of scale and scope, in addition sufficient 
investment incentives. That the regulator or government is not always in 
possession of the appropriate information has been demonstrated in the 
Gassled court case against the Norwegian State.  
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This is underpinned by the lack of any systems for 
monitoring and measuring the return in Gassled. Nor was it 
well-defined what the maximum return in Gassled was 
supposed to be, or what value the Gassled return could be 
measured against. This is illustrated by the fact that the 
Ministry has itself stated that it spent a long time achieving 
clarity about what the correct basis was for measuring the 
return in Gassled (Regjeringen, 2017c, p. 42) 
The investment factor in the long run77 as a function of Long Run 
Marginal Cost (LRMC) is crucial to ensure that fields and transportation get 
developed. The interaction between optimal capacity at a range of natural 
gas prices determines the diameter of the transmission system pipes and 
compressor power, subsequently resulting in a higher investment cost for a 
larger diameter or compressor78 and vice versa for a smaller combination. 
Gasmi & Oviedo (2010) and Cremer & Gasmi (2003) discuss economies of 
scale in natural gas pipelines79.  
Driving down cost as a consequence of competition appears to result 
in reduced investment in the infrastructure. Especially during periods of 
excess supply and low prices, asset-sweating instead of investment with a 
long-term perspective. This is recognised by the European Union stating that 
“market concentration and weak competition remain an issue and the 
European energy landscape is still too fragmented and does not lead to 
sufficient investments” (EU, 2015). In a number of Member States, regulated 
end-user prices still limit the development of effective competition, which 
                                                   
77 The debate on the relation between Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC), Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) 
and Average Marginal Cost. This might have implications for tariff location once identified. 
78 For a complete explanation on the interaction between flow, compressor power and diameter selection 
see Appendix. 
79 For a discussion on numerically estimates long-run average cost (LRAC) and long-run marginal cost 
(LRMC) reference is made to Yépez (2008) 
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discourages investments and the emergence of new market players, this will 
only work if market prices send the right signals (CEER, 2016). 
Security of Supply 
There is a long history of Security of Supply (SoS) regulation both for 
energy in general and gas in particular. With the objective of creating a single 
European Energy market came the recognition of a strategy to secure energy 
supply, and more relevant for this research security of gas supply. In the EU 
green paper “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply”, the European Union with a long-term perspective, expected an 
increase in dependency on gas from non-EU sources of supply (EC, 2004). 
However, the implementation of energy and gas directives did not provide 
a guarantee of supply as was recognised in The DG TREN memo “The 
Internal Energy Market – Improving the Security of Energy Supplies – Gas 
and Oil Stocks” (2003) stating the lack of a framework at “EU or IEA level 
guaranteeing a minimum level of security of gas supplies in the European 
Union”. With the liberalisation of the gas market it became apparent that 
there was no incentive to take any form of responsibility for security of 
supply from the market. The completion of the internal gas market required 
a common approach EC (directive 2004/67/EC). A significant number of 
regulations80 supported the preparation and mitigation of risks associated 
with natural gas supply (EU, 2017a).  
                                                   
80 “Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ L 211, 
14.8.2009, p. 94).  
Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing 
an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 1).  
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 (OJ L 
211, 14.8.2009, p. 3 6).   
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 
concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC 
(OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 1)” (EU, 2017a). 
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That multiple internal and external sources should increase security 
of supply holds not necessarily true. As Stern (2002) noted it depends 
amongst others on source, transit and facility. A risk-based approach to 
assess the security of supply in the European gas market has been initiated 
for common and national risks. “October 2018 Member States shall notify to 
the Commission the first common risk assessment once agreed by all 
Member States in the risk group and the national risk assessments” (EU, 
2017a). The foundation of risk is based on sustainability of gas usage for a 
set period of time.  
 The N-1 formula describes the ability of the technical 
capacity of the gas infrastructure to satisfy total gas demand 
in the calculated area in the event of disruption of the single 
largest gas infrastructure during a day of exceptionally high 
gas demand occurring with a statistical probability of once 
in 20 years. (EU, 2017a, p. Annex 2) 
The Norwegian upstream supply has been categorised as the North 
Sea gas supply risk group. Through the mathematical model the risk 
exposure of the upstream supply of Norwegian gas supply can be calculated. 
Factors affecting the risk include the availability of an alternative route to 
transmit gas and bi-directional gas flow. In the Norwegian offshore gas 
supply this alternative could inter alia be captured with Sleipner and 
Heimdal for further transport to end locations. The Security of Supply 
Regulation appears to have little relevance for this research, e.g., there 
appears no bi-directional flow requirement to and from Norway. 
Furthermore, considering Norway’s position as a non -European Union 
member and as one of the larger suppliers of natural gas to the European 
Union amounting to ~95% of its annual gas production. However, from the 
non-exhaustive list described in (EC, 2004) several security issues do have 
relevance for the thesis in relation to offshore transmission systems and will 
be briefly discussed. 
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Long-Term Contracts to Secure Infrastructure Investments 
From a historical perspective, import depending countries wanted to 
reduce technical and political supply risk and secure natural gas supply. In 
addition to building gas storages and the upcoming of dual burner capacity, 
European gas importing countries preferred to have several sources of gas 
deliveries to secure the supply and reduce price fluctuations. Germany as 
first in the early 70ties, appeared to be willing to pay a gas price that made it 
possible to develop new Norwegian gas fields and subsequently ensure 
future gas supply. This came at a cost of a long-term gas contract. It was inter 
alia for this uncertainty that long-term contracts were used to minimise risk 
from the customer side. Typical gas contracts would last 15-25 years, could 
potentially contain a take or pay (TOP) obligation i.e. 80-90% of annual 
quantity contracted and were oil price indexed.   
These long-term contracts, initially required to reduce risk and 
support the financing of the infrastructure, have been argued to be 
subsequently unnecessary for the assurance of security of supply. The 
infrastructure is in place and mature in the North Sea and to an extent in the 
Norwegian Sea. It could be argued that there would be less need for large 
capital investments to build new infrastructures.  
Market liberalisation as set out in the gas directives does not indicate 
that long-term contracts have been redefined from 15-30 years to 5-10 years, 
however terms will become more flexible and are moved away from a 
monopolistic nature. The creation and expansion of traded markets will 
largely eliminate potential take-or-pay problems, by allowing market 
players to sell volumes which are surplus to requirements argues (Stern, 
2002). Investments of up to $2bn will continue to be financed by new long-
term contracts. But there might be a major issue as to whether investments 
in excess of $5bn, and particularly in excess of $10bn, in remote greenfield 
locations will find investment funds. That investments which cannot be 
made in stages, can obtain finance when these are selling into liberalised and 
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competitive markets has been demonstrated in Norway with the building of 
the Langeled pipeline. At the cost of (2016)81NOK 9.28BN Langeled was the 
first major greenfield pipeline selling gas into a liberalised and competitive 
gas market in 2007. The owners of Gassled and Langeled initiated 
negotiations and agreed to transfer ownership in 2006. Langeled would 
provide a real rate of return of around 7% before tax (Regjeringen, 2017c).  
There is not a large number of projects of this dimension, therefore 
European and national regulators have allowed for time-limited exemptions 
from access conditions during the finalisation of the 2nd and 3rd energy 
package if such projects can make a demonstrable contribution to source and 
transit diversification. The gas directives allow for temporarily granting 
partial derogations for “exceptional risk profile of constructing those exempt 
major infrastructure projects” (EU, 2003).  
The research will further investigate whether the Barents Sea Gas 
Pipeline Infrastructure will be developed under these regulations, 
considering there is minimal infrastructure present, the location is remote, 
sensitive to higher risks, environmental issues and the gas prices that are 
significantly lower than before the Gassco 2014 study was conducted.  
Security of Assets and Health Safety Environment (HSE) 
Security of supply can also be seen from a physical asset-specific 
(Source, transit and facility) security of supply. The Norwegian gas history 
has had casualty related accidents e.g., Alexander L. Kielland82, Sleipner 
concrete base in 1991, and a helicopter crash in 2016 which have had an 
impact on HSE and subsequent cost. However, further investigation has not 
provided evidence to assume supply interruption due to asset breakdown. 
The Norwegian gas infrastructure provides alternative routes for gas to be 
transported. Diversification of facilities is present, and the infrastructure is 
                                                   
81 approximately £1.7BN 
82 A Norwegian semi-submersible drilling rig that capsized while working in the Ekofisk oil field in 
March 1980, killing 123 people. 
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supported by the Pipeline Repair System (PRS) capable of rapid response for 
pipeline repair. The PRS pool was founded in 1987 and is owned by Gassco, 
Statoil, ConocoPhillips, Shell, Nord Stream, BBL Company, Lyse Neo, GdF 
Suez, BP and Woodside.  
To what extent prolonged personnel strikes might have a significant 
impact has not been investigated to date. It could thus be argued that 
security of gas supply from Norway to its customers is dependent on 
resource allocation, field development and investments in the infrastructure 
to connect and ship the gas to the end user.  
3.3. INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BARRIERS  
Countries within the European Union and EEA have additional 
national regulations to address infrastructure investment barriers. 
Addressing all involved parties in each country is too broad and outside the 
scope of this research. A general approach is provided based on the 
assumption that the aim is the development of one trans-European network 
for transporting gas as set out in the Internal Energy Market (Europarl, 2017). 
With the implementation of the Third Energy Package in 2012 came the 
unbundling of ownership of transmission systems. This allowed for more 
competition, TPA and security of supply. Within the European member 
states and in Norway as an EEA member, ownership has been unbundled. 
Under exceptional conditions new infrastructure developments may be 
exempt from unbundled ownership by the national regulator (subject to 
approval by the European Commission) provided that certain conditions 
have been satisfied (Carter & Peachey, 2015). It appears thus prudent for 
investors in the energy infrastructure to make a distinction on ownership in 
the investments made, be it through share holder interest, management 
control or financial vehicles or other options. 
Several funds have been set up, e.g., the Europe 2020 Project Bond 
Initiative designed to enable eligible infrastructure project promoters, 
usually public private partnerships (PPP) to be set up. The Trans European 
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Energy Network (TEN-E) is a part of the financial structuring of Projects of 
Common Interest (PCI). Within TEN-E, Ormen Lange and Nord Stream 
were designated as PCIs by the EU (EC, PCI, 2015). 
Financial Regulatory Barriers  
Financial regulations such as the Basel III and MiFID II have a direct 
impact on the availability of third-party finance and bank liquidity limits 
(Ledesma, et al., 2014). Several papers83, have discussed the benefits of long 
term stability and governmental reliability for investments in e.g., 
transmission systems. The expected remuneration period for new 
infrastructure projects is a substantially shorter period than the project 
lifetime. Trust in a regulatory regime takes time to build and can suffer 
instant reputational damages that last over prolonged periods (Ma, 2016). 
Traditionally banks and financial lenders invested in the funding of 
transmission system projects. Tables 3-1 to 3-4 depict the various fixed forms 
of financing in the market. The financial expertise of the bankers and lenders 
enabled supervision of projects in construction and procurement, to identify 
and mitigate risk. However, two factors have altered the position of banks 
in meeting infrastructure investment needs. One factor was the growing 
long-term requirement for transmission system investments which had 
outgrown the financial resources available to the lenders and the second 
factor was the 2008 Credit Crisis84. Regulations implemented to avoid 
another financial crisis e.g., Basel III85, MiFID II86, Solvency II, UCITS IV87 and 
the Dodd Frank Act88 are making it more complex for financers to offer debt 
on long term projects exceeding 20-30 years. Basel III has had a significant 
effect on the structuring of Project Finance (PF) contracts, which will be 
                                                   
83  (Culp, 2010; EC DG for Energy, 2011; Joskow, 2013) 
84 (Havemann, 2008) 
85 (BiiiCPA, 2017) 
86 (FCA, 2016) 
87 (EU, 2009a) 
88 (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission , 2010) 
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explained in more detail in Section 4.4. Inter alia, financial institutions are 
now required to hold a larger deposit of liquid assets resulting in tighter 
lending capacities. Furthermore, the financial institutions still capable of 
entering PF contracts will most likely reduce the length of these contracts to 
maintain the option to relocate assets to other projects. Project bonds (PB) 
have become an alternative with reduced risk, e.g., from the European 
Project Bond Institute. All the financial institutes mentioned receive returns 
from tariffs to recover the financing payments. 
The intention of regulations was that the tariffs on gas transports 
would recover the cost of financing the transport system. Due to the size of 
the capital required to upgrade and expand the European infrastructure, the 
EU set up funds to facilitate investments to support PCIs. Connecting 
Europe Facility (CEF) and the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) 
are two examples of such funds (EC, 2015). For the period of 2014 to 2020, 
EUR 5.35BN of financial support has been made available.  
The financial instruments are designed to use public 
funds as a lever and catalyst to attract additional private 
investment and thereby increase the overall volume of 
funding available for PCIs. On a larger scale, the concept of 
encouraging private investment through public financing 
instruments is applied under the EUR 315 BN EFSI, the 
centrepiece of the Juncker Plan. (EC, 2016, p. 18) 
Although funding has decreased during the years 2008-2017, the 
investment gap has been reduced. Financially attractive projects in western 
Europe, as opposed to more risk prone eastern Europe projects, have 
received capital. In a paper published by (Carter & Peachey, 2015) it is 
suggested that in accordance with the general EU strategy, support for PCIs 
is increasingly shifting to repayable financial instruments rather than grants. 
However, there remains a funding gap between the commercially viable and 
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less viable projects. Pricing challenges play a significant part in the financial 
investment incentives, high prices draw more investors. 
Oil & Gas Regulatory Barriers 
According to the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy report89, regulatory uncertainty was the most challenging factor 
related to transmission system investment in the EU. Issues include 
regulatory remuneration and the stability of the regulatory regime and 
related remuneration. These factors are equally important for the TSO as 
well as the external investors and lenders (EC DG for Energy, 2011).  
The financing of large infrastructure investments went through 
changes around 2008-2010 (Gatti, 2008). Various factors played a part in 
these changes e.g., financial regulations, change in appetite for risk and a 
change in the attitude of the banking industry to institutional investors. With 
these changes, different forms of cooperation between stakeholders and 
financial institutions brought different investment options. Transmission 
systems in Norway are financed by the Oil & Gas companies and the 
government as shareholder in Statoil and/or Petoro. The Oil and Gas 
companies, at the beginning of the establishment of Gassco-Gassled in 2001, 
either joined the Gassled JV, sold the transmission system to the Gassled JV 
and or handed over operatorship to Gassco.  
As a consequence of the change in regulations through the three gas 
directives, in combination with the 2009 low oil prices and divestment 
requirements to focus on core business, the large Oil and Gas companies90 
sold their shares in Gassled to insurance companies and infrastructure 
investors. Infrastructure investments returns are set by the Norwegian 
government at 7% pre-tax. The returns required to satisfy O&G91 companies 
                                                   
89 Study results are based on 32 interviews with TSOs in the electricity and natural gas sector and 15 
interviews with financial institutions.  
90 Statoil maintains a 5% stake in Gassled. 
91 Not taking into account the exact sub-sector of O&G companies and location. E.g., Oilfield service 
companies (OFS) could achieve returns between 8% and 12% (S&P, 2017) whilst pumping companies 
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IRR are estimated to be around 12-15%. Oil companies, desperate to keep 
shareholders satisfied by paying high dividends, additionally wanted to be 
able to receive the right amount of leverage based on strong returns. The 
financial institutions, normally investing in the upstream sector for high 
returns, were under pressure from financial regulators and the investments 
were restricted. 
3.4. INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS 
The OECD paper Infrastructure Financing Instruments and 
Incentives identified “the root cause solution for financial investment 
interest is risk mitigation” (OECD, 2015). This section explores financial 
investment solutions from a risk reduction and financial reward perspective 
based on different financial instruments.  
A substantial number of different risks are associated with the 
development of a subsea pipeline, including engineering, procurement and 
construction (delays, extra costs, technical failure), operational (limited 
production, increase in costs, quality of the gas), supply contract (deficit or 
supply, interruptions, price of supply), financial markets (rates of return, 
currency), market fluctuations (demand, price of gas, delay in payments), 
and politics (expropriation, political turmoil, regulation). Major risks 
associated with field projects and infrastructures are transferred to insurance 
companies directly or indirectly through the insurance of the EPC firm e.g., 
SBM and the Yme platform in the Norwegian North Sea Sector (SBM, 2013). 
Insurance and reinsurance companies are often heavily involved in projects 
as providers of project completion insurance and O&M risks. In fact, 
(re)insurers play such a large role in some projects that they become de facto 
or de jure cosponsors of the project (Culp, 2010). 
 A gas project is subject to financial and non-financial risks. This 
section will focus on the financial risks. To further discuss solutions to the 
                                                   
might achieve higher IRR 15%-20%.  
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financing and investment challenges, the risks associated with these 
challenges will be divided into three categories. 1) Technical risk, related to 
engineering, producing and operating capabilities. 2) Regulatory risk e.g., as 
discussed in the tariff reduction in the Gassled versus The Norwegian 
Government case. 3) Economic risk as a result of non-viable resources as in 
the example of Polarled. An aggregate of multiple factors is required to 
interest sufficient financial investors, whether through private, public or 
PPP92 funding. 
Technical Solutions 
 The history of Norwegian resource development has been 
highlighted with technically innovative solutions. Furthermore, Gassco’s 
performance record as operator has been optimal with a system regularity93 
of 99.71% and quality of 99.98%. In addition to the fact that the transmission 
system operator does not bear risk during the construction phase, the need 
to offer technical advances to financiers is deemed minimal. Typically, 
financiers prefer the use of proven technology (Ledesma, et al., 2014). Corielli 
(2010) discusses the risk shifting of non-financial contracts. Offtake 
agreements, supply contracts, equipment procurement contracts, guarantees 
in project financing are used to transfer risk to counterparties. However, the 
counter-party to the contract determines effectiveness of risk transfer. 
Due to Gassco’s high regularity and quality rate, in addition to the 
lack of significant disputes on technical transportation matters in Gassco’s 
history, the risk related to the occurrence of technical issues will be assumed 
low. Subsequently technical solutions appear to have limited impact on 
investment decisions once the design has been approved during the PDO-
PIO phase. 
                                                   
92 A comprehensive list of all public and private funding forms is described in the Appendix 
93 Regularity is measured as the volume delivered from the transport system (Gassled area D) in relation 
to shipper orders. Quality standards are measured in relation to the gas quality delivered from the 
transport system (Gassco, 2016). 
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Regulatory Solutions 
Governmental decisions, e.g., policy changes, or supra-national 
regulations can have a substantial impact on an investment decision. 
Furthermore, it can have implications in different parts of the transmission 
system investment with later consequences. Table 3-1 depicts the regulatory 
risks associates with each stage of the development of the transmission 
system. 
Development 
phase 
Construction 
phase 
Operational 
phase 
Decommissioning 
phase 
Environmental 
review, e.g., 
ministry of 
fishery 
Permit delay 
or 
cancelation  
Tariff 
changes 
Contract 
termination 
Rise in pre-
construction 
cost 
Contract re-
negotiations 
Currency 
convertibility 
Decommissioning, 
Asset transfer  
Change in Taxation 
Social acceptance 
Change in regulation or legal environment 
Table 3-1 Regulatory risk  
Source adapted from: OECD (2015)  
The final report to the European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy (EC DG for Energy, 2011) discusses recommendations to close 
financing gaps regarding the trans-European energy networks (TEN-E). Five 
solutions were provided,  
Solution 1) Improve the regulatory environment for the financing of 
energy infrastructure.   
Solution 2) facilitate equity financing (see Table 3-3), 
Chapter 3 
 
 92 
 Solution 3) Enhance debt financing (see Table 3-2),  
Solution 4) Specific project financing (Table 3-4 provides an overview 
of the financial instruments) and, 
Solution 5) Increase transparency in financial denominators or 
multiples (EC DG for Energy, 2011).  
Not all solutions would provide a satisfactory result in a Norwegian 
investment context. E.g., the Norwegian regulations resulting in a permitting 
process taking between 2-6 months, are well documented, and incorporate 
environmental and social impact analysis from the engineering stage to 
decommissioning. Furthermore, increasing transparency through the use of 
financial indicators and standardisation of accounting practices in the EU are 
based on International Accounting Standards (IAS) (Regnskapsstiftelsen, 
2017). The Norwegian Accounting Standards Board94 (NASB) complies with 
these standards95.  
Changes in national regulations have a valid place as a financial and 
investment incentive, if changes can be made in favour of investment, but 
they can be opposed to (additional) investment. Norway faces challenges 
with inter alia social acceptance of usage of fossil fuels. The opposing 
implications of Norway’s position as a supplier of natural resources can be 
seen on one side in the commitment to COP21, divesting from all coal power 
in its Sovereign Wealth Fund portfolio, but on the other side in discussing 
the proposal to open Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja (LoVeSe) to exploration 
for oil & gas (The Conversation, 2016). The proposal was opposed in 2016 by 
environmentalists and has yet to be decided upon.     
Solutions on a national level could be implemented through 
regulatory remuneration. This would provide the regulator with an option 
of a predetermined time frame and return to recover investments made in 
                                                   
94 Norwegian companies listed in an EU/EEA securities market follow IFRSs since 2005. Dispute over 
IFRS for SME is June 2017 
95 Despite this compliance, Norway is stepping back from an ambitious plan to introduce of IFRS for 
SMEs based accounting standards (Deloitte, 2017). 
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the transmission system in each specific phase of the life cycle e.g., increasing 
the Return on Equity for infrastructure expansion96compared to 
maintenance. Taking the three gas directives into consideration, it is 
arguable that changes in regulation come with significant challenges. 
Financial and Investment Solutions  
There are several options for financing infrastructure, through 
private finance, on the balance sheet, project finance and through an EU 
fund/grant or through EU leverage. Private finance, i.e., corporate finance, 
for public infrastructure projects is not a new concept: the English road 
system was renewed in the 18th and early 19th centuries using private- 
sector funding based on toll revenues; the railway, water, gas, electricity, and 
telephone industries were developed around the world in the 19th century 
mainly with private-sector investment (Yescombe, 2013).  With the growth 
of private sector investment in infrastructures came a new class of 
(infrastructure) investors such as Macquarie Infrastructure & real assets 
(MIRA), Brookfield Asset Management, Global Infrastructure Partners. In 
addition, subsidiaries from banks such as Deutsche Asset Management, JP 
Morgan, UBS and insurers like Allianz and Aviva. There are several reasons 
which justify investment in infrastructure from a financial institute’s 
perspective; stable and predictable cash flows during the operational phase 
of the project’s life cycle, ROI insensitive to fluctuations, with relatively high 
recovery rates compared with low default rates. Furthermore, good credit 
ratings and the possibility to enhance one’s reputation by being seen to 
finance social infrastructure (OECD, 2015). 
Private corporations have options to obtain resources to invest 
through lending. The fixed income options are depicted in table 3-2. 
                                                   
96 Germany utilises a 9.29% and 7.56% pre-tax return (EC DG for Energy, 2011).   
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Debt 
 Infrastructure Finance instrument Market vehicles 
Asset 
Category 
Instru-
ment 
Infrastructure 
project 
Corporate 
balance sheet 
Capital pool 
Fixed 
Income 
Bonds  Project Bonds Corporate 
bonds, green 
bonds 
Bond Indices, 
Bond Funds, 
ETFs 
Sub-sovereign 
bonds 
Green bonds Subordinated 
bonds 
Loans Direct/Co-
Investment 
lending to 
Infrastructure 
project 
Direct/Co-
investment 
lending to 
infrastructure 
corporate  
Debt funds 
Syndicated Project 
Loans 
Syndicated 
Loans, 
Securitized 
Loans (ABS), 
CLOs 
Loan Indices, 
Loan Funds 
 
Table 3-2 Fixed Income bonds and loans  
Source:  Adapted from OECD (2015) 
Bonds and loans are established instruments to obtain capital for 
private firms to invest in infrastructures. The cost of capital obtained will be 
shown on the corporate balance sheet. Another option for a private firm to 
raise capital is through equity. Table 4-2 below depicts the instruments 
available on the equity market. 
Equity 
Another form of finance that supplements debt is through equity. 
There is no standard equity funding structure and the exact details of timing 
and mechanisms for funding will be determined through negotiation 
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between the sponsors and the lenders (Clews, 2016). The various types of 
funding for equity are displayed in table 4-3.  
  
 Infrastructure Finance instrument Market vehicles 
Asset 
Category 
Instru
ment 
Infrastructure 
project 
Corporate 
balance sheet 
Capital pool 
Equity Listed Yield/Cos Listed 
infrastructure 
& utilities 
stocks, Closed- 
end Funds, 
REITs, IITs, 
MLPs  
Listed 
Infrastructure 
Equity Funds, 
Indices, trusts, 
ETFs  
 Unlist
ed 
Direct/Co-
Investment in 
infrastructure 
project equity, 
PPP  
Direct/Co-
Investment in 
infrastructure 
corporate 
equity  
Unlisted 
Infrastructure 
Funds  
Table 3-3 Equity financing  
Source: Adapted from OECD (2015) 
The listed and unlisted issuance of equity is often the only option 
available for exploration companies. E&P firms in general do not produce 
tangible energy resources and thus have limited options to result in debt in 
lack of significant cash flow of selling resources. In addition, gas price 
volatility increases the investment risk factor in the sector resulting in a 
smaller share of equity to debt in generated funds and corporate debt finance 
(Clews, 2016). 
Hybrid Finance  
Mezzanine finance provides credit for the potential funding gap 
between the senior debt loans and equity.  
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 Infrastructure Finance instrument Market 
vehicles 
Asset 
Category 
Instru-
ment 
Infrastructure 
project 
Corporate 
balance sheet 
Capital pool 
Mixed Hybrid Subordinated 
Loans/Bonds, 
Mezzanine Finance  
Subordinated 
Bonds, 
Convertible 
Bonds, 
Preferred 
Stock  
Mezzanine 
Debt Funds, 
 
Hybrid Debt 
Funds  
Table 3-4 Hybrid financial instruments  
Source: adapted from OECD, 2015 
Usage of Hybrid Finance is increasing but is subordinated to 
“traditional” debt and equity loans. Mezzanine finance is a collective term 
for hybrid forms of finance and contains characteristics of debt and equity. 
Typical examples comprise subordinated loan, participating loan, ‘silent’ 
participation, profit participation and convertible bonds (EC, 2014). Table 3-
5 depicts a hypothetical division of an investment into 4 parts (25% each) 
with the aforementioned finance forms and the anticipated return rates. 
Mezzanine finance lenders have a position inferior to lenders but superior to 
equity providers. Mezzanine finance is unsecured, provides higher returns 
and higher risk.   
Tranche Pay priority  Return 
Equity 4) highest risk. Absorbs the first 25% of 
losses on the portfolio 
15+% 
Preferred Equity 3) absorbs the next 25% of losses 11-15% 
Mezzanine Debt 2) the next 25% 6-10% 
Senior Debt 1) final 25%, lowest risk. 4-5% 
Table 3-5 Tranches of finance in mezzanine finance  
Source Author’s own, adapted from (EC, 2014) 
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The different tranches yield different returns for each investment 
form. Regardless of incentives to invest or investment form, all rational 
investors make use of decision criteria that are applied in corporate finance 
and which are accepted as common practice. In order to identify cost benefit, 
valuation methods with time value and without time value are used. Cash 
flow modelling and payback97 rules are applied without time value. Both are 
valid methods to provide a reasonable result.  Net present value (NPV) and 
Internal rate of return (IRR) are time value base methods98 and provide more 
insight into returns over a prolonged time as is the case with transmission 
system investments.  
A diversification of investors to meet the hybrid model is growing in 
the LNG market in which portfolio players with medium and long-term 
contracts see improving margins on sales linked to hub or LNG spot prices. 
Rogers (2017) further suggests that the advantages the oil and gas majors 
bring to the portfolio players compared with the independents and smaller 
players inter alia consist of well-developed portfolios of LNG supply sources 
and destination markets. These advantages would allow the portfolio player 
to see higher value in new LNG projects (intrinsic and extrinsic value) 
relative to the stand-alone player (Rogers, 2017). 
Project Financing (PF) 
The connection between Transaction Cost Economics and Project 
Finance as a potential option has been identified by Williamson; 
Whereas most prior studies of corporate finance have 
worked out of a composite-capital setup, I argue that 
investment attributes of different projects need to be 
distinguished. I furthermore argue that rather than regard 
debt and equity as "financial instruments," they are better 
                                                   
97 For further reading on Cash flow modelling and pay-back rule see (Bhattacharyya, 2011 p. 175) 
98 A brief description of time valued methods has been set out in the appendix. 
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regarded as different governance structures (Williamson, 
1988, p. 576) 
Project finance is a method of raising long-term debt financing for 
major projects through "financial engineering," based on lending against the 
cash flow generated by the project alone. It is dependent on detailed 
evaluation of operations, expected revenue risks, distribution of revenues 
between investors, lenders, and other parties through contractual and other 
arrangements (Yescombe, 2013). Project Finance in the O&G industry is used 
by project sponsors to raise capital as an alternative method next to capital 
and equity. Specifically, it provides an option for NOCs IOCs or JVs with 
smaller portfolios and reduced cash flows to attract equity or favourable 
interest rates to compete with large IOCs. Project finance might be an option. 
The BSGI report refers to “smaller players needing to bundle resources and 
assets to optimise the efficiency of a trunk-line”. The increased usage of 
Project Finance in the international petroleum industry is depicted in Table 
3-6 denoted in executed projects. 
 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
PF-
Projects 
42,725 51,836 28,437 37,257 43,450 64,652 50,281 77,195 
Table 3-6 Project Finance projects per year  
Source: adapted from Clews, 2016 
The borrower is usually a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) that is not 
permitted to perform any function other than developing, owning, and 
operating the installation. The consequence is that repayment depends 
primarily on the project’s cash flow and on the collateral value of the 
project’s assets (Clews, 2016). 
In the case of oilfield development, Project Finance started to be used 
in the United States during the 1930s and later in Europe at the beginning of 
the 1980s (Croce & Gatti, 2014). An advantage of Project Finance is the 
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detailed contracting that needs to take place for the project to commence, 
thus reducing imperfect information and resulting in efficient credit 
appraisal. It could thus be argued that PF provides research settings free 
from portfolio effects, institutional overlap and historic precedents and 
clearly defined in terms of project context (Müllner, 2017). Project Finance 
has been frequently used in the O&G sector, more specifically on gas, 
consisting of large infrastructure projects with high initial capital cost before 
production (Ledesma, et al., 2014). The available capital for project finance is 
inter alia, dependent on the overall liquidity of the global financial system, 
and the relative competitiveness of that specific project (Giamouridis, 2015).  
Project finance techniques have also been used more frequently to 
fund offshore infrastructure, particularly floating structures. In fact, project 
finance is now a well-established source of funding for FPSOs and similar 
offshore facilities. Finally, a similar judgement can be made for the shipping 
sector which has many features in common with project finance (Clews, 
2016).  
Advantages of Project Finance include separation of existing 
infrastructure from the to build pipeline. The Special Purpose Company i.e., 
a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) is the direct owner of the pipeline. Cash 
flows are generated through an agreement with e.g., Gassco as the operator 
of the complete transmission system. Such a construction requires regulatory 
approval. Investors in addition to the TSO have direct control over the asset. 
A project finance approach is clearly the preferred structure from an 
investors' perspective for legal separation and asset ownership (OECD, 
2015). Disadvantages are the risk to investors of insolvency of the 
participants of the SPC and the TSO and, in the case of cross-border 
pipelines, more complex contracts.  
3.5. CONCLUSION 
EU energy packages and competition regulations were intended to 
promote perfect competition and economic efficiency. This was done 
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through the separation of structural and functional segments of the 
transmission system, providing third party access and unbundling of sale 
and transmission services giving end-users an option to choose a provider 
matching the customer’s criteria.  
All three gas directives and regulations make note of upstream 
pipelines; however, the relevance is minimal to offshore high-pressure 
pipelines and more directed at regulation of low pressure gas transport to 
end-users. The impact on the implementation of the Norwegian offshore 
transmission system was minor. As for the timing, it could be argued that 
the gas directives came at a welcome time since pre-Gassled-Gassco, a 
plenitude of gas pipeline systems was established with different owners, 
different tariffs and different terms and conditions for transport. 
Transporting gas required several transport agreements with several 
owners, on different terms. This represented an obstacle to efficient 
utilisation of the infrastructure, and a need therefore arose for coordination 
of the transport systems (Regjeringen, 2017c). Gasled 1 was proposed in 1995 
however did not receive governmental approval at that time. The 
establishment in 2001 of Gassco and Gassled solved the issue of multiple 
systems, owners and tariffs, albeit at the cost of access.  
Whilst the origins of increasing competition through supranational 
regulation were a factor in several cases between the European Court and 
Norway, e.g., Ruhrgas, Thyssengas and GFU unwinding as discussed in 
Chapter 2, competition was opened up with the implementation of the gas 
directives. The Norwegian government provided a return on investment for 
the transmission system owners based on tariff payment for shipped gas. 
The intention was to provide “the owners with reasonable returns while also 
preventing additional profits from being taken out in pipelines and 
treatment facilities” (Regjeringen, 2017c). This ensures the earnings are 
extracted on the fields and not in the transport system and thus leaving the 
risk in the field development (Stern, 2017c). 
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Furthermore, the European Union regulation focussed on Security of 
Supply, as stated in the document “concerning measures to safeguard the 
security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010”. The 
document described that for matters concerning offshore pipelines “only 
when several gas infrastructures are connected to a common upstream or 
downstream gas infrastructure and cannot be separately operated, they shall 
be considered as one single gas infrastructure” (EU, 2017a). It could thus be 
argued that supranational regulations related to offshore pipelines are 
limited. 
The introduction of supra-national regulation had as a downside 
reduced investments in infrastructure. Despite EU financial support in the 
form of grants, bonds and loans at reduced rates, for investment in EU 
Projects of Common Interest, the outcome has been suboptimal.  
Whilst on one hand the regulations promote investment, from a 
financial regulatory perspective on the other hand, MiFID and Basel II and 
III reduced the funding power of the recognized financial institutions in 
energy transmission systems. Financing conditions, with infrastructure 
characteristics resulted in additionalchallenges i.e., higher costs of capital 
and prolonged credit maturities related to acquiring infrastructure 
investment capital. Under Solvency II a similar position has emerged for 
long term capital investments of pension funds and insurance funds. In 
addition, investment funds also face new requirements relating to the 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) Directive, making it less 
interesting for non-EU investors (EC DG for Energy, 2011).  
Despite these barriers several solutions have been discussed. 
Technical solutions in this Chapter are seen as engineered financing models 
insured by the EPC companies. This has been arranged through various 
contract forms in which shared risk and participation of the EPC firm has 
been the coming trend. Regulatory solutions are another possibility, the EU 
gas directives are set up to leave the implementation to the regulators on a 
national level. However, implementation or change of regulations can be a 
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prolonged process, and regulatory change can have a negative effect on 
investments long term if trust in a government diminishes. There are 
dispensation addendums in the energy packages and network codes to 
provide alternative options if agreed upon, with Nord Stream offshore 
pipeline as an example.  
A foundation has been laid to explore the options for financial 
solutions. Based on theoretical underpinning of Transaction Cost Economics 
and the discussion of the value of Project Finance, its application will be 
further explained in the context of large capital infrastructure investments in 
which asset-specificity is a key factor. The upside and downside are 
discussed and reflected upon in light of TCE and PA theory in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
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4. Regulatory Factors on the NCS 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
From the moment evidence started mounting that Norway might 
have natural resources under its seabed, the government took a proactive 
role in developing them. Through implementation of royal decrees, laws, 
regulation and policies on one side, the Norwegian government controlled 
the gradual and guided development of ownership and resources. Through 
contract negotiations on the other side it developed the sales of natural gas 
to importing countries in Europe99. This provided Norway with a set of rules 
that allowed it to control the sales of gas to Europe through a state monopoly 
with commercial characteristics.  
The essence of this Chapter is not to depict the complete regulatory 
and legal system but to continue the discussion from Chapter 3 on regulation 
from a Norwegian perspective. The chapter describes the origins and 
interaction of the Norwegian regulations in place, which are used to control 
the exploration and production of natural resources on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf.  
Chapter 4 draws further on investments in the European 
transmission systems in light of neo-classical theory. Section 4.1. will explain 
the neoclassical theory which is applied in the European Union, where 
                                                   
99 A distinction is made here that Norway is part of the EEA, however remains a non-EU member. This, 
inter alia, being the outcome of two referenda held in 1972 and 1994.  
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security of supply, competition and sustainability, three drivers of the 
European regulatory framework, have resulted in market failure through 
inefficiencies, externalities, poor communication resulting in sub-par 
investments. It could be argued that competition did not solve anticipated 
failure so that regulatory intervention was required. A substantial amount 
of research has been done on the implications of the European Union Gas 
Directives on Europe’s security of supply and sustainability. Based on the 
gas directives and Norwegian national regulations the development of the 
transmission system is left to the communication between the oil & gas 
companies to incentivise investments through Gassco-Gassled and the 
Government. As Shaton (2014) discusses, efficient regulation is required to 
ensure long term investment for the transmission system. It is in this setting 
that there are additional discrepancies. Investments can be made through a 
variety of financial methods/vehicles. Currently there are two main streams 
of investment in offshore infrastructures, balance sheet and project finance.  
There are several investor types which could invest independently, 
direct or in a public private ownership100 in some form or structure. Project 
finance for the purpose of this research divides project finance into a private 
framework, or a public framework. The fact that project finance is growing 
could be argued as a sign that TCE is a valid method for this research, but 
the use of project finance is more complex101 and thus less efficient. A Cost 
Base Analysis (CBA) can be made and will be explained in section 4.3 and 
applied in Chapter 7. Section 4.4 discusses several solutions which would 
increase investment and explains the different financial models and vehicles 
commonly used. Section 4.5 concludes on the possibilities and provides 
                                                   
100 For further details on Private public ownership configurations see appendix Section 8.9 
101 Complexity can be thought of as the “incompleteness becomes more severe as the number of features 
of transactions (precision, linkages, compatibility) across which adaptations are needed increases and as 
the number of consequential disturbances that impinge upon these features increases” (Tadelis & 
Williamson, 2010). 
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support for question A and the judgements that can be deduced from the 
data.  
4.2. NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION  
The following description of the Norwegian regulatory system is a 
summary from (Norskpetroleum, 2017e). Although the Norwegian political 
organisation is founded on a significant number of decrees, policies and 
regulations, this Section will only discuss the roles, responsibilities and 
regulations that have a substantial impact on natural resource exploration 
and development and on offshore pipeline systems. 
 
Figure 8 State organisation of petroleum activities  
Source: NPD, (2017b)  
The Storting (Norwegian Parliament) is responsible for the legislative 
framework related to petroleum activities. In addition, it participates in 
discussions on large projects which have an influence on the development of 
the NCS resources. The Storting controls the Government and Public 
administration. Despite changes in the ruling government between e.g., left 
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(Venstre102) and right-wing (Høyre) parties, the framework for Norwegian 
petroleum policy has refrained from significant changes. 
From a hierarchal perspective the Government, assisted by the six 
Ministries as depicted in Figure 7, is responsible for the execution of the 
Petroleum Policies and reports to the Storting. 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) is responsible for 
resource management and the overall petroleum sector. In addition, it has 
taken on the task of managing the State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) in 
Gassco, Petoro and Statoil. 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) is directly responsible 
to the MPE. Its duties consist of petroleum management and it is an advisory 
body for the Ministry. The NPD has administrative authority over petroleum 
E&P in the NCS and has powers to adopt regulations, additionally make 
decisions under the petroleum legislation. 
The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is responsible for the 
working environment and for safety and emergency preparedness in the 
petroleum sector. 
The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) is the body responsible for 
technical and operational safety, emergency preparedness, and deals with 
accidents and issues related to the working environment. It reports directly 
to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. 
The Ministry of Finance has two main responsibilities in relation to 
oil and gas exploration. One is the taxation system of the oil and gas sector, 
the second is the responsibility for the Sovereign Wealth Fund i.e., “the 
Pension fund”. 
The directorate of Customs and Excise reports directly to the ministry 
of finance and is responsible for tax assessments. 
                                                   
102 Sosialistisk Venstreparti (left wing Socialist party), Høyre is considered the Conservative party 
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The Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible in 
relation to natural resources for any serious pollution which may occur in 
Norwegian waters. 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration is the executing body which reports 
directly to the Ministry of Transport and Communications and is responsible 
for oil spill preparedness and response. 
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries is consulted as part of 
the procedures for awarding licences, to facilitate coexistence between the 
petroleum and fisheries industries. Additionally, The Norwegian Guarantee 
Institute for Export Credits (GIEK) is the central Norwegian governmental 
agency responsible for issuing export credits and investment guarantees. 
GIEK operates under the authority of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Fisheries, which contains a section that oversees export and 
investment guarantees and domestic industry financing.  
The Ministry of Climate and Environment has overall responsibility 
for environmental policy and environmental protection in Norway. It has a 
subordinate agency, the Norwegian Environmental Agency, with 
responsibilities under the Pollution Control Act. 
State participation 
In addition to the ministries, subordinate bodies and agencies, the 
Norwegian government has significant stakes in the operational segments of 
the oil and gas industry. The Norwegian state participates 100% in Gassco, 
100% in Petoro, 67% in Statoil and ~46% in Gassled through its share in 
Petoro. 
Norway has an extensive institutional framework to foster 
sustainable development and coordinates with European policies 
concerning the natural gas market. Whereas several European countries 
have different approaches for onshore production, offshore production and 
transportation of petroleum resources, Norway does not. Facilities for the 
production of subsea petroleum deposits and facilities for transport of 
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petroleum are covered under the Petroleum Act, regardless of whether the 
facilities are located offshore or on land (NPD, 2010b). 
NORWEGIAN 
FRAMEWORKS/POLICES 
1 Petroleum Act: Act relating to 
petroleum activities (the Petroleum Act), 
29 November 1996, No. 72;  
2 Petroleum Regulations: Regulations to 
the Act relating to petroleum activities, 27 
June 1997, No. 65; 
3 Regulations relating to stipulation of 
tariffs, etc. for specific facilities, 20 
December 2002, No. 1724; 
4 Regulations relating to third party 
access to facilities, 20 December 2005, No. 
162;  
Table 4-1 Norway petroleum regulations  
Source: NPD, 2015c  
The regulation of Norway’s natural resources started with the royal 
decree of 1963 determining that: 
The sea-bed and the subsoil in the submarine areas 
outside the coast of the Kingdom of Norway are under 
Norwegian sovereignty as regards exploitation and 
exploration of natural resources, as far as the depth of the 
super-adjacent waters admits of exploitation of natural 
resources, within as well as outside the maritime boundaries 
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otherwise applicable, but not beyond the median line in 
relation to other states (Storting, 1963). 
Since there were no previous private owners, it was a 
straightforward matter for the state to declare itself the proprietor. Both the 
cabinet decree, and the contracts which all International Oil Companies had 
to sign in order to be allocated concession rights, contained procedures to 
ensure the state’s sovereign right of intervention and regulation of the IOCs’ 
practices. The decree did not include any rules on safety as such but stated 
that if the state were to appoint inspectors, the companies had to provide 
access and follow directives (Ryggvik, 2010). Norway was careful to address 
the issue of the exact boundaries of the to be defined Norwegian Continental 
Shelf, whilst getting information about its resources. This required careful 
consideration on licensing103whilst ensuring the participation of IOCs (due 
to lack of an experienced NOC) with a limited budget. With these objectives, 
Norway offered licenses for a large section of its continental shelf and 
imposed low taxes and royalties. The royalties were set at 10% instead of the 
commonly used 12.5% in other North Sea areas with a corporate income tax 
of 41.8% (Lund, 2014). It could be argued that although Norway did not take 
an initial high financial risk, it risked a large portion of its shelf. It was the 
largest allocation ever in the Norwegian sector (42,000 km2) as depicted in 
Figure 3. Based on minimal regulatory conditions for IOCs and no 
noteworthy involvement by Norwegian companies, Norway represented a 
minority share in 21 of the 81 blocks allocated in the first round. The Ekofisk 
discovery from this round in which Petronord only had a 6.7% share (which 
due to the size of reserves is still a considerable share) proved difficult in 
relation to Norwegian participation and in the field development. It was 
recognised that “these matters should not be left to a small number of civil 
                                                   
103 See Figure 2 
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servants and members of the government through the ministry of industry 
and foreign affairs” (NPD, 2017b). 
Several issues were identified in that period. A main feature of the 
Norwegian political economy was and still is the desire to maintain national 
control over important areas of the economy, especially where it concerns 
the utilisation of the country’s natural resources (Lie, 2011). This appears 
particular characteristic of Norway considering it has dominated two 
referenda104 whether to join the European Union, inter alia over control of 
natural resources. The discovery of natural resources came with two 
significant problems. One was the revenue stream that accompanied the 
large finds of the early seventies and how to avoid what has been called “the 
Dutch Disease105”. The second problem involved the recovery of natural 
resources in an organised timely manner. This led to further discussions106 
around the role of foreign companies (IOCs), the combination of private and 
publicly owned companies, and an increase of local content with sufficient 
knowledge in oil and gas matters. 
The idea was to have a 100% state-owned oil company as political 
agent to maintain Norwegian traditions and have a national identity. 
Although there was an attempt to select Norsk Hydro107for the position the 
final decision on the14th of June 1972 resulted in the establishment of Den 
Norske Stats Oljeselskap A.S. (Statoil) a state-owned oil company, and the 
                                                   
104 “Norway has applied for membership in the EC/EU four times: 1962, 1967, 1970 and 1992. The 1962 
and 1967 applications were vetoed by France, as was also the case for the UK. In 1972 53.5 per cent of the 
Norwegian voters, in a referendum, rejected the 1970 application. In 1994 52.2 per cent of the voters 
rejected the 1992 application. Both in 1970-72 and 1992-94 long and hard negotiations between the EU 
and Norway took place. Before the EU referendum in 1994 Norway entered the EEA-agreement 
(European Economic Area)” (Claes, 2002) 
105 The Dutch disease received its name from the increase in services in the petroleum industry after the 
find of the Groningen field in 1959 at the expense of other industries such as industry and agriculture  
106 While the Labour party had traditionally looked favourably upon state-run industry, the more 
conservative and liberally inclined opposition was more sceptical and restrictive in its attitude to state 
ownership. (Lie, 2011), (Ryggvik, 2010), (Austvik, 2011) present further details of the political situation 
during this period. 
107 In 1971, just before the end of Per Borten’s centre-right government, the Ministry of Industry had tried 
to create the conditions for Norsk Hydro to become the dominant Norwegian national oil company. A 
bank took on the task of secretly buying up shares in order to secure more than 50 % for the state. 
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Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) as regulator (Austvik, 2011). This 
set the foundation for Norway to control and govern its natural resource 
activities. With the establishment came the basis for Norwegian oil policies 
manifested in the 10 Oil Commandments: 
1. National supervision and control must be ensured 
for all operations on the NCS. 
2. Petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a way 
which makes Norway as independent as possible of others 
for its supplies of crude oil. 
3. New industry will be developed on the basis of 
petroleum. 
4. The development of an oil industry must take 
necessary account of existing industrial activities and the 
protection of nature and the environment. 
5. Flaring of exploitable gas on the NCS must not be 
accepted except during brief periods of testing. 
6. Petroleum from the NCS must as a general rule be 
landed in Norway, except in those cases where socio-
political considerations dictate a different solution. 
7. The state must become involved at all appropriate 
levels and contribute to a coordination of Norwegian 
interests in Norway’s petroleum industry as well as the 
creation of an integrated oil community which sets its sights 
both nationally and internationally. 
8. A state oil company will be established which can 
look after the government’s commercial interests and pursue 
appropriate collaboration with domestic and foreign oil 
interests. 
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9. A pattern of activities must be selected north of the 
62nd parallel which reflects the special socio-political 
conditions prevailing in that part of the country. 
10. Large Norwegian petroleum discoveries could 
present new tasks for Norway’s foreign policy (NPD, 2010a). 
Until 1972 the IOCs dominated the Norwegian oil and gas industry. 
The government wanted to maintain the IOCs in place, but also wanted to 
grow Statoil into a company that would conduct operations across the 
complete value chain from exploration, production, transportation, and 
refining to selling oil and gas. The government wanted to build on the 
knowledge of the IOCs and grow local knowledge. It was decided that the 
state would have a minimum of 50%108 of each production license and that 
this proportion could be increased or reduced as and when needed. The 
shared licenses insured knowledge sharing and transfer of competencies. In 
addition, with a minimum of 50% state participation, the authorities could 
directly influence the decision-making process through voting within the 
license group. There was thus no need for the authorities to approve directly 
the exploration plans as developed by the licensees. Another part of the 
agreement was that the license period provided an option for Statoil to take 
over ownership ten years109 after commercial declaration (Al-Kasim, 2006). 
In addition to Statoil, wholly owned by the state, Norway’s partly state-
owned Norsk Hydro and private Norwegian oil company Saga Petroleum 
came to set their stamp on national offshore activities (Lie, 2011). 
                                                   
108 “The thinking at the time of the first licensing round was that the state’s revenues from discoveries 
would come exclusively in the form of taxes and duties. Prior to the second round, however, the idea of 
state participation by means of “carried interest” was launched in order to increase the government take 
from a possible future oil enterprise. The arrangements meant that the state and the oil companies 
negotiated the size of a “carried interest” agreement for each one of the blocks likely to be allocated to the 
companies. The system was time-consuming and the cause of some friction between the government and 
the oil companies. Indeed, Gulf and Shell refused to accept the idea of state participation at all (Hanisch 
and Nerheim 1992, p153). As a result, the ground was prepared for a system which would assure the 
Norwegian state of a greater revenues in a more efficient way” (Lie, 2011 page 268). 
109 The idea of stipulating a take over from an international operator was first introduced in the Statfjord 
agreement. According to this agreement Statoil had an option to take over the operatorship of the field 
ten years after declaration of commerciality 
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It was resolved that resource management and control would be 
exercised by the government and the NPD. The government110wanted 
controlled development of the NCS and limited the number of blocks per 
licensing round in addition to size, location and time period. The period 
from 1969 till 1978 can be seen as a restrictive period (Al-Kasim, 2006). The 
main reason for tight administrative control was that Norway would not 
otherwise be able to exert the desired level of control on the development of 
its petroleum resources, particularly if the activity levels were to accelerate 
without a well-planned strategy. To be precise, Norway has a long-term 
interest in its oil and gas resources.  
A link was laid between licensing and revenues. The only realistic 
way of regulating the tempo of petroleum operations was by regulating the 
speed of potential block allocations to oil companies. The mind-set behind 
this approach was that once blocks are allocated and provide resources, 
economic incentives would dictate putting the fields on stream, both from 
the company and governmental (treasury) perspective. Additionally, the 
Norwegian economy would only be able to absorb a set amount of 
production and subsequent revenues before the economy and social 
framework would suffer. However, the decision to focus on production 
turned out to have a negative impact.  
In hindsight, it could be argued that production levels would be 
dictated after allocation and licensing, and furthermore that production 
ramp up periods could take more than 15 years to get oil and gas on line. In 
1982, a government committee was appointed to oversee the tempo of 
petroleum activities. It proposed “the petroleum fund”111 which created a 
cushion between oil and gas revenues and the national economy, which 
would be able to absorb uncontrolled oil and gas income and stop it from 
entering the Norwegian economy. The government’s intervention regarding 
                                                   
110 The Storting decides on the opening of new areas of the NCS to petroleum activity, and the 
government awards licences. 
111 (NBIM, 2016) 
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tempo regulation changed from production to investment. Storting112 report 
No.46. said, 
 An investment level of 25 BN Nok can be too high 
when viewed against the desired development in the rest of 
the Norwegian economy. The government will continue to 
evaluate the question of how high the investment in the 
petroleum sector should be (NPD, 2003, p. 15). 
 In the Storting report 56 of 1987-1988 113 the government once more 
explained the need for levelling out investments as part of a national effort 
towards economic recovery. The proposition once more reiterated that if the 
operators’ plans were to be followed without modifications, all fields would 
be developed in the course of two-three years. This would in turn bring the 
annual investment level up to 35-40 Million Nok (Al-Kasim, 2006). Realising 
that such high investment levels could not be sustained in the years to come, 
the government decided to prioritise marginal fields114. Essentially this 
resulted in developing gas fields in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and 
Barents Sea if and when an opening occurred in the gas market. It was 
established through the 10 commandments (NPD, 2010a) that gas should be 
exploited as a product, but marketing and selling proved challenging. 
 Regulating Gas Sales 
Before 1973115 licensees were free to negotiate terms for the sale of 
associated gas from the fields e.g., the Petronord Group for the Frigg field 
negotiated terms and sold gas directly to BG in the United Kingdom. The 
                                                   
112 “Storting Report/White papers (Meld.St.) are drawn up when the Government wishes to present 
matters to the Storting that do not require a decision. White papers tend to be in the form of a report to 
the Storting on the work carried out in a particular field and future policy”. (Regjeringen.no, 2017) 
113 The petroleum law of 1985 would be altered one more time in 1996 
114 Fields that needed to be developed within the lifetime of the existing infrastructure 
115 In the early 1970s, each gas field was sold as one by the respective owners ("depletion" or "field" 
contracts from Ekofisk and Frigg) (Austvik., 2010) Depletion contracts  are contracts which cover the 
entire contents of specified fields. 
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negotiation of gas sales proved be an important factor. There was no 
contractual requirement in the licensing that identified the need for gas sales. 
The royal decree of 1972 made a change to this practice and ruled that all oil 
and gas should 1) land on Norwegian soil and 2), require approval from the 
government setting the foundation for the controlling of gas sales in 
Norway. Furthermore Statoil, when it was established owning 50% shares of 
the licenses negotiated the sale of gas from 1973 till 1978. This approach 
proved effective in the negotiations for Statfjord, Heimdal and Ekofisk and 
resulted in the construction of the Statpipe I gas pipeline. As was set out in 
the “Ten Commandments” above the State oil company Statoil now 
controlled 50% of license shares and looked after the government’s 
commercial interests and cash flow which became considerable following 
the oil shock in 1979.  
It was argued that Statoil’s political power became too large because 
of the government’s power. It was thus decided in 1984 to reduce Statoil’s 
power by “clipping its wings116” through the establishment of the State 
Direct Financial Interest (SDFI). The SDFI, established in 1985, was to control 
80% of Statoil’s shares in licenses, leaving Statoil117 with 20%. A peculiar part 
of this arrangement was that Statoil negotiated the SDFI share (Stern, 2017c). 
Another action to further reduce Statoil’s power was the establishment of 
several committees.  
The combination of gas sales and building infrastructure 
underscored the Norwegian government decision to coordinate 
development further through the appointment of the Trunk line committee 
in 1977, tasked with the future development of pipelines on the NCS. In 1983, 
the ministry of oil and energy appointed the “gas committee” in order to 
coordinate all gas activities. This was considered necessary to optimise 
investments in the pipeline infrastructure in addition to flexibility in field 
                                                   
116 For a detailed discussion see (Austvik, 2011) and Willoch in (The Economist, 1987) 
117 With the privatisation of Statoil in 2001 the SDFI went to Petoro, Statoil arranged the negotiations for 
the transaction. 
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development in a timely manner. In order to expand expertise in 
negotiations the GFU, Gas Negotiations Committee was established in 1986 
(Stortinget, 1986). The GFU, initially set up to handle gas produced by the 
three Norwegian gas companies Statoil, Norsk Hydro and Saga was later 
transformed into the national GFU in 1987. The objectives of the latter were 
to secure field-neutral gas sale contracts allowing the government room to 
coordinate gas off-take in addition to optimal field development it already 
planned. Different types of gas sales contracts118 were developed e.g. 
depletion contracts and delivery contracts, delivery contracts being the 
dominant type. The government established the GFU and promoted 
differentiated contract models to support a robust market position against 
the off-take market119 in Europe, where a few large buyers dominated the 
buying market. As Haase (2008) described it in terms of transaction cost 
theory “hierarchy (vertical integration) captured potential risks related to 
information asymmetry, or behavioural uncertainty for instance by trading 
parties”. Offshore gas transmission systems are subject to significant upfront 
investments, ergo it made sense to minimise risk through long term delivery 
contracts and reduce the risk of underutilisation of the transmission system. 
This concept was not newly invented and applied in Norway. The principles 
were first applied by the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM) after 
the discovery the Slochteren gas field when the Dutch government had to 
renegotiate gas delivery terms. The concept was applied throughout Europe 
in the oil and gas industry. The contracts would contain one or more of the 
following criteria:  
                                                   
118 MPE approves all commercial deals, pursuant to paragraph 19 of the Decree and designates contract 
volumes to individual fields. MPE’s designating activities are called allocation of field and transmission 
system development and assignment of gas sales contracts to contractual field or supply fields. A 
contractual field is assigned the contractual responsibility for the gas deliveries to the customers, while 
the actual physical gas supplies may be assigned to other fields called the supply fields. (Dahl 2001) 
119 Big transmission companies on the Continent (such as Ruhrgas, Gasunie, and Gaz de France) 
collaborated as buyers ("the consortium"). (Austvik, 2010) 
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• Long-term: 20-30 years’ contracts, matching the duration of 
investments. 
• Take-or-pay: the buyer has to pay for a certain amount of gas each 
year regardless of whether he uses it or not in that year.  
• Market-value principle: price of gas was linked to the price of the 
alternative fuels for that customer. This was added to the long-term 
contracts after the first oil crisis, 
• Netback price: transportation costs were subtracted from the price 
the producer received. Destination clauses in some supply contracts 
assured that gas would flow to the destined market. 
• Price review clauses (typically 3-year reviews): were introduced in 
the mid-1980s to ensure that the contract price always represented 
the market value (Talus, 2011). 
The IOCs and buyers had mixed thoughts about this approach. IOCs 
were concerned about the pecking order. The IOC’s position that was set 
both for field production and gas sales ahead of actual field development 
required decisions on which field should benefit from the export quotas 
obtained and on what terms. This could mean that it was not necessarily an 
IOC field that would get preference above a national oil companies’ field.  
The time critical resources (e.g. Associated gas) would still need 
infrastructures to end up on the market and the investment required to 
develop these resources120 would be uneconomically high as stand-alone. 
Cost had become a major issue. Whilst in the seventies and early eighties 
infrastructure development focus had been on human and technological 
capabilities to install such pipelines.121 Gas prices couple to low oil prices 
($26/barrel to $9/barrel in the period ending in 1985 (BP, 2016) required cost 
containment, innovation and infrastructure optimisation. 
                                                   
120 marginal resources were first mentioned in the NPD’s annual report for 1983 (NPD, 1984) 
121 Norwegian trench, experimental saturation diving to 701 meters. 
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As a countermeasure to the rising unit cost of development there was 
emphasis on the optimal utilisation of existing infrastructure for new 
projects as a way of reducing new investments. It was however realised that 
by tying in production from several sources through few installations the 
vulnerability of the economy to accidents and unforeseeable events would 
increase. Against the backdrop of the smaller sizes of new discoveries, new 
concerns arose regarding the cost levels associated with development and 
thus the economic viability of these smaller discoveries. The authorities were 
therefore evaluating the merits and drawbacks of such joint utilisation of 
facilities from an overall national point of view (Al-Kasim, 2006). 
Whereas the marketing of Statfjord gas in the late seventies was in a 
seller’s market and the British Gas Consortium (BGC) and the continental 
consortium competed for the gas, the market in the mid-eighties was a 
buyer’s market and Norway had to make an effort to sell gas to continental 
Europe (Stern, 1990). Thus far BGC sold Frigg gas to the United Kingdom 
through the Frigg pipeline and Philips marketed Valhall gas through its 
Ekofisk buyers. An attempt to sell gas from the Sleipner field to the United 
Kingdom was aborted by the United Kingdom government122 in 1985 after 
the conclusion of negotiations between Statoil and BGC and the Department 
of Energy (DOE). It was not until gas from the Troll field was sold to 
European buyers based on a long-term contract (1986) which provided the 
option to sell associated gas from other fields, that marginal field 
development came into play. This was done with some considerable risk for 
the government, in addition to a reduction of 40% of the price123of the 
Statfjord gas (EU, 1988). It took the geopolitical124 unrest between East and 
West involving the US embargo of Russian gas and its subsequent 
inclination towards Norway for Norway to become the preferred supplier of 
                                                   
122 For a detailed discussion see (Stern, 1986; Austvik, 2010; Stern, 2002; Stern, 2004) 
123 For a detailed discussion see (Stern, 2002)  
124 For further details about this conflict see (Jentleson, 1986) and (Austvik, 1991) 
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gas to Europe. To draw even more control over the complete value chain to 
itself (and to some extent away from Statoil) the MPE established a Supply 
Committee (FU) in 1993, consisting of NOCs and IOCs to evaluate individual 
fields and subsequently which company/companies should supply gas from 
the field. In this manner, the FU was able to optimise resource development, 
and apply economies of scale and scope in a timely matter. The FU, GFU 
SDFI and Statoil all under control of the MPE represented the NGF and were 
the national policy instruments making it possible to achieve lower costs 
through economies of scope, and better resource management and 
strengthened the market position for Norwegian gas production and its sale 
(Austvik, 2011). In sum, the structure in which the NGF operated facilitated 
control which included timely investments in the infrastructure.   
 
Figure 9 Organisation of sales in the GFU period  
Source: Adapted from Austvik (2011) 
Buyers had security of supply but depended on a sole seller through 
a Statoil-led committee. Furthermore, the GFU had options to partner in 
other ventures as well, including with Wingas and the Netra pipeline in 
addition to upstream and midstream ventures. Statoil-Norsk Hydro started 
to venture into downstream activities in Germany. When the GFU declined 
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to sell gas to Wingas125 this was not received well and ended up as a court 
case with the European Union. The GFU’s intention was to maintain its 
position at the expense of Saga petroleum. The Wingas business, although 
not the only one, highlighted the frustration with the monopolistic character 
of the gas suppliers and transporters (Radetzki, 1999). There was an apparent 
need for European Member States to develop a common approach to energy 
price formation and the EU laid down general principles to be observed by 
each Member State in its energy pricing policies (EU (83/230/EEC), 1983) 
and ensure optimum use of the transmission networks and greater regularity 
in supplies during the year through further integration of the European gas 
grid. (EU, 1988). This further supported the liberalisation126process of the 
European Gas Market and would affect the MPE-GFU-FU system for 
producing, shipping and selling natural gas.  
 
Figure 10 Gassco-Gassled Sales construction  
Source: Adapted from Austvik (2011) 
                                                   
125 BASF complaint over high gas prices and competitiveness in the region. For further discussion, see 
(Radetzki, 1999; Claes, 2002; Eikland, 2004) 
126 “The term liberalization is used to describe the process that is currently underway in the European 
gas market. As noted by deregulation may remove restrictions on competition, but it may also remove 
regulation (which does not necessarily enhance competition). Liberalization, to the contrary, is used here 
to describe measures aimed only at “opening up for competition,” or for “removal of restrictions on 
competition.” (Dahl, 2001, p.33) 
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As described in Chapter 1 The change of operator-ownership from 
GFU-SDFI to Gassco-Gassled took place in 2002, with Gassco the 100% state 
owned operator and Gassled a joint venture owning the majority of the gas 
infrastructure on the Norwegian Continental Shelf i.e. pipelines, platforms, 
onshore process facilities and receiving terminals abroad.  Gassled is the 
owner and the official decision-making body for the gas transmission system 
and subsequent budgeting. It could thus be argued that Gassled functions as 
a principal and Gassco as the agent. However, that would not do the 
situation justice considering that Gassco’s role is more than that of operator.  
Efficient utilisation of existing infrastructure is an important aspect 
of the Norwegian regulatory framework. Gassled is obliged to allow for 
TPA, providing opportunities for smaller discoveries, which would 
otherwise not be financial viable to carry the full weight of offshore pipeline 
investments. To support the efficient utilisation of the offshore transmission 
system, the costs of using other parties’ facilities should be reasonable. “It 
has therefore been an important principle to ensure that as much as possible 
of the profit from petroleum production is taken out on the fields, and that 
it does not fall to the infrastructure owners” (Regjeringen, 2017c). The 
framework allows the owners of the system an acceptable return on 
investment but does not allow the owners to set tariffs. 
Gassco is responsible for the architectural role of the transmission 
system and thus for advising Gassled how and where to invest. However, 
who will Gassco ultimately report to? The State? Gassled? Petoro?  Other 
issues have been raised, for instance, “has an operator without ownership in 
Gassled the right incentives to ensure an efficient low-cost development and 
operation?” (Rekdahl, 2004). Objections to Gassco from the industry suggest 
that the company might have an incentive to expand the infrastructure 
(Løvås, 2011). As a state regulated monopoly, which by definition should not 
maximize its own profits or shareholder value, Gassco’s management may 
have incentives to increase its own influence which is possibly within the 
Chapter 4 
 
 122 
regulations, but Gassco has no direct financial interest in Gassled and is not 
affected by any Averch-Johnson effect e.g., gold plating.  
Several projects and studies have been initiated and or executed by 
Gassco that are not necessarily a direct requirement for its function. E.g., the 
Skanled pipeline (Gassco, 2007), Skogn (Gassco, 2005) and Kårstø’s Co2 
capture system (Gassco, 2009) which were politically driven and not with 
focus on Gassled’s interest. As set out in the Gassco (2016) annual report, 
bonus incentives and performance systems for personnel could be 
interpreted as ambiguous if there is a clear connection between the 
individual employee's efforts and success criteria bonus. On the other side, 
no punishment for failure is applied, leaving a risk prone situation open to 
managerial decision making. 
Gassco does not have the same incentives127 that shippers have i.e., 
wanting the lowest possible transport tariffs. It is natural to imagine that 
Gassco’s foremost consideration is to avoid disruption and the unpleasant 
attention it brings to users, Gassled owners and authorities. The bonus 
system gives incentives in the same direction (Løvås, 2011). The question 
then is whether Gassco may have similar incentives to over-invest as 
financial owners can have and wish for "the robust" construction. Users’ 
objections to increased tariffs can have little impact in such a trade-off.  
4.3. REVENUE AND CASH FLOW 
To offset the cost of installing and operating a transmission system, 
revenues must be made at least equal to this cost. Investments in 
infrastructure are perceived as lower risk128 due to the long-life span of a 
project, frequently involving government and regulation. Transmission 
                                                   
127 On the question should there be incentives for the principal agent: 
No: (Fama, 1980) Forces of reputation on managerial labour market enough to motivate manager to work 
hard, assumes managerial labour market works well 
Yes: (Wolfson, 1985) Forces of reputation help to motivate manager, but incentive contract still needed, 
suggests that managerial labour markets do not work fully well. 
128 For a discussion on different preferences towards risk (e.g., aversion/neutral/loving) (Pindyck & 
Rubinfeld, 2012) 
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system owners are driven by a Return on Equity (ROE), a Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE) or a Return on Assets (ROA). The transport systems 
established in the seventies were based on different return requirements. 
Tariffs were based on the risk associated with the investments, for example 
in Statpipe. Since it had to cross the Norwegian trench (the first transmission 
system to do so), there was additional risk, resulting in a higher rate of return 
of 10%. For the following offshore pipeline Zeepipe, the Ministry assumed 
that a return of 7% was sufficient (Regjeringen, 2017c). 
Depending on the size of the return, investing in a transmission 
system becomes more or less attractive. Before 2010 transmission system 
owners on the NCS were also producers and would earn a return on 
investments through the resources (oil, gas, condensate) as well as the 
shipping of the resources. Gassled as owner of the transmission system is 
dependent on the tariffs as a return on investment. This Section sets out the 
function of the tariffs and how it translates into revenue.  
When E&P companies had a stake in the transport system the IOCs’ 
had the key advantage of distributing their own gas first with competitive 
pricing. With the installation of an independent operator (Gassco) 
transportation was separated from the owners (Gassled). Gassco takes care 
of transportation, capacity allocation and administration, whilst the MPE 
sets the tariffs129 for gas transport through the transmission system. Inter alia, 
the MPE’s control over the tariff is to ensure that profits are taken from the 
production segment rather than the transmission of the gas.  
The tariffs provide the owners with reasonable 
returns while also preventing additional profits from being 
taken out in pipelines and treatment facilities (Regjeringen, 
2017c, p. 85) 
                                                   
129For 2017 tariffs: (Gassco, 2017a2) 
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Furthermore, the tariff ensures a rate of return for all shareholders, 
proportional to stakes in Gassled. In order to determine the rate of return, 
the tariff structure is explained. The tariff is calculated as the capital invested 
during the construction of the infrastructure K plus the investment cost per 
unit described as I/Q added to a factor to be able to expand the transmission 
system U resulting in: 
K-Element 
In order to provide a return on capital employed, the K element is 
based on throughput of gas over the pipeline’s life. More throughput equals 
a lower K. The invested capital (CAPEX), plus a 7%130 in return is calculated 
as a cost per unit, NOK/Sm3 to make up the return to investors.  
O-Element  
Operational cost (OPEX) as discussed in Section 5.3 consists inter alia 
of maintenance and running cost. The cost element is fixed per area. Once 
the sum exceeds the upper limit the cost is carried on to the I-Element. 
Area Upper limit O element 
A&B 40MM Nok x E 
C 250MM Nok x E 
D 200MM Nok x E 
E 250MM Nok x E 
F 40MM Nok x E 
G 40MM Nok x E 
BN 40MM Nok x E 
I 40MM Nok x E 
Table 4-2 Gassco AS investments in the O-Element  
Source: Lovdata (2016) 
 
                                                   
130 The reduction in 7% pre-tax return will be discussed below 
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I-Element 
Investment on the transmission system that exceeds the limits of 
table 5-4. Differences between O and I element are pay-back periods. O-
element is payed back the same booking year whilst the I-Element will be 
spread out over several years. Furthermore, the I-Element includes a 7% rate 
of return from the K-Element.  
U-Element 
Although the U-Element has never been applied, the function is to 
cover the cost of expanding the transmission system and cover engineering, 
production and installation cost. 
E-Element 
Escalating factor (E), The scaling factor for each year is determined 
on the basis of the Norwegian consumer price index published by Statistics 
Norway131. This results in the following formula: 
! = #$ + !" +&' ∗ ) + #"   
 
Tariff Calculation NCS. Source: Gassco, 2017 
Taxation  
The petroleum taxation system is based on the Petroleum Taxation 
Act of 13 June 1975 No. 35. Due to sizeable returns on oil and gas production, 
O&G companies are subject to an additional special tax. In 2017 the 
“Ordinary” company tax rate is 24 %, and the “Special” tax rate is 54 % 
resulting in a marginal tax rate of 78 %. In 2016 the taxation rates were 25 % 
and 53 %. An additional feature is introduced to safeguard normal returns 
                                                   
131 The ratio of the last index published before 1 January of the same year and the corresponding index 
as of 1 January 2002 (77.9). If the ratio is less than 1.0, E is set equal to 1.0. (Lovdata, 2016) 
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from the special tax. This comes in the form of a deduction called uplift. In 
2016 the total uplift132 was 22 %. 
 
Operating Income (norm prices) -/- 
OPEX 
Linear depreciation of Investments (6 years) 
Exploitation expenses, R&D and decommissioning 
Environmental taxes and area fees 
Net financial cost 
Corporation tax base (24%) 
Uplift (5.4% of investment for 4 years) 
Special tax base (54%) 
= Net operating profit after tax 
Table 4-3 Tax break down  
Source: adapted from (MPE, 2017) 
“The petroleum taxation system is intended to be neutral, so that an 
investment project that is profitable for an investor before tax is also 
profitable after tax” (Norskpetroleum, 2017f). The purpose of this approach 
is to optimise revenues from natural resources and accompanied services 
and encourage companies to invest in commercial projects on the NCS. This 
is in line with allowing offshore pipeline owners reasonable returns while 
also preventing additional profits from being taken out in pipelines and 
treatment facilities (Regjeringen, 2017c). Furthermore, the approach 
supports resource recovery on the NCS. 
 With these objectives, the taxation system only taxes net profits and 
allows losses to be carried over to the following period with interest. The 
other benefit of this approach is the upside it provides for investment-based 
tax deductions. With such incentives, the Norwegian government has the 
                                                   
132 5.4 per year for 4 years = 21,6 % starting with the investment year 
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possibility, to a certain extent, to steer investments to exploration or e.g., 
transmission.  
An example is the reimbursement system for exploration cost. The 
government’s focus in the years 2016 and 2017 has been on E&P, in particular 
the Barents Sea, through licensing. With the reimbursement system for 
exploration costs new O&G companies are encouraged to invest in E&P 
projects as a financially attractive option considering the carried forward 
principle if the wells are dry. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to have lead 
times up to 15 years before production of a field is actually started and 
revenues are coming in. Carrying forward losses all these years is financially 
challenging for the companies (Norskpetroleum, 2017f). The reimbursement 
system therefore supports companies investing and paying tax in 
accordance with earnings. Companies that are making a loss may choose to 
request an immediate refund of the tax value of exploration costs from the 
taxation authorities or carry losses forward to a later year when the company 
has a taxable income e.g., when it does strike gas. If a company chooses the 
immediate payment option, the exploration costs cannot be deducted from 
income in later tax assessments (Norskpetroleum, 2017f).  
Risks Associated with infrastructure investments 
Cash flows from Norwegian sector projects are mostly in NOK, so 
that international investors face additional risks. Ehlers (2014) suggests 
hedging long-term currency risks is not feasible, international financing 
often comes in foreign currencies. Although this may present a significant 
risk for investors, for the purpose of this research it will not be taken into 
consideration, just as currency devaluation could be beneficial to an 
exporting country and not for the seller, as has been the case in Russia 
(Mitrova, 2017) 
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4.4. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES 
With the change in ownership and control from Statoil and the GFU 
to the 2017 position of Statoil, Petoro, Gassco and Gassled, investment 
incentives and strategies have changed. Each participant plays a role in the 
development process leading to an investment. To determine roles, 
responsibilities and potential conflicts in investment decisions in 
transmission systems on the NCS, the roles will be further discussed. As 
operator of the transmission system Gassco has several responsibilities and 
roles (Gassco, 2017c).  
1) Special operatorship, e.g., system operation, capacity 
administration and infrastructure development. The tasks are regulated in 
accordance with the Norwegian Petroleum Activities Act. This can be 
divided into three main sections: 
• Capacity allocation 
• System operation 
• Development of the transport system 
2) Normal operatorship consists of technical operations of the 
transmission system and processing and receiving terminals on behalf of the 
owners Gassled. This operatorship is agreed upon through the terms and 
conditions (T&C) set out in the “T&C for transportation of gas in Gassled 
(Gassco, 2015). 
The Operator133 is Gassled’s representative under the 
Transportation Agreement. The Operator will conduct all 
operations in the Transportation System and, on behalf of 
Gassled, provide the Transportation Services and execute all 
Gassled’s rights and obligations under the Transportation 
Agreement”. (Gassco, 2016) 
                                                   
133 Where “Operator” means Gassco AS or its successor as determined by the Ministry 
Regulatory Factors on the NCS 
 
 129 
Framework conditions for Gassco are determined by the government 
in the Norwegian Petroleum Activities Act. From the Government side 
Gassco’s activities are regulated by the Petroleum regulations 
(Regjeringen.no, 2016b). Gassco’s relationships with the Gassled joint 
venture provides the relationship with oil and gas companies. They are 
regulated by the Act and also by the operator agreement with the Gassled 
joint venture (Regjeringen.no, 2015).  
Gassco’s task is to coordinate the processes for further development 
of the upstream gas transport network, and to assess the need for further 
development. In the context of this research it has the responsibility to 
develop and advise on efficient and effective exploration and/or 
investments to contribute to optimal management of the natural resources. 
Gassco’s web-site indicates:  
Gassco is responsible for initiating and coordinating 
development processes for the gas pipeline network and 
related facilities (process plants and receiving terminals). It 
makes its own assessments and recommendations for 
infrastructure development (Gassco, 2016)  
The licensee and the permit to develop a field/transmission system 
Project undertakings such as field development and infrastructure 
building are cost- and time line-driven. An efficient permit approval process 
reduces the time taken to start generating revenue streams to pay debt and 
shareholders, and it reduces financial cost. An approved permit is a key 
component for actually releasing funds to a project. To explore the 
requirements, an insight into the development process will be provided. 
Excerpts from the NPD “A plan for development and operation of a 
petroleum deposit (PDO) and plan for installation and operation of facilities 
for transport and utilisation of petroleum (PIO)” will be discussed (NPD, 
2010b).  
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Starting with the licensee i.e., the Oil & Gas company drilling for gas 
and having the intention to market the natural resources, distinctions can be 
made between a PDO and PIO. For simplification134 the PDO will consist of 
the exploration phase, test production, plugging and abandonment of the 
well, and the PIO the installation of e.g., a modular construction to facilitate 
production and transport including transmission system. One interesting 
fact remains, that one does not have to be a licensee for a PIO, however must 
be for a PDO (NPD, 2010b). “If a licensee decides to develop a petroleum 
deposit, the licensee shall submit to the Ministry for approval a plan for 
development and operation (PDO) of the petroleum deposit” as per section 
18 of the Guidelines for plan for development (NPD, 2010b). Furthermore, 
the PDO shall include “Information on the destination of the pipeline, route, 
dimension and transportation capacity, as well as the criteria for the choices 
that have been made”. The submitted approval shall have undergone an 
impact assessment, inter alia identifying risks with the routing and transport 
of natural resources. Even if a PIO is, or will be submitted the transportation 
information shall be submitted (NPD, 2010b). The application shall be 
forwarded to the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, Petroleum Safety 
Authority, NPD and Ministry of Labour. The MPE may decide that a licence 
to install and operate facilities shall be subject to conditions with regard to, 
inter alia: 
1) The ownership of the facility; 
2) The landing point of the pipeline; 
3) The routing, dimension and capacity of the pipeline (NPD, 2015c). 
The latter is then further detailed in “Contents of a plan to install and 
operate facilities”. Highlighting the relevant issues in relation to 
transmission systems, an overlap of one issue seems apparent, the licensee 
is required to provide detailed analysis regarding inter alia, the transmission 
system’s route and capacity in the PDO and the PIO. Gassco receives a copy 
                                                   
134 (NPD, 2010) provides detailed specification of the requirements for PDO and PIO 
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of the PIO in addition, is responsible for making an assessment on 
infrastructure development and provide recommendations directly to the 
MPE. The multifunctional role of Gassco further encompasses the 
responsibility of the further development of the upstream gas pipeline 
network (and associated facilities) lies with the operator, based on the 
licensee’s need for additional capacity (NPD, 2015c). This appears 
contradicting to the earlier sections in which the licensee was required to 
provide transport capacity and routing of the license. Figure 11 depicts the 
processes and participants involved in the infrastructure development 
process. 
 
Figure 11 Procedures for development and Operation 
Source: NPD( 2010b) 
The time required for the authorities to process a PDO or PIO is 
between two and six months. For example, the Aasta Hansteen PDO was 
submitted to the Norwegian Authorities in December 2012 and approved in 
June 2013. Process time depends in part on whether the matter must be 
submitted to the Storting as depicted in figure 10. The Storting must consider 
Chapter 4 
 
 132 
developments with an investment ceiling that exceeds a predetermined 
amount as stipulated in connection with the Storting's annual budget 
deliberations (NPD, 2010b). Permitting processes pose a potential risk to the 
timely completion and the cost of projects. This has an impact on the 
financing of projects, especially in the case of project finance via a separate 
project company (EC DG for Energy, 2011). 
Financing proficiencies for investment 
Development of a new transmission system or extending one is part 
of Gassco’s responsibilities on behalf of the Government. The planning is 
initiated by the Oil and Gas companies through a PDO and PIO, indicating 
the volumetric needs, route and landing of the pipeline and connection to a 
facility e.g. Karmøy or Nyhamna. Engineering, procuring and constructing 
transmission systems are capital intensive projects and require large 
investments.  
To which extent financing needs and financial challenges exist in a 
Norwegian context depends on various factors. If the transmission system is 
financed by Oil & Gas companies as part of the field development, and 
providing TPA is applicable, the transmission system could be integrated 
into Gassled135. Furthermore, a financial healthy O&G company or a financial 
Transmission System Owner will have the benefit of lower cost funding for 
the investment in the Norwegian infrastructure.  
Credit ratings play a significant part in the potential of financial 
capabilities. Some of the owners of Gassled have credit ratings136 allocated 
by one or more agencies for example S&P, Fitch and Moody’s.  
Company Moody’s S&P Finch 
Dong Baa1 - BBB+ 
Petoro n. a n. a n. a 
                                                   
135 Separate arrangements are made for exceptional pipelines e.g., Grane and Heidrun pipeline are 
operated my Statoil. 
136 A comprehensive list of credit rating values is depicted in the Appendix. 
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Statoil Aa3 A+  
RWE Baa3 BBB-  
Norsea n. a  n. a  
Silex (Allianz) Aa3 AA  
Solveig Pa3   
Njord  BB-  
Table 4-4 Gassled JV Credit Ratings 
Source: Moody’s, S&P, Reuters, 2017 
Gassco as a TSO does not have a credit rating. In the case of state 
ownership or significant ownership, the country’s rating could serve as an 
indication of the TSO's rating. Norway has an excellent credit rating despite 
challenges of significantly lower prices for natural resources in the period 
2008-2017. According to Moody's framework for assessment, Norway has 
the highest possible institutional strength AAA, compared to e.g., Russia 
which received BBB- after cutting interest rates. In addition, Moody’s 
described Norway’s fiscal strength very high even compared to peer AAA 
rated countries and marked Norway with a (+) due to a strong balance sheet 
with significant net assets (Moody's, 2017). 
Investments in pipelines and subsea installations on the NCS  
Following the oil price collapse in 2008 O&G companies reduced 
investment spending and increased a strong focus on cost cutting. 
Regardless of these actions the companies increased leverage137. Whilst debt 
cost increased initially, the availability and cost of bond financing has 
improved (IEA, 2017b). The development of the subsea infrastructure saw 
its peak in 2014. The delayed decline in investments can partially be 
explained by the lifecycle of the execution of ongoing projects (backlog). One 
PDO was approved by the authorities in 2016 for the development of 
                                                   
137 Leverage describes the relation of debt to equity on a balance sheet. This is influenced by regulatory 
frameworks and the TSO's commitment to keeping a certain credit rating and thus leverage. 
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Oseberg West Flank and in 2017 four fields have been approved in Utgard, 
Byrding, Dvalin, and Trestakk, however only Dvalin is a gas field 
(Norskpetroleum, 2017b). Figure 12 provides historical financial investments 
versus the forecast in BN NOK. 
 
Figure 12 Investments in pipelines and facilities on the NCS 
 Source: NPD, 2017b 
Development of the infrastructure in the light of Sustainability 
Sustainability can be seen from several perspectives, customer, 
producer and/or public perspective. What both customer and producer 
have in common are two criteria related to sustainability. To be able, in this 
particular case, to maintain the price and/or volume of gas at a level which 
contributes to a sustainable energy future for Europe.  
 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) states that 2/3 of the 
resources remaining on the NCS accumulate to 4 Tcm, that natural gas 
production is levelling out, and that the production outlook remains stable 
and Norway remains “a supplier for the Future” (Lien, 2015). A quantitative 
descriptive study is needed to investigate how the required volumes and 
infrastructure can be sustained and potentially expanded based on 
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regulations, prices and cost. Maintaining Norway’s position as a reliable 
supplier of natural gas to Europe will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
All these factors appear a challenge, considering the variables and 
dynamics that come into play. Furthermore, in the light of incomplete 
information this works two ways, to the European customers and to the 
network owners in relation to the tariff reduction.  
The principal responsibility of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
is to achieve a coordinated and integrated energy policy. A primary objective 
is to ensure high value creation through efficient and environment-friendly 
management of Norway’s energy resources (Regjeringen.no, 2016b).  
The NCS has mature and frontier provinces which require effective 
resource management to maintain sustainable development of natural gas 
as a fuel. For greenfield developments in frontier areas this would involve 
new infrastructure, whilst in the mature Brownfield provinces this would 
necessitate a minimum tie-in to existing infrastructure, the former being 
more prone to risk than the latter. Depending on the definition of proved 
natural gas reserves based on volumes, cost and price, Norway as a producer 
potentially has to take a higher risk based on incomplete information and 
invest in infrastructure for long term customer demand whilst regulations 
might have a significant influence on the role of gas in the future (Inderst, 
2010). Furthermore, the lifespan of the actual assets depends on the returns 
of the commodity. The volume of gas which could be profitably produced 
and delivered to its customers at different prices will be further discussed in 
Chapter 6 and 7. 
Environmental regulation 
With COP21 commitments and reduction of CO2 high on the agenda, 
sustainability additionally relates to the public good “a clean environment 
now and in the future”. Environmental regulation is recognised and that this 
may result move away from fossil fuels might be an option, or that gas could 
function as a bridging fuel or that renewable energy sources will become the 
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sole supplier of energy or that a combination may speed up the transfer and 
leave assets and resources stranded. However, sustainability related to the 
environment is too broad and out of the scope of this research. 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
With the implementation of the European Union gas directives 
several principles in the Norwegian regulation changed. It could be argued 
that the Gas Directives were “forced” upon Norway through competition 
laws and TPA. At the beginning of 2001 the organisation and regulation of 
the offshore NCS gas transmission system moved from a collection of 
individual networks owned by field licensees to ownership by Gassled and 
operation of a TPA system by Gassco. 
However, considering that in the Ministry’s view, it was not an 
expedient transport policy in the long term to let all fields have their own 
transmission systems (Regjeringen, 2017c), the Norwegian state chose to 
ensure that it has stronger regulatory powers for the petroleum activities 
than for other mainland economic activity, reasoning that its main interest is 
to recover the natural resources allowing companies to make profit from the 
field rather than the transmission system (Regjeringen, 2017c). The 
government allowed the transmission system owners a return of 7% pre-tax 
on investments made in the transmission system, which has changed from 
pipelines owned and operated by (NOC) oil & gas majors to a low cost 
common transmission system. The transformation of ownership to Gassled 
and operation to Gassco required compromises between profits on 
investment e.g., upside tariffs, social welfare through increased resource 
recovery138 thus a low tariff for gas transport.  
The implementation of EU directives provided a setting which 
opened a discussion about whether, despite best efforts and intentions, 
regulators may not be using the optimal mechanism to achieve public 
                                                   
138 Moving away from profit on infrastructure and focus on wellhead recovery (Chapter 3)  
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interest goals. The regulation might not have the desired effect and may thus 
cause more cost directly, through the “independent” agent’s service and 
indirectly by not resulting in an improved service or price for the public 
interest. Furthermore, political factors managed by stakeholders play a role 
in the introduction of the regulation and how it is implemented by the 
authorities. The direct cost incurred by the authorities through its 
regulations may not benefit the distortion in the market in relation to the 
indirect cost associated with the regulated, monopoly, commodity or price.  
Observations of interest on infrastructure development 
To provide an insight, the Norwegian infrastructure development 
system will be divided into four main stakeholders for explanatory 
purposes. 
1) Gassco, the operator responsible for investments in the transmission 
system 
2) The government, responsible for social welfare and maximising 
returns on natural resources 
3) Oil & Gas companies, i.e. licensees, who either require a PDO or a 
PIO to market the discovered natural resources and need to provide 
a transportation plan. 
4) Gassled, the infrastructure owners. 
Besides the overlap of licensee (O&G companies) and Gassco 
providing supporting material for a PDO to the Government and Gassco, 
several other factors are highlighted. Gassco is a 100% government-owned 
non-profit organisation. In this capacity Gassco should aim for long term 
social welfare from a governmental perspective, additionally it should 
maximise returns to satisfy shareholders needs i.e., Gassled owners. Briefly 
returning to the principle-agent theory139, where for example purposes 
                                                   
139 See Section 2.4 Principal-Agent  
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Gassled and Gassco were identified as agents for the Government 
considering Petoro’s interest in Gassled including Norsea Gas is ~47% 
(Petoro, 2017) and Statoil 5% bearing in mind that Statoil is 67% government 
owned. As discussed, multiple agencies (Gassco, Gassled, Petoro) 
continuously interacting with principals, MPE, NPD, Ministry of Finance, 
whilst Governmental institutions are normally multitasked with multiple 
principals. As a result, outcomes remain suboptimal because the principal 
imposes multiple constraints and conflicting interests (Gailmard, 2009). 
According to the definition, principals should be of equal power; there is no 
requirement regarding relative power of principals (Shaton, 2014). Gassco 
could thus be regarded as a common agent for two principals, Gassled and 
the Government. Furthermore, the majority share of Gassled is government 
owned, leaving a minority share of private investors.   
Based on these findings a judgement can be made regarding the 
specific Norwegian offshore pipeline cost characteristics and regulations 
which are most important for Barents Sea decision makers. Theoretically and 
empirically sunk costs have been a significant factor in the development of 
the gas infrastructure as a monopoly. To regulate effectively the regulator 
needs data about demand, investment, management, financing, 
productivity, reliability and safety. It was recognised that an offshore 
pipeline system with significant additional spare capacity could result in a 
monopoly position compared to smaller discoveries that are not financially 
viable to justify their own transport. Time critical resources (e.g. associated 
gas) would still need infrastructures to reach the market and the investment 
required to develop these resources140 would be uneconomically high as 
stand-alone. Cost is a major issue and has played a significant role 
throughout Norway’s activity in the petroleum sector on the NCS, 
highlighted in the 1990s with the establishment of NORSOK141. Allowing 
                                                   
140 Marginal resources were first mentioned in the NPD’s annual report for 1983 
141 The purpose of NORSOK was to cut the number of company- specific requirements and to reduce 
time and costs for development and operation (Norskoljeoggass, 2016). That high cost still contributes to 
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TPA to existing facilities means that minor discoveries can also be profitable, 
assuming reasonable tariffs and that profit does not fall to the infrastructure 
owners. Thus, Gassled as transmission system owner of a monopoly has 
several factors that could result in imperfect competition. Reasoning from a 
perfect competitive market, potentially the freedom of entry and exit of the 
transmission system allows for direct imperfection. Furthermore, cross 
subsidisation and incomplete information are potential factors that would 
allow Gassled as transmission system owner to add additional cost resulting 
in an increased imperfect market.  
                                                   
Norwegian gas development will be further explained in Chapter 6 and 7. 
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5. Norway’s role in the Natural Gas Market 
 
 
 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 explored the principles of the energy policies of the 
European Union, Norway’s biggest customer. 98% of Norway’s natural gas 
ends up in Europe and the major share of this amount of 115BCM is 
transported through offshore pipelines. Europe’s energy demand is an 
important factor in Norway’s supply of gas through its offshore pipeline 
system. Potential further investment in Norwegian natural gas and the 
Barents Sea Gas infrastructure in particular, are influenced by externalities 
such as price, climate policies, supply and demand. These variables are 
influenced by a wider network than the European Union alone. This Chapter 
will explore variables affecting the role of natural gas in the market 
worldwide and how these factors might affect Norwegian gas sales and 
transport.  
Chapter 5 provides insights on changes in the natural gas market and 
the challenges it faces with the low gas price that has set the scene from 2014 
to 2017.  Section 5.1 discusses energy production in Europe, the reduced 
domestic production in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark and 
externally Algeria’s, Norway’s and Russia’s role in it. Section 5.2 discusses 
the European desire to become less dependent on Russia as a provider of 
gas, the geo-political consequences of a Nord Stream 2, and gas as a 
transition fuel. In addition, the use of gas instead of coal to compensate for 
the intermittency of wind and solar power have failed to gain acceptance 
from a variety of environmental, energy and political stakeholders (Stern, 
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2017b). The global oversupply of LNG (2017) which is expected to last 
between 2020 and 2025 (Corbeau & Ledesma, 2016), the wave of LNG which 
is coming on line between 2015 and 2020 and the influences it has on the 
global gas market and prices is described in Section 5.2. The demand side is 
then discussed in Section 5.3 in addition, are increasing demand from China, 
India and Southeast Asia still realistic or does it present uncertainties in 
terms of growth due to price sensitivity (Corbeau & Ledesma, 2016; Rodgers, 
2016). Section 5.4 looks at future projections of Norway’s role. The Chapter 
concludes with Section 5.5 and provides insights relating to market and price 
uncertainties. 
EU Energy consumption 
Long term European projections suggest that energy consumption 
will be declining until 2040 where it plateaus as depicted in Figure 12 (EU, 
2016). Within this mix of different energy sources oil will still be playing a 
significant role, as it is linked to transportation.  Furthermore, solid fuels will 
see a significant reduction whilst nuclear energy and gas maintain a stable 
segment of the energy mix. 
  
Figure 13 EU28 Gross European Consumption.  
Source, Primes EU, 2016 
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When focussing on natural gas as a source of energy 
transported through Norway’s offshore transport system different 
scenarios appear. The IEA scenario forecast for natural gas demand142 
in 2020 is 434 Mtoe, falling to 402 Mtoe in 2030 and to 381 Mtoe by 
2040. In comparison, the EU 2050 forecast indicates 381143 Mtoe for 
both periods.  
 2020-2030 2030-2040 
EU 2050 381 381 
IEA 402 (from 434) 381 (from 402) 
Table 5-1 Forecast gas demand 
The IEA scenario and the European Union forecast arguably display 
a similar gas demand in the period 2030-2040. Ex-post 2040 projections 
would strongly depend on the extent of aggressive decarbonisation policies. 
Stern (2017a) states “In order to retain its place in European energy balances 
these policies will require the gas industry to make significant progress 
towards decarbonisation”. 
EU Energy production and import 
European domestic fossil fuel energy production is declining, and 
this trend will have its biggest impact in the fossil fuel energies as depicted 
in Figure 14. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands North Sea regions 
are at the end of the lifecycle and some fields are already depleted. In 
addition, the Dutch province of Groningen144 is suffering from earth tremors 
caused by gas recovery which are forcing the government to reduce 
                                                   
142 For an in-depth analysis of the IEA scenarios see (Stern, 2017) 
143 Averages for the periods 2020 to 2030 and 2030 to 2040 are 381.1 Mtoe and 381.53 Mtoe. 
144 For more detailed discussion on the impact of earthquakes caused by gas extraction in the Province 
of Groningen, The Netherlands read (van der Voort, 2014) 
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production drastically. The decline is anticipated to be offset by an increase 
in Dutch renewable energy production, with solar and wind gradually 
increasing from around 17% in 2015 to 36% in 2050 (EU, 2016). This decline 
will not only have consequences for the Dutch gas market where 98% of 
consumers are connected to the distribution system, but also for Belgium 
where Dutch L-gas is the main source of supply.  
 
Figure 14 EU Energy production (Mtoe)  
Source, Primes EU, 2016 
Reduction in output from Groningen requires changes in the 
treatment of N-gas on each system. Additionally, the North-western 
European network as a whole uses Dutch gas as buffer supply for winter 
surges. The continuing reduction of production from Groningen will have 
an impact on security of supply (Honoré, 2017). 
Despite the anticipated offset of renewables, the EU will continue to 
be dependent on imports of gas - the consumption of gas is expected to be 
387 Mtoe in 2020, whilst in the decade 2020 to 2030 it is assumed to drop only 
to 371Mtoe. To cover this difference gas imports are anticipated to rise from 
278 Mtoe in 2010 to 332 Mtoe in 2050 as depicted in figure 14 (EU, 2016).  
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Figure 15 Gas - production, net imports and demand  
Source: primes EU, 2016 
The gap between natural gas production and import is filled with 
LNG and gas imported through pipelines. 
5.2. EXTERNAL SUPPLIERS OF GAS 
The three main sources of pipeline gas to Europe are Russia, Norway 
and Algeria, in addition to LNG. According to the European Commission’s 
second quarter report of 2017, EU gas imports were 8% higher than in 2016. 
The growth was driven by increasing flows from Russia. Ukraine remained 
the main supply route for Russian gas coming to the EU covering 43% of 
extra-EU imports (EU, 2017b). 
Norway has been seen as a stable and key supplier of (33%) of 
external European Union natural gas imports (Lien, 2015). Despite 
reductions in the export of gas due to planned maintenance activities in some 
fields and processing plants, gas flows from Norway increased by 5% year-
on-year in the second quarter of 2017. Norway has been exporting around 
115BCM per year and projections remain around 115-116BCM up to 2021 
(Norskpetroleum, 2016a) 
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Figure 16 EU natural gas import in Twh.  
Source:  BP statistical review 2016 
Algeria145as third largest exporter to the EU has shown flexibility 
regarding oil indexed pricing, however the country’s main problem 
concerns capacity. It is not able to maintain export levels due to upstream 
issues and lack of investment (Stern, 2017c). Pipeline imports have fallen 
compared to the same period in 2016 (EU, 2017b). 
All three countries deliver gas through pipelines146 and due to the 
economies of scale as set out in Chapter 2 lean towards a regulated 
monopoly supplier. The relationship between piped gas and security of 
supply has been a topic of much interest in the media, e.g., the Southern 
Corridor, Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. The strategies involved in 
investment, in new routes and ownership have been described as “pipeline 
wars” and provide a picture of natural gas as a “highly politicised 
commodity” (Franza, 2016). 
                                                   
145 Algeria approx. 9bcm (LNG) and 20.7 BCM (piped), Russia 159.8 bcm piped, Norway 109.5bcm piped 
(BP, 2016) 
146 Algeria is also an LNG Exporter 
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Europe’s dependence on natural gas is divided. Certain countries 
rely more on Russia as supplier of natural gas than others147. The overall 
European dependence will not change before 2020-2025 for several reasons. 
The first is the long term contractual agreements for 115 bcm/year up to the 
early 2020s falling to 65 bcm/year by 2030 (Dickel, 2014). The second reason 
is that replacing Russian gas in the period up to 2030 with domestic sources 
would require an increase in production, which is unlikely to come from the 
United Kingdom and other domestic producers. External pipeline delivery 
other than from Russia, e.g., from Algeria and Norway and the Southern 
corridor, are not capable of capturing Russia’s 55 bcm/year share (Nord 
stream 2 capacity). This is before taking into consideration the competitive 
pricing advantage Russia has with other pipelines and LNG (Henderson & 
Mitrova, 2015). LNG is struggling to compete with Russian and Norwegian 
pipeline supplies, leading to a decrease of LNG imports (EU, 2017b).  
LNG Supply Wave  
Pipeline trade still accounts for the majority of global gas supplies, 
yet LNG has secured 33% of the global gas trade and its share has been 
increasing. LNG made rapid gains in the late 1990s and 2000s, however its 
share has stabilized around 10% since 2010: in 2014 LNG accounted for 9.8% 
of global gas consumption. Still, LNG retains the highest growth rate of the 
gas supply sources, expanding by an average 6.6%/year since 2000 with a 
drop to 2.2% between 2010 and 2014. Europe has over 200bcm of LNG 
receiving terminal capacity, with utilisation rates reaching an average of 
only 25% in 2015, suggesting that a significant amount of LNG could be 
absorbed if it became available (IGU, 2016). 
 
                                                   
147 “Countries in the Baltic region and south- eastern Europe which are more dependent on Russian gas, 
and hence vulnerable to interruptions” (Dickel, 2014) 
Norway’s role in the Natural Gas Market 
 
 147 
It could thus be argued that LNG could contribute as a potentially 
flexible source of natural gas supply to the EU (Corbeau&Yermakov, 2016). 
There are several factors that support this statement. One is the oversupply 
of natural gas on the market, which is anticipated to reach a peak around 
2020. Spot and short-term148 LNG trade is expected to continue rising, 
potentially reaching 45% of global LNG trade by 2020 (Corbeau&Yermakov, 
2016). 
 
Figure 17 Short, medium, long- term LNG trade 2010-2014 
Source: IGU, 2016 
Two, the decline in European LNG consumption which occurred 
during 2011 ended with 2015 imports risingby 4.6 MT as supply was 
redirected away from weaker Asian markets and the Asian-NBP149 price 
differentials narrowed significantly. “All but one European importer 
(France) registered a YoY gain in 2015, (with the UK showing the third-
largest gain overall at 1.3 MT), causing the region to have thehighest global 
YOY growth” (IGU, 2016). Absent of premium paying Asian customers, 
                                                   
148 Short-term LNG means contracts of less than four years (Corbeau & Ledesma, 2016) 
149 The UK National Balancing Point, (NBP) is a virtual trading location for the sale, purchase and 
exchange of natural gas. 
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LNG seemed to end up in the European market (Corbeau&Yermakov, 2016; 
Corbeau&Ledesma, 2016). A significant increase in LNG export capacity 
came into the market in 2009-2010 as well as some minor (=<10bcm) projects 
in the years from 2011-2013 which would have balanced the market out 
according to the IEA (2015). After a massive capacity increase in 2009 and 
2010, few additions followed between 2011 and 2013. The average annual 
capacity increase was less than 10 bcm, with just one or two projects added 
each year (IEA, 2016b). These low volumes would have gradually helped 
rebalance the LNG market following the supply glut of 2009/10, but the 
unexpected surge in Japan’s LNG demand in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011 vastly accelerated that process, tilting the 
market from balance to tightness. In 2014 capacity was ramped up with new 
projects.  
Country Project Capacity in bcm Completion date 
Australia Wheatstone 12.1 2016-17 
Australia Prelude FLNG 4.9 2017 
Australia Ichthys 11.4 2017-18 
Russia Yamal LNG 22.4 2017 
Malaysia PFLNG 2 2.1 2018 
United States Cove Point LNG 7.1 2018 
United States Cameron LNG 16.3 2018-19 
United States Freeport LNG 18 2018-19 
Table 5-2 LNG projects 2017-2020  
Source: IEA, 2015 
The gas market in 2017 does not invite investment in new LNG 
projects. As displayed in table 5-1, LNG capacity remains firm for the years 
up to 2020. Absent strong demand, oversupply and projects awaiting to 
come online, new investment decisions for LNG projects would require 
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strong financial benefits for approval. Corbeau&Ledesma (2016) argue it 
would be unlikely that project sponsors would trust financial derivatives to 
hedge project risk and move ahead without sufficient long- term contracts. 
Furthermore, the 45% increase in export capacity between 2015-2021 is based 
on investment decisions already made before 2014. These projects where 
signed off under long-term contracts whilst the market currently tends to 
favour short term and spot price contracts. “A growing spot market with 
sufficient liquidity will force contract terms to adapt to provide the flexibility 
desired by buyers including the end of destination clauses and competitive 
LNG pricing structures” (Corbeau&Yermakov, 2016).  
One of the largest contributors to the LNG oversupply is the United 
States. Up until 2008 its LNG imports were expected to increase for decades 
to come, however the increase in the recovery of shale gas in combination 
with the 2008 economic crisis turned it from a net gas importer to an LNG 
exporter (IEA, 2017).   
 
Figure 18 Additional LNG capacity 2005-2020 
Source: IEA, 2015 
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While LNG projects with long lead times were still being built, the 
spare LNG capacity, predominantly from Qatar and aimed for the United 
States, entered the global market leading to the “gas glut”. Because of this 
oversupply gas spot prices dropped. Demand uncertainty and liberalisation 
in Asia increasingly exposed LNG importers to risks in deregulated markets, 
making importers and consumers more reluctant to commit to long-term 
contracts/volumes. The reduction in demand and change in long-term 
contract volume resulted inter alia in a higher volume of uncommitted150 
LNG with fragile demand and prices around $6.27/MMbtu151  
(Corbeau&Yermakov, 2016). United States production growth is anticipated 
to be relatively flat during 2017. Despite low oil and gas prices the United 
States shale industry appears resilient. Supported by data from table 5-1 
global LNG export is expected to increase by 45% between 2015 and 2021, of 
which 90% will be delivered from the United States and Australia with 
Australia predicted to become the number one supplier in 2018 (Corbeau & 
Ledesma, 2016).  Based on the data available it is highly likely that Europe 
will receive a significant amount of LNG between 2020 and 2025. However, 
after this period LNG availability becomes much more uncertain (Stern, 
2017). 
5.3. ASIA AND THE ROLE OF THE USA 
It would be too broad and complex for this research to depict each 
country and its natural gas balance. The essence of this Chapter is to provide 
an oversight of how global supply and demand affect Norway’s supply to 
Europe. Several general judgements will be made on the demand side. 
Natural gas consumption growth is likely to be dominated by Asia, a 
reduction in demand is anticipated to be seen in the United States. Europe’s 
                                                   
150 Another factor that adds to the oversupply are destination clauses for over contracted LNG 
151 (Ycharts, 2017) 
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demand is anticipated to stagnate. The Asian and United States markets will 
be further drawn upon to provide a general overview of developments. 
Asia, and in particular China, is anticipated to maintain a positive 
demand for gas in line with its Strategic Energy Action Plan152 (2014-2020) 
and its national 13th Five Year Plan (2016). Japan (113.4 bcm) and South 
Korea (43 bcm) follow as the largest importers of LNG in 2016 (BP, 2016). 
Furthermore, the enormous increase (~20%) in natural gas demand in China 
in 2017 should be taken into consideration if this demand trend continues 
(Rodgers, 2016). 
The United States are anticipated to change role from importer to 
exporter. The shale gas production on one hand and the steady increase of 
gas consumption worldwide on the other, provides opportunities to export 
substantial volumes of natural gas. As indicated in table 5-1 there is an 
increasing LNG supply wave as a result of new projects coming on line. It is 
anticipated that a vast majority of US natural gas production will be shipped 
to Asia as LNG.  
As depicted in Figure 18 and discussed previously, shipping natural 
gas to Asia provides a higher return. In the period 2011 to 2014 gas prices 
reached the highest level recorded in Asia and were at a prolonged high level 
in Europe. If Asian LNG prices remain higher than European prices, after 
allowing for the transport cost and insurance, the effect of global LNG 
supply on Europe will be one of more dependency on exogenous pipeline 
gas from Russia.  
                                                   
152(Stats.gov.cn,2016; Stats.gov.cn, 2017) 
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Figure 19 Natural gas prices across five regions 
Source: BP, 2016 
Global change in demand for gas? 
Global fossil fuel demand153 has been slowly growing by 1%/year in 
2014 and 2015. Natural gas has a market share of 24% (oil 33%, coal 29%). 
Emerging countries were responsible for this growth with China being the 
largest with 1.5%, China’s slowest growth in 20 years.  Reduced fossil fuel 
demand, energy efficiency and intensity have resulted in a reduction in 
global gas demand from a 10-year average of 2.2% to 1%. (IEA, 2016b) The 
IEA predicts natural gas demand to be 3.9 trillion cubic metres increasing at 
an average annual rate of 1.5%, equivalent to an incremental 340 bcm 
between 2015 and 2021. This will contribute to a marginal growth of natural 
gas use in the total energy mix. Despite low gas prices it is difficult for gas to 
compete with low coal prices and favoured/subsidized renewables. The 
oversupply of natural gas on the market will thus not be absorbed in the 
2020-2025 period unless a significant supply disruption occurs.  
                                                   
153 Based on data from (BP, 2016; IEA, 2015; IEA, 2016; IEA, 2017) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
Japan cif (LNG) $/m Btu Germany (AGIP) $/m Btu
UK (Heren NBP Index) $/m Btu US Henry Hub $/m Btu
Canada (Alberta) $/m Btu
Norway’s role in the Natural Gas Market 
 
 153 
Inter-fuel competition and complementarities 
Another relevant factor affecting the global gas market is the relative 
prices of different sources of fuel. The interaction of fuel prices in inter-fuel 
competition will be briefly discussed in light of the effects of Norwegian gas 
consumption in the European Union. 
Although coal is recognised as one of the more polluting fossil fuels, 
coal will remain a competitive fuel source unless political and or 
environmental intervention redirects incentives otherwise, e.g., through 
carbon taxes. 
From 2014 to the beginning of 2017 weakened economies and low oil 
prices (~$114 to ~$50 a barrel) have contributed to a lower gas price and as 
depicted in Figure 18 a merger of regional prices closing the spread 
significantly. Saturated gas markets supported by new American and 
Australian projects coming online, are most likely to keep gas prices 
relatively low due to volumes of “flexible” LNG. This gas oversupply is 
estimated to be present during 2020-2025. Ex-post 2025 demand might 
increase, and gas prices rise (Corbeau & Ledesma, 2016).  
Lower gas prices are more competitive and promote a switch from 
coal. In a similar way, a rise in oil prices might have a positive effect on 
consumption of gas, which is cheaper than oil. This spread between the 
prices between the fuel types might accelerate the reduction of the gas glut. 
LNG contracts in Asia are predominantly oil price indexed with occasional 
short-term contracts. Saturated markets could support a change to other 
contract forms than long term contracting. As the IEA (2016) suggests “As 
spot prices remain under pressure, buyers will search for better pricing and 
non-pricing terms from sellers”. Furthermore, it is anticipated that oil 
markets will recover before natural gas markets, and that natural gas will 
likely be based more on hub pricing and move away from oil exposure in 
long-term contracts.  
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Inter-fuel competition varies across sectors, e.g., the power sector has 
different incentives than the residential sector. Competition also varies 
widely across regions making it complex to provide a concise summary. The 
power sector is the larger consumer and will be the centre of focus. Within 
the European market inter-fuel competition is inter alia dependent on 
availability of domestic resources and policies. Based on COP21 agreements 
it could be argued that power sectors currently running on lignite and coal 
might become affected by policies, moving away from CO2 high coal, to gas 
and renewables. To what extent gas will be used as a bridging fuel for 
renewables in the coal-gas-renewables-nuclear configuration remains 
uncertain. Oil fired power generation is small scale in Europe and 
considering the cost of oil, gas may become favourable. At present renewable 
energy is in favour with many European governments and provides 
financial incentives e.g., the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark. Other factors 
that could influence choice of energy sources are the development cost of 
building new power plants or upgrading plants and switching cost between 
fuels. 
Although natural gas prices have come down from the 2008-2014 
high and prices across the five main regions have come closer together as 
depicted in Figure 18, this high price period might have done long-term 
damage. Large European countries e.g. Germany have moved away from 
gas and towards cheaper coal and renewables. Notably the exchange of 
renewables-coal for gas offset an intrinsic part of carbon reduction 
incentives. Despite dropping gas prices demand growth has been absent, 
suggesting factors other than pricing might have a larger influence. The IEA 
(2015) described the combination of cheap coal and continued policy support 
for renewables as factors supporting weak gas demand. Moreover, gas prices 
in 2014 and 2015 in the IEA (2015) market demand setting did not provide 
an incentive to switch from coal to gas. In 2016-17 significant growth in 
European gas demand (albeit from a low base) and considerable switching 
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from coal to gas especially in the UK but also to some extent in Germany 
have taken place (Stern, 2017c).  
5.4. NORWAY’S ROLE OVER THE NEXT TWO DECADES 
A significant number of supply and demand predictions are 
available, including an equal number of software forecasting tools. 
However, accounting for all (geo-)political, economic and price uncertainties 
appears near impossible. The 2008 financial crisis followed by the 2014 oil 
price downturn providing evidence of unexpected events.  
However, starting from the principle that Norwegian gas trunk lines 
operating at 100% utilisation are optimally efficient and have a 100% quality 
of gas (it is 99.98% now), and assuming that we calculate a gas transmission 
tariff based on costs, there should be 111 BCM of Norwegian production 
until 2030 (and possibly beyond). Maintaining these flows beyond 2030 
would depend on putting on line new fields with high pipeline construction 
and operating costs. Nevertheless, Norway will play a crucial role for the 
foreseeable future (Norsk olje og gass, 2016). 
Approaching this question from a TCE perspective, it could be 
argued that from an environmental perspective 0% could be considered as 
the best possible quantity of Norwegian production. Additionally, the EU 
from a Level-1 TCE framework standpoint has a different perception of 
efficiency related to dynamic demand. Gassled cost characteristics are 
determined by several cost factors. For the purpose of judgement CAPEX 
and OPEX will be considered the main contributors and further discussed 
from an empirical perspective in Chapter 7. However, to provide some 
insight into the judgement from a theoretical perspective, Norway has to 
consider the volume of resources it wants to open up to the market and has 
a substantial influence on the price. The price volatility the market is willing 
to accept and the price elasticity for each of its customers is a variable 
environmental uncertainty. Customers also bring behaviour uncertainty. 
Norway as a supplier of natural gas depends on agreements supporting long 
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term demand, whilst investors in transmission systems are reliant on fixed 
regulations to allow for an ex-ante determined investment return. The, 
investors, as agents, would like to avoid a locked-in position and as agent 
being dependent on the non-opportunistic behaviour of the principal.  
It could be argued that the extent to which gas is a political 
commodity depends on the contractual agreements that need to be put in 
place. In order to receive an appropriate rate of return on a pipeline 
infrastructure investment, a long-term contract seems to be the most viable 
solution. Depending on the speed of policies driving climate change induced 
transition, several oil & gas assets will not be able to recover the investment 
cost in the life time of the asset, rendering the assets stranded. The capital 
involved in stranded assets is complex to value due to the timing of climate 
policy interventions, macro-economic growth, investor appetite and 
regulatory incentives. Being boxed-in through a long-term contract, whether 
or not oil indexed, may appear less appealing when the aim is moving away 
from fossil fuels and thus looking at LNG for smaller volumes of natural gas 
supply may proof a solution. Chapter 6 and 7 will explore cost factors and 
investment returns on gas infrastructures to provide a basis to apply to the 
Barents Sea Gas infrastructure. 
Gas future and decarbonisation    
The EU Roadmap to 2050 acknowledges natural gas as a bridging 
fuel and as supplement to renewable energy sources. The former statement 
is a similar judgement to that in the 2011 report from the IEA “Are we 
entering a golden age of gas?” (Birol, 2011) where it seemed that natural gas 
was determined to become the energy source of choice. “Based on the 
assumptions of the GAS Scenario, from 2010 gas use will rise by more than 
50% and account for over 25% of world energy demand in 2035 – surely a 
prospect to designate the Golden Age of Gas” (Birol, 2011). But the scenario, 
as set out in the report missed all of the targets, except in North America 
where the gas production and demand assumptions were exceeded. Despite 
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the shortfall in predicted gas demand, natural gas still has the potential to 
play a significant role considering the upside factors identified in the report. 
Natural gas is the fossil fuel that produces the lowest emissions per unit of 
energy produced.  As suggested by Van der Veen (2015)154 changing out coal 
for gas to produce power would support the 2degree Celsius limit, 
indicating that gas could still play a role in the transition towards a cleaner 
energy mix. Besides a lower CO2 content than oil and coal, natural gas 
reduces poor local air quality when used in power generation, as an 
industrial fuel and as a transportation fuel. In addition, changing from coal-
fired to gas- fired power generation, and using gas to back up intermittent 
renewable power generation are the quickest and most cost-effective way to 
reduce carbon emissions (Stern, 2017a). Interestingly, the areas that have 
increased gas consumption over other resources, appear to provide no 
evidence that the move has been politically motivated to reduce emissions. 
In Europe gas, unlike renewables, appears to lack a specific policy support 
as a fuel. (Franza, 2016). A potential tool, the European Trading Scheme 
(ETS)155, to catalyse coal to gas exchange lacks clout to perform as stimulus156, 
leaving the industry relying on national measures, e.g. the UK carbon 
support price which has progressively favoured gas over coal, and emission 
performance standards (EPS) (Stern, 2017a). Alternatively, thought should 
be given to the possibility that gas might need to be phased out before newly 
built infrastructure is amortised leaving stranded investments (Stern, 2017c). 
                                                   
 
155 For further reading on the European ETS https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en 
156 “The early phase III of the ETS has seen a significant surplus of allowances, amounting to 2070 Mt in 
2014. Due to ETS back-loading and from 2019 the start of the MSR and the continuously decreasing 
number of available allowances, the surplus is decreasing. The surplus would reach equilibrium levels 
shortly before 2025 and that the ETS price will follow a slowly increasing trend until 2025 and thereafter.” 
(EU, 2016 p 26)  
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
A global surplus of natural gas will, barring any significant 
disruption, remain till the period 2020-2025. After this period predictions are 
uncertain for various reasons. Next to the uncertainty of demand in a 
decarbonising world is the uncertainty about the cost of fossil fuel relative to 
low carbon alternatives. Potentially more important than the cost of the fuel 
source itself, would be the needed future investment in production. The long 
lead times and capital-intensive nature of the energy sector and power sector 
require a commercial return on investment and the sector will not invest if 
assets may be stranded. Operational cost, regulatory requirements, return 
rates will depend on fuel sources and ultimately on investment decisions. 
Long term investments require price signals that provide optimal financial 
efficiency, whether in low carbon technology or renewables.  Low oil prices 
have significantly reduced incentives to invest in new projects. 
To see potential trends in energy demand, a “longer” perspective 
provides a better insight. There are other reasons for looking at a long-term 
energy demand,  
1) offshore pipeline project lead times  
2) political and regulatory implications take long to see results  
3) COP 21 and decarbonisation programmes have a 2degree Celsius 
limit over a prolonged period in mind 
 4) finally, it is the European Union itself that has produced the paper 
(EU, 2016) and thus makes it more unambiguous than e.g. BP, Total, Shell or 
Statoil prognoses.   
For these reasons, this research looks at the EU future up to 2050 
considered in its most recent publication (EU, 2016). For a similar approach 
this research will look at the whole of Europe considering the increasing 
interconnection between the countries rather than the end points of the 
pipelines, e.g., France, UK, Germany and Belgium. From this point of 
departure several judgements can be made. The European Union scenario 
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recognises a domestic production decline and expects a slow increase in 
natural gas imports over the period to 2050.  
Although renewable energy will take a larger share in the energy 
mix, natural gas from Norway will play a significant role (EU, 2016). 
European Union natural gas importers are anticipated to be dependent on 
Russian and Norwegian pipeline gas supply. The European Union Energy 
Security package clarifies that natural gas will play a crucial role in the 
European energy mix until 2030 and beyond (Norsk olje og gass, 2016). In 
the package gas is considered the cleanest of all fossil fuels and is the bridge 
between coal and renewables. Additionally, switching from coal to natural 
gas is an important contribution to the reduction of EU carbon emissions. 
“For the Norwegian oil and gas industry, this package is a source of 
optimism and gives us the confidence that we can invest further on the 
Norwegian shelf, knowing that there will be a market for Norwegian gas for 
decades to come” (Norsk olje og gass, 2016). Such predictions are in line with 
Petoro’s (2016) assumptions in which European Union gas market demand 
is expected to be in line with 2015 in which a high level of Russian gas supply 
will enter the European market. In addition, LNG from global capacity 
developments may end up on the European market resulting in dampened 
gas prices for 2017 and beyond.  
As discussed in Section 5.4 the extent and timing of decarbonisation 
either involving switching from coal to gas or renewables or phasing out 
fossil fuels entirely is not clear. In addition, technological advances may 
increase the efficiency of power storage. Much will depend on policies that 
would support COP21, the following through on NDC commitments under 
COP21 and recognising natural gas as a bridging fuel because of its low CO2 
content and high efficiency compared to oil and coal.  
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6. Norwegian Sea Gas Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 described the history of the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
starting with the North Sea Sector. Through its resource management 
system, the NCS was gradually explored in a northern direction. In order for 
Norway to maintain its position of supplier of gas to the European Union, 
without taking into consideration the potential transit to gas as a bridging 
fuel, Norway needs to discover more resources to avoid a decline in future 
supply. White paper Meld. St. 28 (2010 - 2011) described Norway’s Oil & Gas 
activities and future strategy (regjeringen.no, 2011). Targets should include 
improved field recovery rates, maintaining a high level of employment and 
optimisation of the resource base. Additionally, these targets would support 
growth in Northern Norway. The emphasis of this strategy was publicised 
again in 2015 as a response from Norway to a consultation on a European 
Union strategy for liquefied gas, natural gas and gas storage in 2015. 
Norway supports the EU goal of improved supply security 
and diversified gas supply sources. A well-functioning, 
integrated and competitive gas market with a variety of 
suppliers and buyers is key to enhance gas security and 
maintain the attraction of natural gas (Aamot, 2015). 
 Chapter 6 discusses the reserves present on the NCS, how they need 
to be expanded with additional exploration and discoveries to maintain 
Norway’s position as preferred supplier of natural gas to Europe in Section 
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6.2. From the data (Gassco, 2014; Gassco, 2016; NPD, 2016d) it can be inferred 
that the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea provide the highest potential for 
large undiscovered resources. Section 6.3 describes the technical and 
operational field of the development of the first case, Norwegian Sea Gas 
Infrastructure (NSGI) project known as Polarled and the challenges it faces. 
Section 6.4 discusses the investment through a neo-classical theory lens and 
how it fails to optimise the resource base through a TCE lens. Section 6.5 
provides data to add to the discussion of Judgments.    
6.2. RESOURCES, RESERVES AND POTENTIAL 
Although smaller diameter inter-field, shorter pipelines and tie-ins 
have been added to the Gassco portfolio (e.g. in 2015 the 22-inch 177km 
Valemon gas pipeline, Knarr a 12-inch 106km long pipeline and Utsira High 
a 16-inch 94km long line) no major trunk lines have been built in the North 
Sea157 in the last 10 years (Langeled 2007). The last installed trunk-line on the 
NCS was Polarled located in the Norwegian Sea.  
The Norwegian Sea Gas Infrastructure (NSGI) or Polarled, has been 
built and resembles the Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure (BSGI) which has 
been reported and investigated as a promising potential for opening up a 
new gas province. These two sectors, the Norwegian and Barents Sea, with 
the highest potential will be discussed. Because it is the last transmission 
system built on the Norwegian Continental Shelf the research starts with the 
Norwegian Sea Gas Infrastructure. Although it could be argued that the 
relatively short trunk line has no significant influence on Norway’s export 
capacity to the EU, the system has revealed interesting issues in the light of 
political dispute, capacity allocation and resource management which might 
have set a precedent for further investment in transmission systems.  
                                                   
157 The next potential investment challenges in the North Sea (2017) are the market consultations of the 
binding Open Season Procedure for the Baltic Pipe Project. The Baltic Pipe (a potential new gas 
transmission pipeline) connecting Norway, Denmark and Poland has been identified as a European 
Project of Common Interest (PCI) which was detailed in Chapter 3. It is unclear if the financing of the tie-
in to Europipe II will be included in the financing portfolio. 
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The resource portfolio on the NCS consists of oil, gas, LNG and 
condensate. Bearing in mind the financial value of oil compared to gas, it is 
arguable that oil discoveries influence decision making on gas transport 
systems. Absence of oil discoveries suggests no potential for associated gas 
synergies and reduces the incentive for natural gas transmission systems. 
Alternatively, oil reserves have been discovered but no timetable for 
transport has been identified.  Gassco 2014 excluded oil discoveries such as 
Johan Castberg (88.10 MMSm3. o. e, FID will be made in 2019), Gotha (14.6 
MMSm3 o.e) and Wisting (56.48 MMSm3 o.e) for the latter. The overall 
resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf are classed according to the 
NPD classification system158 (NPD, 2011). The petroleum resources in Figure 
20 show estimated recoverable resources divided into project status 
categories: historical production (i.e. sold), reserves, contingent resources 
and undiscovered resources. Sub-categories numbered from 0 to 9 have two 
potential states, F for First find and A for Additional find.  
                                                   
158 The appendix depicts the complete table of NPD classes 
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Figure 20 Resource account on the NCS in 2017.  
Source: NPD, 2017 
Apart from the Norwegian government’s system, other resource 
management systems are available to identify the volumes and classify the 
resources, for instance the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE), the 
American Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG), the World 
Petroleum Council (WPC), the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers 
(SPEE) and the Society of Exploration Geophysicists (SEG). This Section will 
focus on the classification system of the NPD.   
Reserves 
If the volumes of reserves as depicted in Figure 20 are limited to gas 
only and an assumption is made that the infrastructure will remain 
operational despite increasing cost per bcm, and that investments will be 
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made to increase capacity within category 3-7, Norway has enough gas to 
produce at a rate of 114bcm/year for another 16 years 159.   
 
Figure 21 Historical production versus resources. 
Source: Adapted from Norskpetroleum, 2017c 
If Norway intents to transport natural gas volumes in the period 
2017-2021160 at the same level as in the period 2014-2016 with an average of 
114 bcm/year, all reserves would be required to be put on line by 2020. Post 
2020 there would be an additional requirement to connect resources in 
discoveries, whilst post 2024 there would be a need to tap into undiscovered 
resources as is depicted in Figure 21.  
Overall resources have been divided into fuel type and region (North 
Sea, Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea), and shown as gas volumes 
according to the NPD classifications. Figure 22 displays the Discovered and 
Produced resources, volumes of oil, gas, LNG and Condensate per region. 
Figure 23 will depict the Undiscovered resources.   
                                                   
159 Norsk petroleum reserves in cat 1-3 @1762.9 gas in cat 4-7 @163 = 1925.9/114=16.8years. If only 
allowing for reserves, it is 10 years. Not taking into account increasing short run cost functions per bcm. 
160 The Shelf in 2016 (NPD, 2017, P10) 
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Figure 22 Total resources per region.  
Source: Norskpetroleum 2017c  
Data from 2017 indicates that the North Sea has the largest 
discovered amount of resources, approximately divided in half between oil 
and gas. Of all the resources depicted in Figure 22, 48% (6,863 Sm3 o.e) has 
been produced and sold leaving 52% (7,421 Sm3 o.e) in reserves and 
resources in prospects (Norskpetroleum, 2017c).  
Determining the possibility of finding undiscovered resources 
depends on several factors e.g., geology, geography and resource 
distribution across fields. The NPD analyses the variables and characteristics 
with a play model161. The analysis returns outcomes with P95 probability for 
the low estimate and P5 for the high estimate, indicating a five% probability 
that the result will be equal to or larger than the P5 value.  
                                                   
161 “A play model is a geographically and strati-graphically delimited area where a specific set of 
geological factors exists in order that petroleum may be provable in producible quantities. Such 
geological factors are reservoir rock, trap, mature source rock and migration paths, and the trap must 
have been formed before termination of the migration of petroleum. All discoveries and prospects within 
the same play model are characterised by the specific set of geological factors of the play model. The NPD 
addresses the uncertainty through a high and low estimate through stochastic calculation modelling 
based on a set of variables” (NPD, 2016b). 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
North Sea Norwegian Sea Barents Sea
M
ill
io
n 
Sm
3 
o.
e
Oil Gas LNG Condensate
Chapter 6 
 
 166 
 
Figure 23 Undiscovered resources per region.  
Source: Norskpetroleum 2017c  
Data from 2017 suggests the undiscovered reserves remain highest in 
the Barents Sea. According to the Norwegian classification system, resources 
in prospects, resources in leads, and unmapped resources are quantified as 
undiscovered resources162. The total amount of undiscovered resources in 
the three regions adds up to 2870 MMSm3 o.e. of which 51% is natural gas. 
56% of these undiscovered resources are expected to be found in the Barents 
Sea (Norskpetroleum, 2017c). To revisit the discussion in Chapter 1.2, the 
principles of licensing on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the total resource 
growth from discoveries in numbered and annual APA rounds have been 
approximately the same since 2000, with the Barents Sea as the largest 
contributor of this resource growth. 
                                                   
162 See Appendix Section 2 Resource classes 
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Figure 24  total recoverable undiscovered resources.  
Source: NPD 2016a  
The variables change, and new information based on assessments has 
an impact on recoverable undiscovered resources163. For instance, the 
reduction in 2010 resulted from downgraded expectations of gas discoveries 
in both the North Sea and Norwegian Sea, whilst the upgrade in 2012 was a 
result of Jan Mayen being included in the estimates for the Barents Sea and 
Norwegian Sea. Figure 23 indicates that there is a decline in recoverable gas 
resources and data has been adjusted downwards accordingly. Another 
trend that can be deduced from Figure 23 is that both the North Sea and 
                                                   
163 Undiscovered Resources category 8-9 “These are potential, undiscovered quantities of petroleum. No 
drilling has been undertaken” (NPD, 2011o) 
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Norwegian Sea have reduced volumes of undiscovered resources, while the 
Barents Sea has increased year on year (except 2009). 
6.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT 
The Polarled pipeline, previously called The Norwegian Sea Gas 
Infrastructure (NSGI), started like the BSGI with a Gassco concept study. The 
project consisted of an (approximately) 482km, 36-inch subsea pipeline from 
the Aasta Hansteen field to Nyhamna and will be connected with the 
Langeled pipeline to the United Kingdom. Partners are Statoil, Petoro, OMV, 
Shell, TOTAL, RWE Dea, ConocoPhillips, Edison, Cape Omega and 
Wintershall. The ownership was built upon expected delivery of gas 
volumes.  
One of the main objectives of installing the Polarled pipeline was to 
create flexibility and optimal utilisation of the already existing transmission 
system operated by Gassco. In addition, the policy impact assessment for 
Polarled indicated stable product quality, market flexibility and better 
regularity of export (Jenssen, et al., 2015). It was thus suggested by Gassco’s 
modelling in 2012, that Polarled should be oversized by 25% and merge with 
the Gassled network prior to commissioning in 2016 (Oxera, 2015). In the 
PDO and PIO the pipeline allowed for capacity expansion and has six tie-in 
points for connections with a 30km 18-inch spur to the Kristin platform, 
preparations for tie-in of Linnorm (via Draugen), Zidane (via Heidrun), 
potential spurs 60 and 173 and a link with the Åsgard Transport system to 
Kårstø north of Stavanger (Statoil, 2014; Gassco, 2017).  
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Figure 25 Polarled pipeline 
Source: Adapted from Norskpetroleum 2017c 
The operational start of the Polarled pipeline in 2017 introduced the 
connection of the Norwegian Sea as a new province by crossing the Arctic 
Circle, supplying Norwegian natural gas to the markets in continental 
Europe and the UK and will strengthen Norway’s position as long-term 
energy supplier. Statoil transferred the operatorship for the Polarled Joint 
Venture to Gassco on 1 May 2017 thus, making Gassco responsible for the 
Polarled pipeline operations and the Nyhamna Expansion Project on behalf 
of the Polarled JV (Gassco, 2017d).  
6.4. ANALYSIS 
The analysis uses the Transaction Cost Economic characteristics as 
set out by (Williamson, 1998) Asset specificity, Uncertainty and Frequency. 
Asset specificity  
The Polarled pipeline could be characterised as asset specific 
considering the location and dependability of multiple shareholders 
identified pre-building and installation of the project. The connection 
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between Aasta Hansteen and Nyhamna was front end engineered and 
designed for additional tie-ins along this route. The Åsgard Transport 
pipeline from the Åsgard field, Norne, Heidrun, Draugen and Kristin fields 
in the Norwegian Sea to Kårstø north of Stavanger lies relatively close to 
(~110km) East of Polarled but is operating at full capacity until 2020. After 
2020 it could be argued that Polarled will become limited asset specific 
considering the option to tie-in to Åsgard, making it more prone to ex-post 
hazards from a TCE perspective. Reflecting on 6 types of asset specificity as 
set out by (Williamson, 1998), the output of the production process cannot 
be easily transferred before 2020, leaving Polarled as the only viable option 
available to transport gas to Nyhamna and further into the “Dry Gas area164”.  
Uncertainty 
Investment choices for the stakeholders in the offshore transmission 
system are driven by return on investment. Chapter 3 touched upon the 
change in tariffs during 2014 and the court case which could be argued as an 
example of regulatory uncertainty. The argument discussed in this section 
concerns the effect (lack of) transparency in processes and incomplete 
information potentially have on uncertainty in transmission system 
investments. What are the consequences if the Norwegian government 
would alter the timely sequence of delivering information, and or implement 
regulatory changes? Considering that no rectification on tariffs or taxes in a 
contracted form has been made, these consequential disturbances could have 
an impact on future investments in additional transmission system 
expansion further North. From a TCE perspective, uncertainty incentivises a 
decrease in contract length, whilst specific assets tend to increase the 
formality of the governance structure. In the case of Polarled the adaptation 
to further investment and field development (including the tie-ins) have 
been inter alia, the result of the adapting oil field service market. Reduced 
                                                   
164 Area D consists of Langeled, Zeepipe, Norpipe, Statpipe, Franpipe, Europipe, Vesterled and Sage. 
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construction cost and services, due to the 2014 credit crunch and the fall in 
oil and gas prices, resulted in lower CAPEX. However, the combination of 
asset-specificity and regulatory uncertainty could not prevent a hold-up 
problem. 
Chapter 3 discussed the change in tariffs and court case during 2014 which 
could be argued as an example of regulatory uncertainty. The table below 
depicts the different tariffs applicable for the different regions and shows the 
difference in tariffs between 2014 and 2017 indicating the price cut initiated 
by the government. 
Area Unit 2014  
K-Tariff 
Unit 2017 K-Tariff, 
Post 2014 
A NOK14/Sm3 0.0683333 NOK17/Sm3 0.0074091 
B NOK14/Sm3 0.0434848 NOK17/Sm3  0.0047149 
C-Extraction NOK14/Sm3 0.1242424 NOK17/Sm3 0.0134711 
Entry     
Kollsnes NOK14/Sm3 0.0239788 NOK17/Sm3 0 
Kårstø NOK14/Sm3 0.0301909 NOK17/Sm3 0 
Nyhamna NOK14/Sm3 - NOK17/Sm3 0 
Oseberg NOK14/Sm3 0.0301909 NOK17/Sm3 0 
Other  NOK14/Sm3 0.0053424 NOK17/Sm3 0 
D-exit NOK14/Sm3 0.0692030 NOK17/Sm3 0.0095645 
F NOK14/Sm3 0.0745455 NOK17/Sm3 0.0808264 
G NOK14/Sm3 0.0185121 NOK17/Sm3 0.0200719 
BN NOK14/Sm3 0.0434848 NOK17/Sm3 0.0471488 
I NOK14/Sm3 0.0503182 NOK17/Sm3 0.0545579 
Table 6-1 Tariff old and new.  
Source: Gassco 2014; Gassco, 2017 
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As depicted in Table 6-1, the majority of exit tariffs have been 
reduced by 90% (D- exit =88% s.t. (D=min)) whilst entry had been reduced 
to 0 (=100%). The reduction in tariffs in 2014 by the Norwegian government 
resulted in regulatory unrest. In addition, the reduction had a direct impact 
on the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), affecting the earlier agreed 7% return 
on investment before tax and pre-development stage (future) projects.  
Combined with the 2014 change in tax build-up165, smaller projects, 
i.e., smaller volumes of natural gas or an aggregate of small producers, are 
particularly vulnerable. Figure 25 depicts the impact and sensitivity to 
higher cost of capital required to build infrastructure with a high sunk cost 
part and the implications for an E&P company (Thema Consulting Group, 
2013). 
 
Figure 26 IRR E&P vs Gassled  
Source: adapted from Pöyry, 2013  
                                                   
165 See Table 4-2 
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Figure 26 displays the difference in IRR by comparing E&P 
companies owning and investing in the Polarled pipeline and investment 
companies (e.g., Silex, Njord and Infragas) owning and investing in the 
Polarled transmission systems. There is a significant difference in returns on 
field development, favourable for E&P owner-investors compared to 
investment companies, specifically, for the smaller fields e.g., Zidane, 
Linnorm and Asterix, which demonstrates the impact of a transmission 
system on field development (Thema Consulting Group, 2013). The four 
non-E&P Norwegian companies166 not having field and gas resources, 
believed that the tariff reduction inflicted a loss of future revenues estimated 
at NOK15BN (Regjeringen, 2017c).  
Bonds issued by Njord Gas were downgraded from A- to BBB by S&P 
(Njord Gas Infrastructure AS, 2015). Standard and Poor commented “We are 
lowering our long-term issue ratings on the bonds issued by Njord due to 
the continuing lack of transparency in the process launched by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum & Energy, and the impact this has on our 
view of the future stability and predictability of the regulatory regime” 
(Njord Gas Infrastructure AS, 2015).   
The change in tariffs as a regulatory measure further reduced interest 
in investment by Gassled owners in other infrastructures and transmission 
systems. E.g., Njord suggested that if tariffs had not been cut, Njord would 
probably have bought a stake in the 480-km Polarled pipeline. Infragas CEO 
Knud Noerve indicated a similar stance, saying: "When it comes to 
investments outside of Gassled, it is not something we're looking at for the 
moment […] That's because of the uncertainty created" (Reuters, 2016). In 
addition, the reputational damage it has done to the Norwegian 
government, renowned as offering a stable and predictable investment 
environment (Bloomberg, 2016). 
                                                   
166 Njord Gas Infrastructure AS (Njord), Solveig Gas Norway AS (Solveig), Silex Gas Norway AS (Silex) 
and Infragas Norway AS (Infragas) 
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The uncertainty of behaviour in the Principal and Agent relationship 
resulted in what could be considered an example of a hold-up problem in 
Transaction Cost Economics. Whilst transacting parties enter into 
relationships to mitigate these and other contractual hazards, nevertheless 
they cannot do so perfectly (Joskow, 2002). Gassled has made the investment 
in the transmission system and was now dependent on the regulator to make 
a return on investment, i.e., “locked in” by the regulator and government. 
As a result, Gassled owners delayed further investments in the expansion of 
the transmission system.  
Contrary to Gassled’s position, the Norwegian Ministry argued 
differently. The government is entitled to change tariffs, through legal 
authority provided by the Petroleum Activities Act and Petroleum Activities 
Regulations. “There is no basis for requiring clearer legal authority than this” 
(Regjeringen, 2017c).  The court found that although  
certain criticism of the authorities is warranted for 
not having clarified the basis for the calculation of returns in 
Gassled sooner and for not having established a system for 
registering and publishing the return achieved at all times 
(Regjeringen, 2017c, p. 4) 
the Ministry has not failed to fulfil its duty to provide guidance. 
Thus, the appeal from the Gassled owners was rejected in the court case. The 
State’s main interest has always been efficient resource management of 
petroleum resources with a long-term perspective for the benefit of 
Norwegian society as a whole (NPD, 2015c). The government intends to 
obtain a high socio-economic profitability through ensuring the maximum 
recovery of natural resources; “as much as possible is recovered of the 
resources in fields in operation, that discoveries are developed and that 
undiscovered resources are discovered” (Regjeringen, 2017c). To achieve this 
objective cost has to be kept low, E&P incentivised, TPA to the transmission 
system allowed and profits taken out of the fields and not from the 
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transmission system (Regjeringen.no, 2011). This concept was reiterated 
throughout multiple governmental publications, e.g., Proposition to the 
Storting No 102 (1980–81), Report to the Storting No 46 (1986–87) and Report 
to the Storting No 28 (2010–2011).  It could thus be argued that there appears 
to be a one-sided uncertainty or misinterpretation of regulations.  A clear 
insight on revenues and transmission was needed to come to the appropriate 
rate of return of 7% agreed upon during the Zeepipe construction and 
delivery in 1987 (Regjeringen, 2017c). 
A sufficient rate of return to incentivise investments 
The intention of the Polarled pipeline was to develop all the fields 
south of Aasta Hansteen on the route to Nyhamna, all supporting the 
investment in the transmission system. The volumes from these fields were 
required to provide optimal capacity and revenues from tariffs. Due to 
reduced project profitability in Linnorm and Kristin, Statoil farmed down167 
its interest in Aasta Hansteen, the Asterix fields and Polarled pipeline and 
decided not to develop the fields (Statoil, 2014). Although Zidane’s owner 
RWE Dea stated that the Kristin field decision would not affect the 
development, Zidane168 is still on hold (Taraldsen, 2014). This had a 
significant impact on the initially designed PDO and PIO. Aasta Hansteen 
was now accountable for 100% of the volume throughput whilst only being 
64% owner in Polarled (Hammer, 2015). Aasta Hansteen is in turn dependent 
on Polarled and vice versa. Without Polarled, Aasta Hansteen’s gas does not 
go to market and will not be enough volume for Polarled to be realized 
(Taraldsen, 2014). The investment decision proved to be one of uncertainty 
when not enough commercially viable resources were available for the 
project to commence. 
                                                   
167 Statoil farmed down a 24% stake in its Aasta Hansteen Field development project, a 19% stake in the 
Asterix Field and a 13.2% stake in the Polarled pipeline. 
168 Since 2016 called Dvalin 
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 Aasta Hansteen Owners 
Polarled 
Joint Venture 
Statoil 51% 37.0760% 
Wintershall 24% 13.2550% 
Petoro  11.9460% 
OMV 15% 9.0730% 
Shell  9.0190% 
Total  5.1100% 
DEA Norge  4.7910% 
ConocoPhillips 5% 4.4520% 
CapeOmega  2.8820% 
Edison International S. p. a  2.3960% 
Table 6-2 Ownership Polarled-Aasta Hansteen  
Source: Wintershall, 2017: Gassco, 2017; Statoil, 2017; OMV, 2017 
Underutilisation      
In order for the Aasta Hansteen owners to recover revenues sufficient 
to cover the cost of overall throughput, which is now covered by only ~65% 
of the Polarled owners169, would require tariffs to increase170by ~55%.  The 
Aasta Hansteen owners would lean towards tariffs as set out in the initial 
modelling done by Gassco, which allowed for overcapacity in the range of 
25% throughput. Furthermore, the operator’s motive was to merge Polarled 
into the Gassled pool. However, due to the tariff reduction, Njord (inter alia) 
a Gassled partner has said that it has no interest in acquiring Polarled. In 
contrast to the Aasta Hansteen owners Petoro and the remaining owners of 
the Polarled transmission system argue for the “standard” 7% return on 
transmission systems (Oxera, 2015).  
                                                   
169 Aasta Hansteen owners that are additionally in Polarled, Statoil, Wintershall, OMV and RWE 
170 37.3%+13.3%+9.07%+4.79% = 64.46% 100/64.46~55% 
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Of the Gassled owners 51% are involved in gas production and 
subsequent transmission leaving 49% of owners not involved in production 
and therefore lacking the potential need for transportation. The owners that 
are O&G companies have dual interests as investor and as shipper. In the 
former capacity, the 51% share owners will benefit from high tariffs whilst 
in the latter case as an owner/shipper they prefer low tariffs. This could add 
to the issue of underinvestment in the transmission system. Furthermore, the 
government has different incentives compared to 50% of Gassled, leaving 
the four firms that bought Gassled stakes in 2010 and 2011 from ExxonMobil, 
Total, Statoil and Royal Dutch Shell with a rejected NOK15BN tariff dispute 
based on regulatory tariff changes. It could be argued that the governmental 
approach is focussed on low tariffs, deduced from the tariff reduction 
discussed in Section 3.3. The tariffs discussed in that Section suggest that the 
government’s intentions are focussed on transmission systems as part of 
field development to transport resources to end users. Gassled identifies this 
as a sunk cost with relatively low returns from an investors’ perspective 
potentially with a short recovery period due to the gas market flux.  
Apart from Gassled’s challenges with tariffs, the change in taxation 
build-up171 , which is arguably an incentive to take profits from the field, 
resulted in reduced investment in resource management directly connected 
to Polarled. Shell delayed its Linnorm field in the Norwegian Sea, which 
would have produced about 100,000 barrels of oil equivalents per day. 
Statoil cancelled The Kristin Gas Export Project (KGEP)172 in 2014, a pipeline 
connection between the Kristin field and Polarled. The KPEG partners 
terminated the project based on unsustainable project economics, increased 
costs and volume risk (Statoil, 2014). Other fields in the vicinity of Polarled 
which are put on hold to a potential later date are Asterix and Snefrid Nord. 
                                                   
171  Ibid Table 4-3, In 2017 the “Ordinary” company tax rate is 24 %, and the “Special” tax rate is 54 % 
resulting in a marginal tax rate of 78 %. In 2016 the taxation rates were 25 % and 53 %. An additional 
feature is introduced to safeguard normal returns from the special tax. This comes in the form of a 
deduction called uplift. In 2016 the total uplift was 22 %. 
172 KGEP partners (Statoil 53.4%, Petoro 35.6% and GdF 11%) 
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Zidane, initially put on hold for 3 years has become economically viable after 
shedding 20% of the 2017 $1.23BN estimated cost. 
The regulatory uncertainty also influenced the development of some 
significant oil reserves. Possibly the most notable was the delay of the Johan 
Castberg ($11.3BN) oil field in the Barents Sea by Statoil in 2015. The change 
in ordinary and special tax would increase cost for a barrel of oil produced 
at Johan Castberg by $7, significantly constraining project profitability. It has 
taken Statoil 2 years to resubmit a Plan for Development and Operation 
(PDO) for the field based on a substantial reduction in cost and increase in 
oil price. 
Frequency in Transaction 
Frequency is a pertinent dimension, in that recurrent transactions 
may support the setup costs of specialized governance and have better 
reputation effect properties (Williamson, 1998). In the context of offshore 
transmission systems, the frequency of contractual transactions compared to 
spot market trading is low. To develop a specialised structure to capture 
excessive cost appears not effective. However, if a contract is recurrent, albeit 
at the same frequency as offshore pipelines are contracted, good reputation 
becomes relevant. Market contracting, if supported by good reputation 
effects, thus becomes part of the comparative contractual calculus 
(Williamson & Tadelis, 2010). 
 Although the decision (PDO and PIO) to develop Polarled was 
already made and the gas directives partially implemented, mid-process 
alteration of tariffs173, demonstrated its importance in the overall 
arrangement of the implementation through all 4 levels of the TCE 
framework. The Plan to Develop and Operate (PDO) and Engineering 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract were agreed upon on ex-ante 
tariff reduction resulting in unfavourable investment conditions ex-post. 
                                                   
173 See Table 2-1 i.e., Level 2 as depicted in the Williamson framework  
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Furthermore, the changes of regulations through the EU gas directives and 
implementation at the national level could arguably be seen as very frequent 
compared to the 10-20 years of the original TCE framework. In addition, the 
frequent change of tariffs in comparison to long term contracts could be 
considered a higher frequency. Reputation has been affected by the changing 
tariffs within the Norwegian gas market, ergo, it became part of the 
comparative contractual calculus. 
6.5. CONCLUSION 
The Chapter started with the exploration of Norway’s natural 
resources and reserves. The largest segment of undiscovered resources and 
available reserves is divided between the Norwegian Sea Sector and the 
Barents Sea Sector. This Chapter focussed on the last trunk line to be installed 
in the Norwegian Sector, Polarled. Aggregating findings from Chapter 2, 
TCE and Principal-Agent theory, from Chapter 3 Supra-national regulations, 
from Chapter 4 National regulations and applying these findings on the 
Polarled case, several judgements can be made. Reflecting back the 
supranational regulations have had limited to no influence on the decision-
making of Polarled. Investment decisions were made post implementation 
of the gas directives. Furthermore, the gas directives might have been more 
beneficial for organising the tariffs and transmission system rather than 
disadvantageous. National regulations played a significant role in the 
investment in Polarled and the further development of the surrounding 
fields with the potential to tie-in to Polarled.   
The potential for underinvestment was supported by statements 
from Njord Gas Infrastructure and Infragas (combined owners of 45% of 
Gassled) indicating that had the tariffs not been cut, Gassled would probably 
have bought a stake in the 480-km Polarled pipeline. However, due to the 
uncertainty created there is no incentive to invest in Gassled (Reuters, 
2016b). It was appropriate for the government to reduce the tariffs according 
to the outcome of the court case in which the Gassled owners lost their 
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appeal against Norwegian’s state tariff reduction. The question remains if 
the rate of return now applicable to Gassled owners is sufficient to 
incentivise an investment. As mentioned in this Chapter, the government 
does not deny the offshore transmission owners a return, but it is limited to 
7% pre-tax based on calculations prepared by and for the ministry. The key 
driver was and is to take profits from the field, rather than from the 
transmission system. The alterations of Norwegian taxes, in combination 
with low 2014-2017 oil and gas prices has provided no incentive for field 
development with tie-in points on the Polarled trunk line. 
Observations 
Although Gassco is not the end-decider on transmission system 
development - this is left to the transmission system owners Gassled as 
identified in this Chapter - it has a significant influence on infrastructure 
projects. It is Gassco’s responsibility to evaluate development with a focus 
on optimal transportation for all Norway’s resources. Oil & Gas companies 
and third-party investors might be reluctant to invest in a region without an 
infrastructure, whereas transmission system investors might be reluctant to 
invest without sufficient volumes to guarantee optimal throughput. 
With Polarled, Gassco had allocated overcapacity at additional cost, 
adding to the investment incentive already present on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. Another observation that can be made is that the 
underutilisation of approximately 50% was not taken into consideration by 
Gassco when expanding the transmission system with 25% overcapacity. 
Nor was the effect it would have on returns for the field and pipeline owners 
taken into account.  
To answer this judgement, a Norwegian regulatory mechanism 
designed to mitigate the potential performance barriers was explored. 
Transmission system investors have encountered several limiting barriers to 
invest further in the Norwegian transmission system. The case study 
provided evidence of uncertainty in the efficiency of the transmission 
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system, significant cost, ex-post increased risk and changes in tax and tariffs. 
Furthermore, increasing cost factors through faster depreciation rates of 
assets and or shorter payback periods, are unfavourable factors influencing 
uncertainty and the performance barriers. These factors pose a substantial 
ex-post hazard that may result in a hold-up. Regulatory intervention could 
reduce investment uncertainties. In the case of Polarled the regulation 
discouraged investment in the fields through changes in taxation. This in 
turn led to underutilisation of the transmission system. To prevent “hold up” 
related to specific assets, natural gas contracts were, on average, longer than 
in typical non-regulated markets (Williamson & Tadelis, 2010). 
Another factor to take into consideration is the coordination between 
other parts of the value chain. The coordination between the asset owners 
and vertical integration where applicable provides insights, information and 
efficiency. The intention of Polarled, when designed, was to facilitate a 
certain amount of overcapacity potentially to supply the transmission 
system with additional gas ex-post decline in the North Sea and to avoid 
overbooking on Åsgard Transport.   
Furthermore, the discussion on Asset specificity of Polarled and 
Åsgard could lead to an interesting revised definition if transporting gas 
from multiple fields, like Polarled and Åsgard post 2020 could create an 
incentive to transport gas from one rather than another system, thus 
becoming limited asset specific or asset diverse. Asset-specific investments 
and efficiency are both key principles of TCE as discussed in Section 2.2. 
Production optimisation and capacity utilisation of the transmission system 
are key factors determining investment returns. As discussed in this Chapter 
an asset specific investment i.e., Polarled on advice from Gassco should 
arguably be efficient. The upfront investment in Polarled created a 
bargaining position from a governmental perspective in favour of the 
pipeline owners, the latter expecting a specific form of economic governance. 
The Norwegian governance in the Polarled case adapted policies relating to 
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tariffs and taxes at the cost of investors and field development resulting in 
postponement of fields. 
The return required to cover the investment in Polarled and future 
Gassled infrastructure rests on a cost-return function. Tariffs as a function of 
regulation determine prices and returns for the investors. Consequently, 
reduction of tariffs increases the cost-return ratio. It could thus be argued 
that to an extent Norwegian regulation affected the investments negatively, 
potentially to the point where no investments will be made.  
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7. Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure     
 
 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter investigates the potential of the Barents Sea Gas 
Infrastructure, discovered and undiscovered resources in the Barents Sea, 
and whether natural gas resources, gas prices, cost (CAPEX-OPEX) and 
financial challenges warrant investment in the Barents Sea Gas 
infrastructure.  
Chapter 7 discusses the second case on the NCS, the Barents Sea Gas 
Infrastructure(BSGI). Section 7.1 describes the resource base and how the 
Gassco 2014 report sets out scenarios to develop the region with a 
transmission system. These findings support the argument to further 
investigate the case of the BSGI and apply data, solutions and methods from 
Chapter 2 and 3. Furthermore, Section 7.2 defines the principles of how fluid 
dynamics and pipeline engineering provide additional information on 
various additional options next to the two proposed 32-inch and 42-inch 
pipeline options discussed in the Gassco Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure. 
Optimal calculations are explained in Section 7.3. Gassco makes use of 
simulation software which makes use of the Benedict-Webb-Ruben-Starling 
(BWRS) equation of state. The Colebrook-White friction factor correlation is 
also used by Gassco, and Gassco makes use of the Gassopt model for short-
medium and long-term simulations which makes use of the Weymouth 
equation (Rømo, 2009). Certain assumptions regarding the BSGI will be 
made and introduced in Section 7.4. Justification is based on data provided 
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(Gassco, 2014; NPD, 2017c). Section 7.5 provides data for judgements which 
will support answering the research question and the sub-questions. 
Barents Sea potential 
Since the 2011 White Paper and 2014 Gassco report174 exploration has 
continued and provided new insights from the drilling of wells and finds. 
Although the ratio of discoveries to exploration has not improved 
significantly there is an increasing trend in drilling activity resulting in more 
discoveries. The exploration of the Northern province has increased in the 
22nd and 23rd licensing-round. Evidence that the emphasis is on the northern 
province is demonstrated by the 24th licencing round. In March 2017, the 
MPE announced a public consultation on a proposal to explore 102 blocks, 
of which 9 were in the Norwegian Sea in addition, but 93 in the Barents Sea 
(Regjeringen.no, 2017b). The increase in drilling activity in the Barents Sea 
has resulted in more discoveries in the last 4-year segment from 2012-2015 
with sizes of 10-50 Scm o.e.   
 
Figure 27 Resource discoveries in 4-year periods (2000-2015)  
Source: Norskpetroleum, 2017c  
Figure 27 depicts the accumulated resource growth over the period 2000-
2015. One significant gas discovery has been made in the Barents Sea – the 
                                                   
174 (Gassco, 2014; Regjeringen.no, 2011) 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
<5 mill scm oe
5-10 mill scm oe
10-50 mill scm oe
>100 mill  scm oe
2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 2012-2015
Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure 
 
 185 
Snøhvit field (1984)175. Snøhvit is now operational but has experienced 
significant setbacks during engineering, construction, as well as production. 
The licensing rounds have consistent accumulated resources, but growth in 
the Barents Sea has been stagnating since 2008. The success rate has been 
volatile year on year, with an average success rate around 45%.  
An increase in reserves is needed to meet the fundamentals for a 
viable offshore transmission system investment. Figure 28 depicts expected 
aggregated gas resources in the Barents Sea. The largest amount is 
“undiscovered”, whilst only 41bcm of gas is produced, predominantly by 
Snøhvit, and transported as LNG.  
Scenarios for 2017 to 2020 prospects  
 
Figure 28 Barents Sea Natural Gas Resources.  
Source: Norskpetroleum, 2017d  
A higher level of drilling activity based on an increase in licenses in the 
Barents Sea should provide a more precise geographical picture, resulting in 
an increased growth of discoveries. A significant factor that has an influence 
on investment in infrastructure in the Barents Sea is the size of the finds. As 
depicted in figure 27 there has been an increase in finds, however these 
                                                   
175 Goliat (2000) and Johan Castberg (2014) Johan Castberg is an oilfield with combined finds from 2011-
2014, Goliat consists of oil and gas. 
41
182
1546
825
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Barents Sea
Undiscovered resources
Contingent resources in
discoveries
Contingent resources in
fields
Reserves
Produced
Chapter 7 
 
 186 
consist of relatively small discoveries, i.e., small deposits. Although small 
deposits are individually less financially viable for development and do not 
warrant an offshore trunk-line, small discoveries may benefit from a 
transmission system and become profitable by the inclusion of a flow line 
tying into the transmission system.  
 Scenarios for undiscovered resources  
Based on the data presented in Section 6.2 Resources and Reserves, there are 
a plenitude of scenarios possible. Gassco, the Norwegian operator starts with 
5 scenarios, A to E and proposes three outcomes, C&D, E and A&B. All 
scenarios depart from a 200 BCM176 discovery base case. 
 
Figure 29 Gassco Scenario A-E 2013-2017.  
Source: Gassco, 2014 
Scenario C&D assumes 60BCM of undiscovered gas, scenario E 200BCM and 
Scenario A&B 440BCM. The five scenarios were selected from Monte Carlo 
simulations to reflect appropriate overall characteristics. The variables taken 
into account are resource size, prospects177 timing of discoveries, number of 
discoveries (several small in A and C, or a few larger fields in B and D), size 
                                                   
176 NPD’s view, as depicted in figure 28, is that the figure should be 243 BCM 
177 Prospects: p5=a high resource outcome, p50=a median scenario, p95=a low resource outcome 
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of the largest discovery, production characteristics (low/high energy and 
poor/good quality) and distance between discoveries (Gassco, 2014a).  
Comparing the data from 2017 that has been proven and categorized 
by the NPD with the data from Gassco’s reference Scenarios indicates that 
the forecast in the Gassco 2014 report have not been met. The actual 
discoveries in the Barents Sea accumulated from Year 2014 till April 2017 
have amounted to one 5F and two 7F discoveries totalling 45.5 Mm o.e. as 
displayed in table 7-1 (last three items). 
Field Year Volume Medium Code Status 
7120/12-2 
(Alke Sør) 
1981 12.92 GAS 5F Production 
likely, but 
unclarified 
7121/5-2 
(Snøhvit 
Beta) 
1986 2.8 GAS 7F Production not 
evaluated 
7122/6-1 
(Tornerose) 
1987 3.87 GAS 4F Production in 
clarification 
phase 
7220/8-1 
JOHAN 
CASTBERG 
2011 10.89598 GAS 7F Production in 
clarification 
phase 
7120/1-3 
(Gohta) 
2013 14.625 OIL/GAS 5F Production 
likely, but 
unclarified 
7120/1-3 
(Gohta) 
2013 6.22 OIL/GAS 7F Production 
likely, but 
unclarified 
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7220/11-1 
(Alta) 
2014 26.396 OIL/GAS 5F Production 
likely, but 
unclarified 
7220/11-1 
(Alta) 
2014 9.7 OIL/GAS 7F Production 
likely, but 
unclarified 
7220/6-2 R 2016 6.5 OIL/GAS 7F Production not 
evaluated  
Total 2017 93.921    
Table 7-1 Barents Sea fields, West- Central.  
Source Norskpetroleum, 2017d 
As depicted in table 7-1, there appears to be a discrepancy between 
the estimates of proved reserves and the required volumes. Accumulated 
1981-2017 findings lean towards Gassco Scenario C&D (93.21BCM versus 
60BCM), and more closely from the date the Gassco report 2014 was 
published 60BCM (see figure 28) compared to 42.6BCM (year 2014-2017), 
with several small finds on multiple locations, however lack the expected 
doubling of the resource base in Norway’s Barents Sea sector as predicted in 
the Gassco report (Gassco, 2014a). 
7.2. TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS 
The BSGI report discussed three possible transmission systems as 
potential options; a 32-inch diameter Pipeline, a 42-inch diameter pipeline 
and LNG. Although LNG might be considered as a viable option, it is outside 
the scope of this research based because 
1) LNG gains significant financial advantages over pipelines over 
long distances e.g., 2,500Km upwards, however this benefit reduces over 
shorter distances.  
2) LNG has a higher cost profile and is technically more complicated. 
Whilst both transport methods would suffer financial losses if production 
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falls, ramping up production is less costly in a pipeline case than for LNG. 
Furthermore, considering Ledesma et al. s’ (2014) statement that investors 
prefer proven systems, LNG might not be a viable option taking into account 
the inefficiencies and setbacks in the case of Snøhvit. In addition, setting up 
another LNG train at Snøhvit would be challenging and expensive from an 
engineering perspective. Moreover, it would lack the flexibility an extra, or 
larger compressor on a pipeline would bring. This leaves the alternative of a 
greenfield LNG transmission system with Snøhvit as reference case.  
From a TCE perspective an LNG investment appears to have several 
benefits over the pipeline option, LNG reduces asset specificity. Although 
the investment is still irreversible LNG and more specifically FLNG is less 
locational specific. Furthermore, there is no requirement to build the facility 
for one specific supplier or end-user. Alternatively, FLNG could be towed to 
another location or country and operate for a different supplier or client. A 
similar approach could be taken for an LNG terminal. A significant 
downside of LNG and FLNG in the Barents Sea Case are high costs, marginal 
use (based on Snøhvit’s record), and less flexibility in volume/production 
compared to pipelines. 
 
 CAPEX Price 
Output 
Revenue/ 
Day 
Increase in 
Output 
CAPEX 2 
NOKMM 
Pipeline 45 M3/D 8 mbtu 95,350,500 27 M3/d 6,000 
LNG 12 mtpa 10 mbtu 119,188,125 7.3 mtpa 109,500 
Table 7-2 Cost comparison on flexibility.  
Source: Author’s own calculations adapted from Gassco 2014 
Table 7-2 depicts the cost differences in flexible delivery for an 
increase of   27M3/Day for a 42-inch Pipeline compared to an equal amount 
of flexible output in LNG. The additional cost of flexibility is significant 
(Gassco, 2014a). Other methods of gas transmission are recognised but are 
outside of the scope of this research due to lack of empirical evidence of their 
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success. E.g., Compressed Nitrogen Gas (CNG) or Gas to Liquid (GTL) have 
not demonstrated cost benefits and operational capabilities in or outside of 
Norway in scalable volumes. The same judgement has been made for the 
option to transform natural gas to electricity for transport to the end market. 
It is clear that a capital investment of this proportion requires risk 
containment and elimination of uncertainties through proven cost-effective 
technology, a substantial amount of resources and documented “long-term” 
contracts. An investing party takes into consideration price, time, volume, 
risk and capacity.  
To support the discussion on transportation of natural gas through 
pipelines, the transportability and requirements of the supporting system, a 
concise description of theories of gas mechanics and dynamics will be 
presented. The related discussion supports the choice of a 42-inch pipeline 
as a viable solution for the BSGI and a basis178 for the cost of such as system.  
Although a transmission system consists of a myriad of pipelines, 
nodes, valves, templates, compressors, treatment facilities and end 
terminals, the components that will be discussed consist of pipeline, 
compressor and the product natural gas. The basis for the calculations serves 
as an explanatory foundation to arrive at a judgement on the potentially 
added value of an increase or decrease in pipe diameter; e.g., the Gassco 
report considers two pipeline diameters, 32-inch and 42-inch. Economies of 
scale will play a significant part in the functionality of transporting natural 
gas. Increasing a pipe diameter has the potential to increase the economies 
of scale but increasing the diameter and or pipeline length also increases 
friction between gas and the pipeline inner wall resulting in a reduction in 
gas pressure between entry and exit point. An increase in the number of 
                                                   
178 Calculating a complete offshore pipeline system is extremely complex and mathematically modelled 
by computer programmes. It is out of the scope of this research. Gassco makes use of the Gassopt model 
to derive conclusions from the data available on the Norwegian offshore transmission system. For an in-
depth explanation (Rømo, 2009). 
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compressors or in the horsepower of a compressor increases pressure and 
throughput. The interaction between these variables is mathematically 
calculated in optimisation programmes. Gassco, the pipeline operator makes 
use of a Gassopt model. 
In gas flow formulae, diameter, inlet pressure and temperature are 
the key design parameters, which have implications on capacity and thus 
economies of scale in trunk-lines. In order to obtain economies of scale a 
trade-off between diameter, volume and pressure has to be considered. With 
an increase in length there will be a decrease in pressure. 
Gassco uses several definitions for pipeline transport capacity, e.g., 
hydraulic, technical and committable capacity. The hydraulic capacity is 
calculated maximum physical throughput using maximum inlet pressure 
and minimum outlet pressure. Available Technical Capacity accounts for 
limitations in system boundary conditions, e.g., caused by limited inlet 
pressure due to dependency on other pipelines. A fuel factor is also deducted 
to account for metering errors and fuel gas consumption in either 
compressors or heating stations. The committable capacity is the capacity 
that is available for stable deliveries. Operational flexibility of 1 or 2% is 
usually deducted from the available technical capacity to ensure that small 
operational disturbances do not lead to loss of delivered gas (Langelandsvik, 
et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, when calculating capacity, a distinction is made 
between an existing pipeline and a study for a proposed pipeline. For an 
existing pipeline, extending the maximum capacity is limited to an increase 
in compressor power, whilst a new build pipeline still has the option to 
increase diameter in addition to an increase in compressor power. When a 
new pipeline is planned, it is designed to meet a transport capacity need. 
This means that after finding the optimal route from the supply point to the 
delivery point and the length of this route, the diameter is chosen such that 
the requested capacity is obtained. This is performed using a pipeline 
simulator with all design data as input and typically makes use of an 
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equation of state179. Gassco simulation software makes use of the Benedict-
Webb-Ruben-Starling (BWRS) equation of state in addition to the Colebrook-
White friction factor correlation. For short-medium and long-term 
simulations Gassco makes use of the Gassopt model, which makes use of the 
Weymouth equation (Rømo, 2009). After the pipeline is commissioned and 
operational, a capacity test is performed to find the hydraulic roughness in 
a real test of the pipeline (Langelandsvik, et al., 2009).  With the planning of 
a new pipeline consideration is given to the cost factor as a function of 
capacity. An increase in diameter results in more throughput and less cost, 
both factors of economies of scale.  
The desire of the operator to have additional capacity is plausible, it 
provides manoeuvrability with capacity and the option of additional 
throughput increases revenue. Furthermore, from a resource development 
perspective, in this case the Norwegian government, it provides the option 
to tie-in additional fields when planning transport capacity in the long term 
including small deposits.  
Economies of scale and subadditivity have been validated through 
calculation of the cost components of the Norwegian dry gas area. Two 
methods will be applied, one considering investment as a ratio to capacity 
and the second method demonstrating the influences of diameter on 
capacity throughput. The cost of eight dry gas pipelines is compared in order 
to identify economies of scale and trends in investment over capacity. If a 
pipeline grows in capacity, its costs increase less than linearly while 
throughput increases exponentially” (IEA cited in (Dahl, 2001). 
 As displayed in Table 7.3, prices of Norwegian offshore pipelines 
have fallen, and economies of scale have grown in the period 1977-2015. In 
the table, a ratio of investment to capacity has been calculated over an 
indicative 12-year period180 in the last column of the table and indicates that 
                                                   
179A semi-empirical functional relationship between pressure, volume and temperature of a pure 
substance. 
180Remaining period for the Gassled owners on the duration of the license period to 2028. 
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overall cost has declined over time and annual total capacity has increased. 
Several technological factors have not been taken into consideration in the 
calculation e.g., wall thickness to diameter ratio, the learning curve following 
the crossing of the Norwegian trench for further infrastructures and the 
various depth considerations. 
Pipeline 
year 
length 
in km 
Diamet
er in 
inch 
ATC* 
in 
Msm3
/d 
Fr
om
 
To
 Annual 
max 
through
put 
In 
2016 
BN 
NOK 
Investment
/capacity 
NOK/BN 
MAX/12Y 
Norpipe 
1977 
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n 
11.68 32.508 0.23193493 
Vesterled 
1978 
361 32 39 
H
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m
da
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. F
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gu
s 
14.23 39.744 0.23266596 
Zeepipe 
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814 40 42 
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e 15.33 16.524 0.08982387 
Europipe 
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D
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m
  
16.79 26.244 0.13025610 
Franpipe 
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D
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r 
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un
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 20.07 12.312 0.05110834 
Europipe 
II 
1999 
658 42 71 
K
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ø 
D
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m
  
25.91 11.772 0.03785452 
Langeled 
2007 
534 44 72 
Sl
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n 
26.28 9.288 0.02945205 
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Sage 
2015 
94 16 5 
Ed
va
rd
 
G
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eg
 
St
. F
er
gu
s 
1.825 1.728 0.07890411 
 Table 7-3 Eight pipelines cost calculations 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
Additional economies181 of scale can be derived from compressor 
power consumption which increases less than linearly as delivery pressure 
increases. This further supports the argument that the flexibility of an 
increase in compressor capacity might be financially more attractive than 
e.g., LNG or a smaller diameter pipeline with a limited pressure capacity. In 
line with the BSGI report, arguably the 42-inch pipeline is the practical 
option in 4 out of the 5 Scenarios and will be used for this research as the 
investment option.  
Revisiting Project Finance as Functional Model 
Chapter 4 set out the principles of financing oil and gas operations. 
From a historical perspective “on balance sheet capital” was raised for field 
development on the Norwegian Continental Shelf which included the 
offshore pipelines segment to transport the resources to the end-user. Whilst 
the balance sheet financing principle still has a place in the Norwegian gas 
sector, the division of the transmission system from fields requires a 
different finance approach for offshore pipelines. From Chapter 6 it was 
made clear that the Gassled owners182 found limited incentives to invest in 
the Norwegian transmission system. Additionally, the final report to the 
European Commission Directorate-General for Energy indicated the 
improvement of the regulatory environment to be the most important factor 
in the financing of energy infrastructure projects, according to the experts of 
                                                   
181 Another method to calculate economies of scale in pipeline systems is displayed in the appendix 
Section 4 
182 (Silex, 2013), (Njord Gas Infrastructure AS, 2015) 
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32 TSOs and 15 financing institutions (EC DG for Energy, 2011). Key issues 
included regulatory remuneration and regulatory stability.  
In the period from 2014-2017 no alterations in the regulatory 
structure have been made to support infrastructure investments on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. For this reason, an assumption is made that 
there will be no incentive from the regulators, national and supranational to 
alter 2017 regulations to support infrastructure investments on the NCS. 
Furthermore, exemptions from parts of the energy packages, e.g., TPA, have 
not been taken into consideration183. The BSGI report identified the potential 
need for alternative investment models’ due to the significant CAPEX, 
likelihood of multiple licenses needed to aggregate the investment and the 
substantial size of the marginal resources needed in order to maximise value 
(Gassco, 2014a). Financial options besides “on the balance sheet” as 
explained in Chapter 4, identified Project Finance as a viable alternative. 
Project finance provides vehicles to deal with the factors described in the 
BSGI report and is in line with the theoretical foundation of Transaction Cost 
Economics. In addition to theory, empirical evidence suggests that Project 
Finance is a common model for large gas infrastructure investments such as 
LNG projects (Ledesma, et al., 2014). Although costlier to set up than on the 
balance sheet investments, it provides the option to obtain more capital from 
a broader investor base. Other factors that support this approach are the 
government’s desire to separate the oil companies from the infrastructure. 
Off-balance sheet financing supports the division of oil field and 
transmission system. Furthermore, it separates the asset from the 
investor/investment, whilst optimising the risk characteristics for each of 
the investor types. 
                                                   
183 Justification in the next section revisiting regulations.  
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7.3. BSGI PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS 
This section will set out the assumptions needed to come to a 
judgement on potential investment decisions on the BSGI. The calculations 
made in this section are to identify the potential of attracting investors, 
following the absence of the Gassled owners’ willingness to invest. To 
commence the project, alternative investors would need to be satisfied with 
the conditions current in 2016-2017. To arrive at a judgement on an 
investment, the section is set out in transmission system cost factors, 
financial modelling and results.  
Assumptions on volumes in Barents Sea Central and West  
The 45 Mcm3/day capacity in Figure 30 has been derived from the 
Gassco (2014) Barents Sea Report and represents the throughput associated 
with the proposed 42-inch pipeline for the BSGI as discussed in Section 7.2. 
The resource volumes in Figure 30 are 243 BCM of which 93.9 BCM is based 
on undeveloped existing fields and discoveries. For completeness, Gassco’s 
reference scenario adds 100BCM from undiscovered resources and 14.5 BCM 
from Snøhvit184. 
                                                   
184 (this volume will be transported through the pipeline instead of the Melkøya /LNG route).  
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Figure 30 Capacity vs Production in the Barents Sea.  
Source: Gassco, 2014a 
The optimal capacity, based on 45 Msm3 a day over a 25-year lifespan 
would require a volume of 402 BCM at 98% utilisation rate or 321BCM over 
a 20-year span at 98% utilisation rate of the transmission system. A 
publication from the NPD of April 2017 suggests a record year for the 
Eastern Barents Sea. The resources increased from 50% to nearly 65% of the 
total undiscovered resources on the Norwegian shelf (NPD, 2017a). These 
figures will not be taken into consideration for this research until Statoil has 
drilled wildcats in 2018 to confirm the potential discoveries. Thus far, 
Korpfjell drilling in August 2017 has been disappointing (Statoil, 2017). 
CAPEX 
Several assumptions have been made to obtain the CAPEX for a 42-
inch pipeline supporting the BSGI. Data for these assumptions derived from 
the Gassco Report, NPD and MPE.185 The Gassco report additionally 
discussed the flexibility of upscaling through compressor capacity increase 
                                                   
185 (Gassco, 2014; MPE, 2016; Norskpetroleum, 2017f). 
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from 45 MMSm3 at the price of NOK72BN to 72 MSm3 at the cost of NOK 
78BN. 
OPEX 
An identical approach of ratio to capacity, as depicted in Table 7.3, has been 
applied to arrive at anticipated OPEX. Data has been adapted from Gassco’s 
cost estimate model (Gassco, 2014a).  
A 1,000km length of 42-inch pipeline from the Haltenbank to the Barents Sea 
with an average daily transmission capacity of 45Msm3/day results in an 
annual throughput of 16.4BCM. The CAPEX is estimated at NOK72BN. The 
investment over capacity in NOK per year over a period of 25 years provides 
a ratio of 0.06667. 
To put 16.4BCM per year in perspective, Troll which accounts for ~30% of 
Norway’s gas export produced 31.86BCM in 2016. 
Capital Structure 
Investments in the Oil and Gas industries have been influenced 
across the entire value chain by declining oil prices post the 2008 financial 
crisis which resulted in reduced cash flows and profits for IOCs an NOCs. 
Oil and gas companies took various measures to maintain the level of 
dividend shareholders were accustomed to. Inter alia, a significant reduction 
in CAPEX in project investments. Additionally, there has been a reduction 
in the debt to equity (D/E) ratio, allowing for larger debt at low interest rates. 
Pre-2008 D/E ratios for the oil and gas majors were between 0.20 and 0.60. 
Post 2014 a shift towards 0.45 to 080 was displayed (Y-Chart, 2017). Pipeline 
investments were leaning towards the .70-.82 bandwidth pre-2008 period 
(Pierru, 2013). 
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Pipeline Year Country Country 
Risk 
Investment 
in US$MM 
Debt 
Ratio 
Cheyenne Plains 2005 US 0 435 .80 
Dolphin Energy 2005 Oman 2 4800 .72 
Atlantic Cross Island 2005 Trinidad 2 336 .80 
Southern Light 2008 US 0 2429 .71 
Elba Express 2009 US 0 578 .35 
Fayetteville Express 2009 US 0 1340 .82 
Ruby  2010 US 0 2910 .52 
Nord Stream Phase 1 2010 Russia 4 7535 .71 
AccuGas 2010 Nigeria 6 250 .24 
Nord Stream Phase 2 2011 Russia 4 4790 .71 
Table 7-4 Debt ratio historical pipelines  
Source: adapted from Pierru, 2013 
Debt 
In a Project Finance construction, financial institutions and banks 
require substantial cash flows to compensate for the lack of asset ownership 
resulting in more risk for the Project Company. Where in the past long 
contractual arrangements between seller and buyer covered the revenue 
stream, the move away from 20-year contracts to e.g. 5-year contracts, results 
in debt volumes becoming dependent on committed volumes to market 
(DNB, 2015). To further the research and provide data to come to a 
judgement an assumption will be made that the BSGI will obtain a Debt 
Ratio of 0.71, taking the Gassco risk profile186into consideration (Gassco, 
2014a).  
Although LIBOR has been considered as interest rate determinant, 
the Norwegian Interest rate has been preferred due to the LIBOR Scandal  
(CFR, 2016). The interest rate applicable is set in accordance with the 
                                                   
186 Risk profile see Section 4.3  
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Norwegian Interbank Borrowing Rate (NIBOR) lending profiles and spread. 
LIBOR is based on the estimated rate of interest that is charged between 
banks in the London interbank market. The rate is calculated for a variety of 
currencies and loan maturities based on a bank submission process 
administered by the Intercontinental Exchange. Another reason for applying 
the Nibor187 is that the Nibor panel banks base their quotes on a US dollar 
rate that reflects the price of unsecured interbank loans in USD. Before the 
financial crisis, the banks used the US dollar Libor rate as a basis for their 
Nibor quotes. During the financial crisis, it was widely claimed that Libor 
underestimated the actual US dollar rate facing banks in the interbank 
market, and the Nibor panel banks decided to switch to a US dollar rate as 
the basis for Nibor. For the purpose of this research the NIBOR will be 
applied with a spread of 100 and 345 based on DNB indications (DNB, 2015) 
and (Norges Bank, 2017). It provides the foundation of the debt build-up that 
comes with the investment in the BSGI transport system. 
Debt and interest build-up 
 Total debt outstanding (MNOK)  51,120 
NIBOR rate (%)  1.33% 
Margin (bps) 222 
Interest rate (%)  3.55% 
Repayment period (years) 15 
Table 7-5 Interest build-up.  
Source: Adapted from Hammer 2015  
Bearing in mind the consequences of Basel III on Project Finance 
portfolios and the 2008 financial crisis the debt is build-up of 71% of 
NOK72BN as a maximum debt ceiling with a ten-year Nibor rate and an 
average margin of 222 base points derived from (Norges Bank, 2017). 
                                                   
187 The term “-ibor rates” refers to the benchmark rates e.g., Libor, Euribor, Stibor, Cibor and NIBOR for 
Norway 
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Equity  
One of the outcomes of the Gassco report concerned the entry of new 
but smaller O&G companies into exploration as well as transmission 
(Gassco, 2014a). These smaller companies (compared to e.g. Shell, Statoil), 
have constraints on raising finance and will typically look for equity, JV 
combinations or joint structures, including farm-out agreements. As a result 
of this diversity a need for collaboration between more companies and 
licensees becomes more pressing in order to be more cost effective, 
competitive and attractive to investors. Clew (2016) described independent 
companies as more innovative in making use of financing structures e.g. 
securing finance against working capital. Equity plays a significant part in 
the capital structure considering the capability of offsetting a high return due 
to the higher risk. Equity holders will be remunerated after the debt is paid.     
Hybrid 
In the scenario depicted by Gassco’s assumptions there are still gas 
resources left post-debt servicing. It could be argued that the volumes left 
are less risk prone resulting in lower returns. The low return features do not 
meet the high return requirements of the O&G companies in the exploration 
segment. Based on owner interviews, Hammer (2015) described the risk 
return for the BSGI to be in the range of 18%-20%. For the gap between debt 
and the high yield returns of the O&G equity the Project Finance model 
allows for a hybrid investment i.e., through mezzanine capital. The hybrid 
capital applied consists of capital returns and dividend. The dividend differs 
from “standard” dividend because it is not a tax-deductible dividend, not 
being on the balance sheet of the company. The hybrid capital instrument is 
assumed at 20% of the required CAPEX. Given that there are some 
contractually committed volumes left to partly service the required 
dividends and the potential value of the warrant structure, the infrastructure 
fund would require a ROI of approximately 10% with a 10-year period 
(Pedersen & Georgsen, interview, 19.03.15 cited in Hammer, 2015).  
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Parameters 
Revisiting taxation as set out in Chapter 4, in 2017 the “Ordinary” 
company tax rate equalled 24 %, and the “Special” tax rate 54 %, resulting in 
a marginal tax rate of 78 %. The general investment phasing profile is set at: 
15%, 20%, 30%, 20%, 15%, adapted fromGassco, 2014a. 
7.4. ANALYSIS    
 
Figure 31 Cash flows from investment in pipeline to 2050  
Source: Author’s own calculations adapted from Gassco, 2014a 
IRR 
Staying with the assumptions that sufficient resources are available 
and put on stream as discussed in the BSGI-E case at 45 Ms3/day (Gassco, 
2014) Figure 31 illustrates that the cash flows in the reference throughput 
scenario are sufficient to service the dividends to the mezzanine capital. As 
the figure illustrates the guaranteed cash flows will not be sufficient to cover 
the dividends required to provide the infrastructure investors the 10% 
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return. Hence, there is significantly more risk associated with owning the 
mezzanine capital than debt, and consequently the infrastructure funds 
must be compensated by higher returns and potential upside. The model 
assumes a 13.6% IRR with a post-tax return of 7%. 
 
 Figure 32 IRR based on Scenario I and Gassco E Scenario  
Source: Adapted from Gassco, 2014 
Figure 32 depicts the resources found and the resources needed to 
meet reference Scenario E, indicating that in order to meet the financial 
returns, significant amounts of natural gas need to be put on stream to 
capture this return on investment. 
A project IRR of 10 % is substantial for offshore pipeline projects of 
this character. In a PF structure with significant leverage, a required rate of 
return of 10% suggests the project is associated with substantial risk for a 
commercial bank issuing debt (Hammer, 2015). In comparison to other 
pipelines on the NCS depicted in Figure 33 the BGSI IRR is higher, based on 
assumptions, whilst historical data suggests that other transmission systems 
are running on a lower IRR. The other projects were however of different 
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nature at a time when there was less volatility of cash flows. Furthermore, 
these transmission systems were built on significant larger finds of gas in 
established areas closer to market. 
 
Figure 33 pipeline IRR over years 1970-2040  
Source: Njord 2015 
NPV 
The NPV is dependent on the annual throughput times the set tariff. 
A distinction should be made that the price of gas and its volatility has no 
direct effect on the tariff and thus, on the volatility of revenues for the 
investors. It could however be argued that a lower price could incentivise 
greater demand and a higher price a reduction in demand. The low prices 
from 2014 to 2017 however indicate that the correlation of low price and 
higher demand and high price and low demand is not necessarily a fixed 
rule. Figure 34 demonstrates that in Scenario I, the NPV of the volume of gas 
defined in the Barents Sea is not sufficient in relation to the total NPV line 
once the tax benefits are offset with the end of loans.  Scenario E is Gassco’s 
Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure Scenario E, the modest Scenario between high 
and low (Gassco, 2014a). 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
IR
R 
in
 %
pipelines over years
pipelines IRR
Statpipe
Franpipe
Zeepipe
Area HEuropipe
Norpipe
Europipe II
Vesterled
Area G
Langeled
BSGI
Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure 
 
 205 
 
Figure 34 NPV Scenario I and Gassco Scenario E  
Source: Adapted from Gassco 2014 
In Section 1.4, the MPE has historically set the tariffs so that the 
pipeline projects yielded a return of 7% based on indicative throughput. 
Hammer (2015) stated that the Gassled owners suggested the required IRR 
for the BSGI should be in the region of 10%, which would have been in line 
with the pre-tariff reduction of 2013. Gassled’s return as a whole for the 
period ex-ante 2013 amounted to 10.7% (Regjeringen, 2017c). In addition to 
increased regulatory risk, the higher required return comes as a result of 
more uncertainty related to throughput compared to other pipeline projects 
on the NCS. The O&G companies’ option to make contractual commitments 
to secure debt repayments, although quite possible, has not been discussed. 
The management of the natural resources through national and supra-
national regulation, will need to provide clear communication of incentives 
and rewards and be open to potentially new investment forms. 
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Collaboration will be required to optimise the balance of investment, cost 
and economic efficiency.  
7.5. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 7 has investigated the potential of the Barents Sea and in 
particular the Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure and its natural gas resources. 
The discoveries up to mid-2017 do not justify the BSGI investment, unless “a 
giant” is found. Although the Troll field with 1,764BCM was called “A 
Giant”, volumes required to justify a BSGI investment would have to be 285-
320BCM188, which is approximately the size of the Johan Sverdrup field 
(298BCM) or Ormen Lange (317BCM). The resources discovered in the 
Barents Sea are spread and are not of substantial size to justify an offshore 
pipeline system.   
Asset specificity  
Economies of scale are a key factor in the decision whether to aim for 
a 42-inch trunk line. Of the various formulae, available to assess the value of 
throughput, it was suggested that the methodology used by Gassco e.g., the 
Weymouth principles189 are best suited for large diameter high pressure 
pipelines. The 2014 to 2017 exploration portfolio in Gassco’s Scenario E was 
expected to double the natural gas resource base in the Barents Sea, but there 
is evidence suggesting (Norskpetroleum, 2017b) no substantial increase in 
resources. The volumes discussed in this Chapter are based on a potential 
scenario as laid down by Gassco’s report (Gassco, 2014a). Calculations have 
demonstrated that the base case, determined by discovered resources do not 
justify any pipeline system considering the cost of NOK72BN required to 
transport a diversified resource base.  
                                                   
188 Chapter 8 provides a calculation to arrive at this volume 
189 Section 8.7 in the Appendix provides evidence and calculation examples to justify the statement 
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Uncertainty 
The region is still in its infancy and would benefit from further 
investigation through wildcats and exploratory services to map the actual 
amounts of gas available, and their location to optimise the transportation 
route of a collecting pipeline. The Barents Sea holds the largest amount of 
undiscovered resources on the Norwegian Continental Shelf with the largest 
amount of fossil fuel to be found as gas (Norskpetroleum, 2017c). With finds 
announced in April 2017, in addition to the increased concentration on this 
area in licensing round 22, (with 72 licences of the 86 in the Barents Sea) and 
in the significant number of blocks in the area in the 23rd and 24th rounds, 
indicates that the government’s intentions are clearly focussed on the region. 
Notwithstanding the 2017 finds and a step up in exploration, the discoveries 
were of marginal to small size and only a small amount has been deemed 
commercially viable in 2017. No discovery on its own has warranted the 
development of the infrastructure (Gassco, 2014a). The smaller scattered 
finds will not become commercially viable without a transmission system in 
place. Thus, the majority of the known potential of natural gas resources, 
discovered and unproven in 2017 in the Barents Sea, are expected to remain 
undeveloped.   
Furthermore, for the Barents Sea Pipeline Developers to commence 
construction, besides the needed currently lacking natural gas resources, the 
cost of engineering procurement and construction would have to be 
significantly reduced given low 2014-2017 gas prices. Historically over the 
period from 1996 to 2016 gas prices190have fluctuated between $2 and 
$10/MMbtu. From 2014-2016 European import prices fluctuated between 
$5-$8/MMbtu, with average 2017 gas prices between $5.5/MMbtu (German 
border price) and $5.8/MMbtu (TTF) (EU, 2017b). It is expected that prices 
of $6-$8MMbtu are needed to remunerate 2017 delivery costs of large 
                                                   
190 See Chapter 5, Figure 19 Natural gas prices in $/MMbtu across five main gas regions.  
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volumes of gas from new offshore pipeline gas (Stern, 2017d). Considering 
Norway to be at the high end of this price range it remains uncompetitive to 
invest in a greenfield Barents Sea offshore pipeline assuming a 20-year asset 
life based on gas prices.  
Frequency in Transaction 
Data provided by the field operators indicates it is unlikely the BSGI 
will be driven by an individual license due to the expected resource base and 
the high CAPEX needed (Gassco, 2014a), so that collaboration across licenses 
will be needed. From a Transaction Cost Economics perspective, focussed on 
supporting an investment of this size, the frequency of contractual 
transactions compared to spot market trading is low. Developing a 
specialised structure to capture excessive (recurring) costs does not appear 
to be effective. 
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8. Summary and conclusions 
 
 
 
 
8.1.  RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Norway’s position as supplier of natural gas to the European Union 
is under pressure from multiple sides, through liberalisation of the natural 
gas market, supranational and national regulations, market dependencies 
and its national resource management. While the European Union, the 
largest market for Norwegian natural gas, has not decided on the future role 
of natural gas and Norway’s position in it, Norway claims to have sufficient 
gas especially in the Barents Sea to `continue to be a trusted supplier of gas 
to the European Union. However, it would require confirmation of an 
offtake commitment. 
Against this background, this research has come to five conclusions 
regarding Norway’s capability to maintain economically viable, 
operationally and technically efficient natural gas transportation to Europe 
under the European and Norwegian regulatory regimes.  
First, as shown throughout the research, Norway can supply the EU 
with natural gas in a technically efficient operation. However, compared to 
LNG and Russian piped gas, cost is a limiting factor for Norway, especially 
when considering the construction of greenfield offshore gas pipeline 
systems such as the Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure.  
The second conclusion is that the implementation of the European 
regulatory framework i.e., the gas directives, was agreed at a time when 
there was a pressing need, from the Norwegian point of view, to coordinate 
the diverse offshore structures and tariffs into a single Norwegian offshore 
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transmission system. In addition, it coincided with the EU Commission’s 
concerns about the Norwegian system for delivery of gas (Regjeringen, 
2017c). Although the implementation of the gas directives does not provide 
sufficient incentives for new investments in offshore pipeline export 
infrastructure on the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the changes in 
regulations and tariffs support the cost-efficient resource management 
needed to produce gas for export at prices that can match natural gas hub 
prices.  
The third conclusion, albeit somewhat obvious considering it has 
been documented on several occasions (e.g., the Royal Decree and the 
Petroleum Activities Act), yet misinterpreted by pipeline investors, 
Norway’s national policies and regulations do not support the commercial 
viability of investments in offshore pipelines and infrastructures. The 
emphasis of Norwegian laws and regulations has always been on taking 
profits from the fields rather than from the infrastructure. Allowing for a 
higher than the predetermined 7% before tax return on pipeline investment 
would have represented a breach of the principle that the return shall 
primarily be taken from the field (Regjeringen, 2017c).  
The fourth conclusion refers to the previous conclusion on ROI. The 
cost characteristics and regulations that are important for the Barents Sea 
decision makers are based on the expected CAPEX, and transportable 
volumes, taking into consideration that increasing the return of 7% would 
be breaking an important principle. The NOK72BN CAPEX is significant and 
would require 17-19 years to recover based on volumes around 285BCM, of 
which (according to 2017 estimates) 42BCM are still to be discovered.  
The fifth and final conclusion of this research is that the EU gas 
directives, although important in a Norwegian context, have a minor role to 
play for Barents Sea decision makers compared to Norwegian national 
regulations.  
This research is motivated by the uncertainty as to whether Norway 
is able to provide the European Union with natural gas for “many years to 
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come”, taking into consideration world natural gas prices and an ageing 
Norwegian infrastructure. In addition, the European Union has falling 
domestic natural gas production, a significant gap in infrastructure 
investments in transmission systems and an increasing obligation to comply 
with COP21 commitments. These factors provide support for additional 
reforms in the European gas market for which Norway is the second largest 
supplier; and also, in government policies and regulations in Norway where 
the oil and gas industry make up 22% of GDP and 67% of exports. 
8.2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This research applied three economic viewpoints to investigate these 
concerns:  
1) The neo-classical approach which is the foundation of European 
Union and Norwegian gas regulation;  
2) Transaction Cost Economics for its alternative view on gas 
regulation and application to investments in offshore natural gas 
transmission systems through capturing deficiencies in 
contractual agreements; and finally,  
3) The Principal-Agent theory for its ability to identify issues 
between the Norwegian government as Principal and Gassco, 
Gassled and Petoro as agents. 
Neo-Classical Theory 
Concluding that there cannot be a perfect natural gas market in 
Europe, European Union regulatory intervention is intended to obtain a 
perfectly competitive191natural gas market with a perfect price equal to 
marginal cost. Regulatory intervention in itself suggests market failure, 
assuming that a perfect market would not require regulatory involvement. 
Built on theoretical assumptions and comparison with the gas directives, the 
                                                   
191 Appendix for detailed explanation of monopoly regulation. 
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separation of ownership i.e., unbundling of the competitive sector from the 
transmission monopoly, occurred in Norway with the abolition of the GFU. 
For the purpose of unbundling vertically integrated entities Directives 
2003/55/EC, 2003/54/EC and 2009/73/EC resulted in ownership 
unbundling. Whilst measures were taken to avoid unfair incentives for 
vertically integrated firms to over-invest in transmission systems, the rulings 
promoted non-discriminatory investments in the infrastructure and allowed 
for new entrants and transparency in the market. Whether or not the non-
discriminatory investment incentives implemented by the directives are 
efficient and effective is subjective. Each member state is free to implement 
the regulations individually, particularly in relation to resource 
development and offshore infrastructure, as is the case of Norway for which 
Gassco is the operator (TSO) and Gassled the owner. The extent to which the 
unbundling has been efficient was analysed by Growitsch & Stronzik (2014), 
whose study of 18 EU countries over 19 years revealed no indication of a 
price-decreasing effect of ownership unbundling. “However, the breaking-
up of formerly vertically integrated TSOs resulted in reduced end-user 
prices” (Growitsch & Stronzik, 2014). From a regulatory perspective, it 
appears that further separation would not provide more efficiency i.e., 
additional unbundling could result in diminishing economic benefits.  
Returning to the economic foundation in which the State’s interest is 
to maximise social welfare, it could be argued that charging no tariffs would 
be optimal. However, to allow investors and transmission system owners a 
fair return a minimum recovery of cost plus a profit would be required. Due 
to the difference between investors, e.g., transmission system owners that 
own parts or shares of the system and natural resources, the transmission 
cost and tariff are financially internalised providing an advantage to sell 
more gas. A homogeneous tariff function for all the transmission systems 
with different cost functions would suggest inefficiency. Transaction cost 
economics bridges the intermediate period by capturing deficiencies in 
contractual agreements.  
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
With the application of the TCE model, determining factors became 
apparent. Furthermore, it provided an understanding of the link between 
neoclassical theories and practice in the natural gas market. The model 
provided a mechanism to divide levels of regulation and implication on each 
level. Whilst this model provided additional insights it had some drawbacks 
in regard to motivation for changes by a regulator or government. In the case 
of tariff reduction and taxation in the Norwegian context it could be argued 
that both incentives measures (tariff reduction and taxation) are 
counterproductive, whilst no clear benefit could be derived from the 
framework. Furthermore, given how the market moved through 
technological inventions and regulatory changes between 2003 and 2009 on 
an EU level, and between 2013 and 2015 in Norway, the adapted Williamson 
model, shown in Chapter 2 Table 2-1, presents time bands of 10-20 years. 
Conversely in the case of Norway, from 1971 until 2017 the general 
consensus is that there has been no significant change of natural resources 
policy, and thus 20-30 years seems within the scope of the Williamson 
framework. Although it could be argued that in Norway there is an intention 
to reduce reliance on oil and gas revenue, no action or significant change has 
been taken on any of the four levels of the regulatory framework.  
It is not the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the appropriateness of 
regulations but several findings from TCE analysis provide insights on 
supra- and national regulations. Chapter 2 described the fundamentals of 
TCE and its limitations. The foundation of its governance rests on 3 factors 
asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency of transaction. Asset specificity is 
potentially the most influential factor in the Norwegian transmission system 
context considering that without it, competition would be a common 
outcome. Buyers would turn to other suppliers and set up a new contract 
with the next seller of natural gas. There is no incentive to continue a contract 
with a specific seller. A form of governance is required taking into account 
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the multitude of governance forms, the differences in the spot price market 
for natural gas, and vertical integration. Within the uncertainty factor due to 
incomplete contracts, opportunism from either side results in ex-post 
contractual hazards. TCE has demonstrated regulatory opportunism albeit 
in a less dominant way than before the outcome of the court case between 
Gassled and the Norwegian Government. The Norwegian ministry as 
regulator of Gassled could have reasonably expected to be accountable for 
the publication of information regarding the return on investment made in 
the offshore pipeline system. Providing this information would have 
indicated exact earnings by the Gassled owners and consequently not have 
resulted in unannounced changes of tariffs. The government has however 
emphasised its rights to alter tariffs in laws, regulations and white papers. 
Whilst the principle of regulatory opportunism resulted in the regulator 
pressuring Gassled, this was not so in the Polarled case and with the Barents 
Sea Gas Infrastructure. The description of Polarled in chapter 6 depicts a 
situation where ex post hazards are not removed and investors in Aasta 
Hansteen are disadvantaged or deprived of appropriate revenue streams. In 
the case of BSGI, the setting was provided to invest on the basis of criteria 
given by the Gassco report (Gassco, 2014a). The situation is still not attractive 
to investors, due to high cost, an uncertain return period for the investment 
and the 7% return on investment before tax, not meeting investors 
requirements.      
Not all situations are appropriate for a Transaction Cost Economic 
approach.  Arguably if asset specificity, uncertainty, frequency of transaction 
is not met, then ex-ante contract alterations or e.g., perfect competition as 
market function could resolve incomplete contracts if such a contract form is 
applicable. The investments in Polarled and BSGI are asset specific due to 
sunk cost, subadditivity, location and frequency of change, making the 
projects vulnerable to ex-post hazards as has been demonstrated in both 
cases.  
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Principal-Agent Theory 
Norway as a gas exporter appears locked into a long run relationship 
with the main importer (EU), the infrastructure owner Gassled and the TSO 
Gassco. Arguably bargaining over the resource rent could be perceived as a 
multi-principal-multi-agent situation. Norway as a gas exporting country 
has an additional principal-agent relationship with Statoil the National Oil 
Company, which is tasked with the maximisation of the resources for 
exporting purposes and thus maximisation of social welfare. Together with 
Petoro “the other” agent of the Norwegian government, both have a 
significant influence on production and operating sharing agreements on the 
continental shelf, functioning as principal in the relationship with 
international oil companies. A substantial dissimilarity between an IOC and 
a NOC is the financial investment horizon, where the NOC may be partially 
on the national political economic agenda for which a long-term perspective 
is normal and lower short term returns in revenue would meet social 
welfare. 
That there is asymmetric information between the principals and the 
agents can be deduced from the fact that before the tariff reduction, the oil 
major Statoil sold its share in Gassled. A robust governance structure and 
clear communication on future strategies reduces principal-agent problems. 
This would include reduction of uncertainty for the asset owners, 
identification of risks and through discussion, a requirement for strategic 
planning.  
The relationship between the Norwegian government and Gassled 
has come under tension due to the tariff change in which the government 
concluded that the Gassled owners were earning more than 7% pre-tax and 
thus reduced the tariffs. The Norwegian court favoured the government’s 
position over the pipeline owners. Whilst Gassled’s focus is based on 
maximising profit at minimum cost, the role which the regulator (i.e. the 
government) has given itself, is to maximise social welfare and optimal 
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resource development, which creates an undesirable tension resulting in 
another principal agent problem. The government incentive is to reduce cost 
in order to develop as much of its resource base as possible, whilst Gassled 
owners as investors want the highest possible return on investment. It could 
be argued that the fall in gas prices post-2014 made it clear that unless 
Norwegian gas costs could be significantly reduced then the resource base 
in the north would remain largely undeveloped. 
8.3. CASE STUDIES 
Regulatory frameworks and anticipated European hub prices need 
to incentivise investments required to meet European Union gas demand.  
However, the Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure is costly and currently 
anticipated gas prices do not meet the requirements. To explain this 
statement the next three subsections will discuss regulations, investment and 
gas prices and provide a generalised observation from the Polarled and the 
Barents Sea Gas Infrastructure cases.  
Regulations 
One of the characteristics of the EU regulations is the “one size fits 
all” format for all EEA countries. No two of the countries are the same. Each 
of the member state’s regulators has a different interpretation and 
implementation of the regulations. The first differentiator is the incentive of 
the regulation. From an EU perspective, this is security of supply, 
competition and sustainability. In the configuration of the European Union 
and Norway, history has demonstrated that adapting to these incentives was 
not a smooth transition. Planning of ownership change based on rulings in 
2001 was not initiated on a voluntary basis but was rather the result of formal 
anti-trust proceedings initiated by the Directorate-General Competition. 
From a Norwegian perspective the implementation of the gas directive, 
although coinciding with the anti-trust proceeding came at a convenient 
time in which multiple pipeline owners with multiple tariffs were required 
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to be aggregated into one uniform transmission system to become more 
efficient and thus competitive.  From a principal-agent perspective the best 
interest of the EU did not necessarily match the interest of the Norwegian 
government, which was selling gas on Norwegian terms. However, the 
Norwegian government wanted a large-scale market for its gas and the 
European Union was quite willing to provide that market. This resulted in a 
transition to EU legislation on the NCS as national laws were adapted. As a 
consequence, the supra-national regulator will encounter asymmetric 
information exchanges and take actions that may not be to the best interest 
of Norwegian society. This allows for additional arguments regarding 
regulatory opportunism and regulatory failure. Reflecting on the discussion 
on TCE and neo-classical theory regarding the EU targets, it could be argued 
that the EU framework does not meet the set target of perfect competition.  
Investments 
The EU framework based on neo-classical economic principles has 
imperfections as discussed from a theoretical perspective in Section 8.2. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 3 the discussion of the development of financial 
instruments designed to attract additional private investment through “the 
Juncker Plan” supports the TCE fundamentals and confirms reduced interest 
in investments.  
Bearing in mind the lead times for long term projects and the backlog 
of these projects, Norwegian investments have declined:192  by ~23% from 
2014 to 2015; by another 6% from 2015 to 2016.  For the years 2017 and 2018 
declines of ~6% and 8% are expected before an 8% uptick to return to 2017 
levels according to Petoro. An estimated reduction of $50 BN in CAPEX and 
E&P should be anticipated between 2016 and 2020.  
                                                   
192 Taking into account all investment forms, e.g., concept studies, brownfield expansion, greenfield and 
E&P (Petoro, 2016 ; Petoro 2017) 
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To distinguish the dampening effect the supra-national natural gas 
regulatory framework has had on investments, from the impact of the fall of 
fossil fuel prices is difficult to determine. The same position is taken on the 
implications of supra-national financial regulations and the effect they have 
on potential investments on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. While both 
may be valid topics, the arguments are out of the scope of this research. 
Revisiting Natural Gas Prices 
Predicting natural gas prices is a complex matter and not in the scope 
of this research. Nevertheless, in order to discuss investments required to 
meet European Union gas demand, a view must be taken on anticipated hub 
prices because of their significant impact. Grounded on historical data, 
whilst referencing to the gas market as set out in Chapter 5, several 
judgements will be made centred on various predictions made by Energy 
Institutes and data providers e.g., BP, EIA and IEA. The average gas prices 
over the past 20 years and the years post 2013 are shown in table 8-1.  
 
$/MMbtu Japan 
LNG 
Germany UK, NBP US BN 
Average 20 years  8,42 6,39 5,68 4,47 
2014-2016 12,44 7,78 7,53 3,28 
Table 8-1 Long-term gas price assumption  
Source: Adapted from BP, 2017 
In the first three quarters of 2017 the prices of natural gas have 
fluctuated between $4-$6MMbtu, Russian gas has been moving in the same 
price range. In a gas oversupply scenario, spot prices are likely to remain at 
a similar level with average 2017 gas prices between $5.5MMbtu (German 
border price) and $5.8MMbtu (TTF) (EU, 2017b).  
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Polarled and BSGI 
It is expected that prices of $6-$8MMbtu are needed to remunerate 
2017 delivery costs of large volumes of gas from new offshore pipeline gas 
(Stern, 2017d). Considering Norway to be at the high end of the $6-$8MMbtu 
price range it remains unprofitable to invest in a greenfield Barents Sea 
offshore pipeline assuming a 20-year asset life based on expected gas prices.   
From an offshore pipeline owner’s perspective, supporting the 
transmission of natural gas resources from the Barents Sea through the BSGI, 
several factors are relevant to consider. Gassco’s annual reports from the 
period 2011 to 2016 depict requirements based on gross revenues and 
maximum throughput. Table 8.2 shows the gross revenue Gassled received 
from Gassco from tariffs, and the volumes transported for this revenue.  The 
volumes required to recover the investment of NOK 72BN depicts a high, 
low and average scenario based on 16.4BCM maximum throughput 
obtainable from the BSGI193. 
Period 2011- 2016 High Low Average 11- 16 
Year 2016 2012  
Gross revenue in MMNOK 
x 1,000 
27.377.312 24.696.780 26.194.239 
BCM 108,6 107,6 103,7 
Gross Revenue/BCM 252.093.112 229.523.978 252.994.511 
Volume required (BCM) 286 312 285 
Years to recover NOK72BN 
CAPEX 
17,42 19,13 17,41 
Table 8-2 Volumes required to recover investment  
Source: Gassco 2011-2016 annual reports, author’s own calculations 
                                                   
193 E.g., 27.377.312/108,6=NOK 252.093.112 per BCM in 2016. NOK72BN/252.093.112=286/16.4BCM 
Max throughput=17,42years 
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Based on 2016-2017 data, it is difficult to predict natural gas 
requirements post 2030194and long-term security of supply. The 
postponement and cancelation of the development of various fields and 
transmission systems may have an impact on the steady flow of Norwegian 
gas to the EU. Furthermore, the Oil & Gas industry has cut back its 
investment plans, in Norway but also globally. As a result, further activity 
linked to development of new production capacity on the Norwegian Shelf 
is expected to stabilise at a lower level than before 2014 (Petoro, 2016). The 
fields that are coming on line, and the continuous drilling on the NCS 
suggest that the incentives to explore are still viable. However, considering 
the cases of Polarled and BSGI, in addition to Johan Castberg, this thesis has 
found that the viability of development and production is limited by the  
return on investment. Minor fields can achieve viability with smaller and 
thus cheaper connections tying into existing systems at a fraction of the cost 
of installing a trunk line. However due to the lack of major offshore pipelines 
in the Barents Sea this is not an option. Natural depletion of the fields could 
result in underinvestment and underutilisation of transmission systems and 
field development leading to reduced volumes available from the NCS to the 
European market. The impact can be deduced from a sliding scale 
depending on the interaction of future demand, discoveries and gas price. 
 
BCM/BN 2020 2025 2030 2040 
MAX 110 96 93 91 
MIN 87 78 59 41 
Table 8-3 pipeline estimates  
Source: Gassco, 2016  
                                                   
194 If usage of fossil fuels would be restricted to e.g., 2030 and pipeline investors would have to recover 
the investment in 13 years (2017-2030), the maximum cost of the offshore of the pipeline would have to 
equal or be less than NOK54BN. This assumption would imply a reduced asset life by ~50% from 25 to 
13 years and a 25% reduction (NOK18BN) in engineering, procurement, construction and installation 
cost. These developments impact long term supply of natural gas from Norway. 
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The supply potentials shown in Table 8-3 (derived from NPD, Gassco 
and MPE data) define a possible range of Norwegian gas exports to Europe 
via pipeline ranging from 110-91 BCM in a high demand scenario to 87-41 
BCM in a low demand scenario.195 Comparing the data from 8-3 with table 
8-2 it appears that an investment in the BSGI is not economically viable. If 
assuming the low-end scenario, the implications would suggest that Norway 
would reduce investments, resulting in reduced revenues and a higher 
OPEX per BCM in the existing offshore pipeline system. To what extent this 
will be commercially feasible depends on future gas prices. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 there is room for improved 
efficiency, however, tax benefits are substantially more accommodating for 
oil and gas companies in offshore facilities, than in onshore investments. 
Furthermore, the intention of the change in Norwegian offshore taxes was to 
stimulate E&P activity, more specifically with the opening of acreage in the 
Barents Sea in the later licensing rounds in 2016-2017. Norway’s aim is to 
develop resources and fields in order to justify an offshore gas transportation 
system. There appears to be no incentive to invest in additional transmission 
systems. The smaller tie-ins (e.g., Valemon, Utsira) have been absorbed by 
the field owners in joint ventures and are operated by Gassco.  
Government reduction of transmission tariffs was aimed at 
increasing production and transportation of gas through the introduction of 
competition, the modifications of national policies and the move to hub-
based pricing may have had a positive competitive effect considering that 
the volumes of exported gas have gone up from ~107BCM in 2014 to 
~115BCM in 2016. To what extent this is a result of policy changes or market 
demand remains uncertain. The fact that Norway has the ability to manage 
its resources in a short-term gas market suggests the regulations meet this 
requirement. Conversely, from a theoretical perspective the regulations on a 
                                                   
195 LNG from Snøhvit has been excluded, Norwegian LNG exports are part of the LNG potentials and 
are not taken into consideration for the purpose of this research. Annual export capacity was around 21.5 
MsM3 in 2016 
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national level still have not excluded market failure, whether in terms of 
incomplete information, inefficiencies, uncertainty or lack of competition. 
The aim should be to provide pre-conditions that eliminate market failure 
corrections ex-post investment or ex-post project execution. Furthermore, 
the research has identified insufficient documentation of measures to avoid 
regulatory opportunism in Norwegian regulation and the EU gas directives. 
The cost associated with regulatory opportunism, if it can be documented, 
could lead to a reduction of intervention through policy changes. 
8.4. AN UNCHANGING SUPPLY OF GAS 
According to the NPD and Petoro, oil and gas production on the NCS 
will continue to remain constant and Norway will maintain its position as a 
reliable supplier of fossil fuels to the EU. However new discoveries are 
needed to maintain production levels around 90-100 BCM for the period 
2020-2040. With a reduction in revenues due to lower oil and gas prices, the 
Norwegian coffers needed filling from the Pension fund in 2016 for the first 
time in its history. This indicates that Norway would need to sell more gas 
for less revenue, as has been the case since 2014. In order to sell more, it 
would require more resources to maintain the predicted production horizon.  
Falling domestic production rates in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands have contributed to a higher level of imports. Germany 
absorbed 41% of Norway’s gas supply and the United Kingdom 30% in 2016. 
The United Kingdom also received 20% of its gas import from the 
Netherlands. This has caused significant issues in the Groningen province 
where reduced production ordered by the council of State will have knock 
on effects on supplies to the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium.  
The fact that Norway has made a reduction in investments has not 
resulted in a reduction in developments or production. The government 
granted Statoil permission to increase output from the Troll or Gullfaks 
fields to 33BCM for a year from October 2017 using additional gas 
technology to extend the field lives, indicating that the government is 
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managing its resources. Updated technologies in drilling and increased 
efficiency in gas development have resulted in cost reduction and an 
increase in drilling completion. The government could stimulate activity and 
take the role of coordinator again in the form of what was known as the 
NORSOK (Norwegian shelf competitive position) cooperation. Technically 
there are restrictions to increasing production (just as with the Troll field), 
but the government has capabilities to increase other fields accordingly. 
Although the Barents Sea has been advocated by the Government, 
Gassco and Statoil as the location which will enable a major increase in future 
production, thus far the 2017 results have only located reserves in the Kayak, 
Blåmann and Gemini fields. The much anticipated Korpfjell196 has not 
delivered commercially viable results. As discussed in Chapter 7 the 
potential resources in the Barents Sea would first need to be discovered in 
accumulations significant enough to create required cooperation between 
various field owners and transmission system owners to justify another 
trunk-line. This will require a major investment in cooperation and 
standardisation. National regulations, and to lesser extent supra-national 
regulations, would need to anticipate investors’ needs and the lessons 
learned from Polarled in relation to field development, resource allocation 
and contract guarantees to minimize uncertainties.   
Based on the low investments in the Polarled fields with a trunk-line 
already in place, only a significant find will result in the building of BSGI 
unless risks are rewarded with a higher return over a shorter period. The 
choice to explore and develop fields near existing resources in the North Sea 
is thus more viable, considering this would allow for optimal usage of the 
existing mature offshore pipeline system. 
                                                   
196 Korpfjell field was a prospect with a BN-barrel potential. However, the result on 29.08.2017 was a non-
commercial gas discovery.  
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8.5. RECOMMENDATIONS ON FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research on the influence of regulation 
Environmental regulation may result in a move away from fossil 
fuels, even if natural gas will function as a bridging fuel. Furthermore, the 
transition to a more sustainable environment in the case of Norway, as a 
substantial supplier of natural resources yet strong advocate of 
environmental policies, will have implications. An analysis of the social 
welfare of Norway vis a vis reduced income and the country’s willingness 
to move away from oil and gas revenues would be extremely useful. This 
research could be taken as a point of departure for an analysis of resource 
management and regulation.  
Further research on the potential for alternative usage of the infrastructure 
The research investigated the Norwegian offshore transmission 
system, transporting natural gas. It furthermore discussed investment 
options in the transmission system. The research approach might be of value 
to investigate alternative usage of offshore transmission systems, more 
specifically transportation of hydrogen from decarbonised natural gas. 
Further research related to economic theory 
Natural gas pipelines have been identified as resources that exhibit 
public goods characteristics. In the case of Norway, which exports nearly all 
its gas, there is the question whether gas and transmission pipelines can be 
considered public goods if they do not serve a very high percentage of the 
population of a country. 
Further research on the influence of technological advances  
Calculating a complete offshore pipeline system is extremely 
complex.  Mathematically modelling a programme in the form of, for 
instance “a digital twin”, to optimise the complete natural gas chain might 
support balancing and more efficient management of natural resources.   
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Appendix  
 
 
 
 
1) PIPELINE CALCULATIONS 
Pipeline cost and material selection 
 (Cherney, 1949), (Yépez, 2008), and (Massol, 2011) depart from a 
theoretical linear function where the pipeline wall thickness is a ratio from 
the diameter, however do not incorporate material selection. In gas 
transmission trunk lines 50-55% of the project cost is the weight of the steel 
used for the transmission lines. If this197 is applied to a 40” trunk line with a 
length of 1000 km with the option to build with either X-70 steel or X-80 steel 
this could make a difference of $24MM. Besides the diameter and length of 
a pipeline is the grade or material choice relevant for the product as well as 
cost factor. E.g. The Europipe II offshore pipeline from Norway to Germany 
which was built in 1996, is the first pipeline using X-80 grade steel. Figure 35 
shows the pipeline transportation cost for a 1000-km pipeline depending on 
capacity and steel grade. The transportation cost for such a distance can be 
reduced by 20% using X-100 instead of > X-70. For 20 BCM per year and 
1000-km distance the pipeline transportation cost is $0.47/MMbtu using X-
70 and $ 0.8/MMbtu with X-100 (IEA, 2011). For purposes of fluid and gas 
dynamics assumptions will be made in accordance with NORSOK M001 
(NORSOK, 2002) recommendations on minimal requirements of Pipeline 
systems shall be in accordance with DNV OS-F101 “The material selection 
                                                   
197 See Appendix for example calculation on X-70 and X-80 
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for pipeline systems for processed gas shall be Carbon-Manganese steel198”  
(Det Norske Veritas, 2010). 
2) NPD RESOURCE CLASSES AND PROJECT STATUS 
CATEGORIES  
The NPD has categorised recoverable resources199 in: 
Reserves category 1-3 
• Reserves are characterized by the following: - it is petroleum (fossil 
fuel in all its forms) that has been discovered, e.g., through test 
drilling 
• These volumes can be recovered both technically and commercially 
• If these reserves are not already developed and in operation, a plan 
for development and operation (PDO) is agreed upon (Gassco, 2014) 
Contingent Resources category 4-7 
• This is petroleum that has been discovered, normally by drilling 
However, it is currently not considered commercially recoverable, 
for example due to small volumes, low oil prices, or technical 
challenges 
Undiscovered Resources category 8-9 
• These are potential, undiscovered quantities of petroleum. No 
drilling has been undertaken (NPD, 2011)  
 
 
 
                                                   
198 Carbon-Manganese Steels have its manganese content in carbon steels increased for the purpose of 
increasing depth of hardening and improving strength and toughness 
199 A detailed table is provided in the appendix 
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Resource 
Class 
Project Status Category 
 Category  Description 
Historical 
production 
0  Sold and delivered petroleum  
Re
se
rv
es
 
1 F 
A 
Reserves in Production 
2 F 
A 
Reserves with an approved 
plan for development and 
operation  
3 F 
A 
Reserves which the licensees 
have decided to recover  
Co
nt
in
ge
nt
 R
es
ou
rce
s 
4 F 
A 
Resources in the planning 
phase  
5 F 
A 
Resources whose recovery is 
likely, but not clarified  
6  Resources whose recovery is 
not very likely  
7 F 
A 
Resources that have not been 
evaluated  
Un
di
sc
ov
er
ed
 
Un
di
sc
ov
er
ed
 
Re
so
ur
ce
s  
8  Resources in prospects  
9  Resources in leads, and 
unmapped resources  
 
Table Appendix-0-1 Resource classification.  
Source NPD. 
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3) A CONSIDERATIONS ON CAPACITY CALCULATION 
Capacity calculation 
In order to calculate the requirements to transport a certain volume 
of gas, several parameters will be discussed which have an influence on the 
construction of an infrastructure and the costs that are involved. The 
decisions about the to be transported volume of gas and investment are 
assumed to be taken separately with the estimate of output assumed to be 
made prior to the investment decision. This assumption is consistent with 
industrial practice because, in many cases, the flow of gas is an outcome of 
exogenous negotiations between a natural gas producer and a group of 
buyers (Massol, 2011). Calculating the flow and pressure needed to transport 
an amount of gas, optimal investments and infrastructures are dependent on 
the properties of the gas and the pressure drop due to friction of gas on the 
inner wall of the pipeline. The properties of gas, e.g., viscosity, gravity and 
compressibility respond differently to pressure and temperature. Friction 
can be calculated using the General Flow Equation or Weymouth, Panhandle 
A & B equations. Several friction and transmission factors are available such 
as the American Gas Association (AGA) and Colebrook-White. No data is 
available indicating which model has preference or is more adequate.  
Hudkins (2009) investigates the accuracy of nine flow equations and 
the respective range of error. The produced errors, according to Hudkins, 
could be pointed to utilisation of the equations outside the intended pipeline 
environment. “This error could directly affect theoretical optimal pipeline 
diameter and cause it to be significantly different from the actual optimal 
pipe diameter” (Carroll & Hudkins, 2009). 
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Equation Name  Range of Error  
Panhandle  3.5 – 10%  
Colebrook  2.4 – 10%  
Modified-Colebrook  1.0 – 8.8%  
AGA  0.2 – 15%  
Weymouth  39 – 59%  
IGT  7.6 – 17%  
Spitzglass  88 – 147%  
Mueller  13 – 20%  
Fritzsche  40 – 52%  
 
Table Appendix-0-2 Equations and range of error.  
Source (Mokhatab Saeid, 2007) 
Considering the functionality of the Gassopt model in addition to 
extensive usage in the industry will the General flow equation with the 
Colebrook white friction factor and the Weymouth equation be used for 
possible calculations on ex-post and ex -ante transmission systems and will 
be compared. 
General flow equation 
The general flow equation will be  
* = 5.747 × 10$%2 #&!'!' + 3'"#$'$#(&%)*4+.-52.5     
  
 
* = 5.747 × 10$%2 #&!'!' + 3'"#$.&'$#(&%)'* 4+.-52.5    
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for which,  !! = "(!!$%)' 	$%&	' = 0.06846	 -("$(#)*+ . 
 
the distinctive difference between the two flow equations being the 
incorporation of elevation alternatively assumption of equal level for the 
purpose of example. 
71 8⁄ = 4	;<= #/.012 '       
   
• Q=Quantity in Ms3 
• C=Constant parameter 
• Tb=Temperature base 
• Pb= Pressure base 
• d=diameter in mm 
• Root 1/f= flow factor 
The Weymouth equation 
The purpose of discussing the following equations is to establish a 
general accepted means to calculate the requirements to transport gas from 
point A to point B. The equation is applied to gas flows at high pressures 
because of its accuracy under these specific circumstances. The equation 
defines the relationship between the flow and the pressure drop due to 
friction through a horizontal pipeline segment defined as:  
Q= C0√l D83 /-P1P2.2 -1         
• Q =quantity 
• D =diameter 
• L = length 
• P1 =pressure at beginning 
• P2 =pressure at end point 
• C0 = exogenous constant parameter 
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Flow in pipelines is indicated inter alia by a Reynolds number.  
Reynolds developed a dimensionless number that 
may be considered as the ratio of the dynamic forces of mass 
flow to the shear stress due to viscosity. If the Reynolds 
number is less than 2000, flow may be considered laminar. If 
it is above 4000, the flow is turbulent. In the zone between 
2000 and 4000 the flow is partially turbulent, however cannot 
be predicted by the Reynolds number (Gas Processors 
Suppliers Association, 2004, p. 456).  
The flow is affected by friction in gas flows with low and high 
Reynolds numbers.  
Colebrook White 
This equation is %-. = −22%3%/ 4 !0.23 + 4.5%6$	&'6 $%&	7! > 4000 
Modified Colebrook White 
This modified equation takes into consideration %-. = −22%3%/ 4 !0.23 + 4.7456$	&'6 
Gas compressibility 
Gas is compressible. A distinction must be made between isothermal 
gas compressibility (Mokhatab Saeid, 2007) which is generally used to 
determine the compressible properties of a reservoir on one hand and the 
gas deviation factor Z or super-compressibility on the other hand. The latter 
will be further discussed in this Section. 
Two particularly difficult tasks are how to calculate the given gas’ 
deviation from an ideal gas (specified as the Z-factor), and how to calculate 
the friction occurring between the gas molecules and the pipeline wall 
(specified by the friction factor). 
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4) COMPRESSOR POWER 
Another important field of interest is to clarify compressor power 
requirements needed for transporting the natural gas in the transmission 
system. The variable costs are directly linked to the fuel consumption in the 
compressor drive motors. Such motors are either gas turbines or electric 
motors. These relationships will also clarify marginal costs of transportation 
as being the marginal cost function, defined as the derivative of the variable 
cost function. 
In order to calculate the compressor power, the compressor’s suction 
pressure and delivery pressures must be defined.  
Gas from the well has natural pressure. To what extent this is 
sufficient to transport it to the next station, whether end terminal or 
compression station, is dependent on several factors. However, once gas is 
being treated and the separations process has commenced the pressure is not 
sufficient for gas to be transported and requires compression. Gas driven 
turbines have been the main instrument for this task although however, 
since 2007 Norway has investigated the option for electric shore power. Until 
now two platforms run on sustainable (predominant hydroelectricity) shore 
power, Valhall and Troll A with Martin Linge and Ula to follow. The turbine 
or shore power operates the compressor which compresses and pumps the 
gas to the next point. Different types of compressors200 e.g. centrifugal, 
reciprocating, blade and axial compressor from different manufactures come 
with different operation characteristics. With the choice of compressor and 
its performance comes a power output and cost. Nørstebø, Rømo, & Hellemo 
(2010) modelled compressor performance and demonstrated that 
“differences between the estimated linearized power consumption and the 
post-calculated theoretical power consumption lie between 1% and 11%. The 
resulting pressure and flow values deviate up to 12% and 66% respectively 
                                                   
200 (Gas Processors Suppliers Association, 2004) provides in depth explanation of the various types and 
functions and the required auxilary equipment. 
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from the user defined pressure and flow values in these cases”. This outcome 
supports  (Langelandsvik, et al., 2009) method to ex-post calculate real power 
consumption based on empirical data and allow for deviation in 
consumption in ex-ante calculation in the front-end engineering.  
To transport gas from A to B a compressor(s) might be required. 
Depending on the pipeline diameter and the volumes to be transported, 
variation in compressor power needs to be calculated. To follow Massol 
(2011) the definition of compressor power required to transport gas from A 
to B, i.e. inlet pressure of P0 to a predefined outlet pressure of P1 Yépez, (2008) 
equation for power is applied as BN =horsepower per Million cubic feet of 
gas R =pressure ratio P1/P2 ≥ 1 with C1 = Positive dimensionless constant 
parameters and β = Positive dimensionless constant parameters (β < 1. 4) BN=C1.;Rβ-1<Q   
Calculating economies of scale in a pipeline 
Another method of demonstrating economies of scale is by looking 
at changes in diameter compared to a throughput of a set amount of gas 
through a fixed length of pipeline. Taking the Weymouth equation and 
compressibility of gas into consideration201 the following example as 
displayed in Figure 30 illustrates that with a smaller diameter of pipe more 
compression power is required to accomplish the same throughput. More 
compression power requires a bigger compressor or more compressors 
raising the variable operating cost. 
                                                   
201 In the hypothetical example, a natural gas subsea pipeline transports 30 Million m3/day of gas from 
an offshore platform to a compressor station site 100 km away. The pipeline is buried along a flat terrain. 
The delivery pressure desired at the end of the pipeline is a minimum of 5500 kPa. assuming a pipeline 
efficiency of 0.95. The gas gravity is 0.65, and the gas temperature is 18°C with a base temperature = 15°C 
and base pressure 101 kPa. The gas compressibility factor Z = 0.92.  
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Figure 35 Inlet pressures for different pipes transporting gas  
Source: Author’s own calculations 
The red baseline is set at 30 Million m3/day202. It requires 160 Bar of 
pressure for a 24-inch pipeline to meet the 30 MMs3 of throughput, whilst at 
half the pressure, 80 Bar, it can make use of a 38-inch.      
  
5) PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP  
Build, operate, and transfer (BOT) 
The public administration delegates planning and realisation 
of the project to the private party together with operating 
management of the facility for a given period of time. During this 
period, the private party is entitled to retain all receipts generated by 
the operation but is not the owner of the structure concerned. The 
facility will then be transferred to the public administration at the 
end of the concession agreement without any payment being due to 
the private party involved (Yescombe, 2007, p. 8). 
                                                   
202 For the example, standard pipe x-70 and diameters have been used rather than exotic alloys or one-
off made diameters. The rounding has been upward to meet the demand. 
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Build, operate, and own (BOO) 
The private party owns the assets. Ownership is not 
transferred at the end of the concession agreement. 
Therefore, the residual value of the project is exploited 
entirely by the private sector. (Gatti, 2008, p.7) 
build, own, operate, and transfer (BOOT) 
The private party owns the assets. At the end of the concession term 
the works are transferred to the public administration, and in this case a 
payment for them can be established.  
Design, build, finance, and operate (DBFO) 
The public administration pays an annual toll to the private 
concession holder based on the volume of throughput the transmission 
system and the service levels. The end user does not actually pay a toll to the 
operator. The final cost of construction is factored into the e.g., national 
budget and so is paid for by citizens through taxes (Gatti, 2008). 
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6) CREDIT RATINGS 
 Investment Grade Rating 
Highest  
grade 
 
  
S&P The issuer’s capacity to meet its financial obligation 
is extremely strong 
AAA 
Moody’s These obligations are judged to be of the highest 
quality, with minimal credit risk 
Aaa 
Fitch Highest credit quality, denotes the lowest 
expectation of credit risk. Exceptionally strong 
capacity to payment of financial commitments 
AAA 
High Grade 
 
  
S&P The issuer’s capacity to meet its financial obligation 
is very strong, differing from the highest-rated 
obligation only to a small degree 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
Moody’s These obligations are judged to be of high quality 
and are subject to very low credit risk 
Aa1 
Aa2 
Aa3 
Fitch Very high credit quality, denotes expectations of 
very low credit risk. Very strong capacity to 
payment of financial commitments 
AA+ 
AA 
AA- 
Upper 
Medium 
Grade 
  
S&P The issuer’s capacity to meet its financial 
commitments. However, it is more susceptible to 
the adverse effect of changes and circumstances 
and economic conditions than higher grade 
obligations.  
A+ 
A 
A- 
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Moody’s Obligations rated “A” are considered upper 
medium grade and are subject to low credit risk.  
A1 
A2 
A3 
Fitch High credit quality, denotes expectations of low 
credit risk. Strong capacity to payment of financial 
commitments 
A+ 
A 
A- 
Lower 
Medium 
Grade 
  
S&P Exhibits adequate protection parameters. Adverse 
economic conditions or changing circumstances are 
more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the 
issuer to meet its financial commitments. 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
Moody’s These obligations are subject to moderate credit 
risk. They are considered medium-grade and as 
such may possess certain speculative 
characteristics. 
Baa1 
Baa2 
Baa3 
Fitch Good credit quality, denotes that there are currently 
expectations of low credit risk. The capacity for 
payment of financial commitments so considered 
adequate but adverse changes in circumstances and 
economic conditions are more likely to impair this 
capacity. 
BBB+ 
BBB 
BBB- 
Speculative 
Grade 
  
S&P Less vulnerable to non-payment than other 
speculative issues, However, the issuer faces major 
ongoing uncertainties or exposures to adverse 
business, financial or economic conditions which 
could lead to inadequate capacity to meet its 
financial commitment. 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
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Moody’s These obligations are judged to have speculative 
elements and are subject to substantial risk. 
Ba1 
Ba2 
Ba3 
Fitch Speculative, there is a possibility of credit risk 
developing, particularly as a result of adverse 
business, financial or economic or market changes 
BB+ 
BB 
BB- 
Table Appendix-0-3 Credit ratings 
7) NOK EXCHANGE RATE 1960-2017 
    
22/9/2017    
Exchange 
rates       
    
Land EU UK USA 
 Euro Pound Dollar 
NOK per: 1 EUR 1 GBP 1 USD 
2016 9,2899 11,3725 8,3987 
2015 8,9530 12,3415 8,0739 
2014 8,3534 10,3690 6,3019 
2013 7,8087 9,1968 5,8768 
2012 7,4744 9,2199 5,8210 
2011 7,7926 8,9841 5,6074 
2010 8,0068 9,3402 6,0453 
2009 8,7285 9,8052 6,2817 
2008 8,2194 10,3304 5,6361 
2007 8,0153 11,7237 5,8600 
2006 8,0510 11,8141 6,4180 
2005 8,0073 11,7111 6,4450 
2004 8,3715 12,3401 6,7372 
2003 8,0039 11,5670 7,0824 
2002 7,5073 11,9461 7,9702 
2001 8,0492 12,9414 8,9879 
2000 8,1109 13,3129 8,8058 
1999 8,3101 12,6252 7,8047 
1998  12,5007 7,5465 
1997  11,5958 7,0788 
1996  10,0795 6,4543 
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1995  9,9997 6,3369 
1994  10,7954 7,0521 
1993  10,6625 7,1060 
1992  10,9326 6,2060 
1991  11,4365 6,4889 
1990  11,1504 6,2544 
1989  11,3077 6,9078 
1988  11,5960 6,5262 
1987  11,0262 6,7355 
1986  10,8504 7,3974 
1985  11,0775 8,5856 
1984  10,8714 8,1694 
1983  11,0686 7,3018 
1982  11,2798 6,4729 
1981  11,5770 5,7461 
1980  11,4936 4,9394 
1979  10,7464 5,0640 
1978  10,0548 5,2417 
1977  9,2955 5,3232 
1976  9,8722 5,4565 
1975  11,5733 5,2283 
1974  12,9240 5,5257 
1973  14,0883 5,7518 
1972  16,4775 6,5895 
1971  17,1527 7,0185 
1970  17,1145 7,1434 
1969  17,0899 7,1534 
1968  17,1113 7,1500 
1967  19,6513 7,1567 
1966  19,9805 7,1533 
1965  19,9933 7,1567 
1964  19,9916 7,1608 
1963  20,0225 7,1542 
1962  20,0407 7,1401 
1961  20,0208 7,145 
1960  20,0292 7,136 
Table Appendix-0-4 Currency conversion 
Source (Norges Bank, 2017) 
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8) CONVERSION TABLE 
1-barrel oil ≈ 159 litres 
1 Scm oil ≈ 6.29 barrels  
1 tonne oil ≈ 1.18 Scm oil 
1 Scm oil ≈ 0.85 tonne oil 
1 Scm gas = 35.315 Scf gas 
 
9) FINANCIAL EQUATIONS 
The Net Present Value (NPV) criterion  
“One should invest if the present value of the expected future cash 
flow from an investment is larger than the cost of the investment” (Pindyck 
& Rubinfeld, 2012) 
>?@ = ∑ (4($5()(789)(:;<7 − C+         
the net present value is described as the sum of all present values in 
a discrete time period (T) submitted to an interest rate (R) in which the cost 
of capital (C) to finance the investment (I) will be deducted from the rate of 
return and taking the initial investment into account. 
IRR, Internal Rate of Return  
Alternatively, in order to find the discount rate for which the NPV = 
0 (or, costs equal benefits). This rate is known as the internal rate of return 
(IRR) the higher the return rat is the more profitable the investment must be 
to capitalise on the investment.  ∑ (=)−?))(1+B))CD=1 = C0       IRR 
Both methods have the option to make use of the (WACC) to obtain 
the cost of capital. 
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Cost of Capital 
Capital related expenses will be accounted for through Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital (WACC)203. This may prove an important factor 
assuming different types of owners of the transmission system have the 
same return function, proportionally the same cost, and potentially can only 
differentiate in the cost of capital employed, leveraged proportion in its 
portfolio or discount periods. 
DEFF =	#.G' ∗ G. + #HG' ∗ 	GH       
The cost of capital is build up from the equity (E) times the rate of 
equity (RE) in addition to the portion (V) of debt (D) times the rate of debt 
(RD). 
10) SUMMARY EU REGULATIONS 
The European union, in relation to natural gas and the IEM, is build 
up out of 6 institutions. These institutions are responsible for European gas 
regulations and legislation. The six institutions are, The European 
Commission; The Council of Ministers; The European Parliament; The 
European Court of Justice; The Economic and Social Committee; The 
Committee of Regions; and The Court of Auditors and will be concisely 
discussed.  
1. The European Commission consists of representatives of each EU 
country/member state (27) with the interest of the EU as main incentive. 
From a natural gas perspective, Directorate- Generals (DG) are allocated 
to Competition, Energy and Transport, Environment, and Internal 
Market and Services (Nello., 2005) cited in (Spanjer, 2006). 
                                                   
203 For this example, tax shield has been left out of the equation WACC = 	 =!"> ∗ R! + =	$"> ∗ 	R$ ∗ (1 − DE)	 
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2. The European Council, contains members of states and governments of 
each of the member states. 
3. The Council of ministers made up out of ministers of each of the member 
states is considered the main deciding authority. Members are 
appointed, and decisions are made by votes. 
4. The European Parliament legislative power is equal to that of the 
Council, in addition is the only elected council.  
5. The European Court of Justice comprises of one judge of each of the 
Member States, additionally eight Advocates-General.  
6. Relevant parties and councils in relation to natural gas, are e.g., CEER, 
ACER, OGPI, GIE and EFET. The aforesaid councils, bodies and or 
associations represent EU stakeholders, institutions, regulators, 
competition authorities, supporting EU decisions on regulations relevant 
for the natural gas value chain. Other stakeholders are national 
regulators, producers, shippers in a national boy or association 
representing national needs in relation to gas value chain issues. 
Approving and implementing a regulation such as e.g., the gas directives 
requires uniformity from all parties to be able to approve a regulation, 
bearing in mind all stakeholders interests. 
Gas Directives 
In this research, a directive is an agreement on a uniform EU desire 
to implement and execute the common objective as set out in the EU 
agreement for each member state. It leaves room for each member state to 
implement this objective as deemed appropriate allowing for national 
regulation to meet the requirements set out in the directive. 
From a Norwegian perspective as resource owner and exploiter pre-
gas directives, the upstream was regulated by the GFU (de facto monopoly) 
the midstream was regulated by the GFU and the Downstream was 
regulated and controlled by national monopolies (Gasunie, Distrigaz, 
SNAM, BG and Gaz de France) in Belgium, France, The United Kingdom, 
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The Netherlands and Germany in accordance with EU, 1995 The Directive 
91/296/EEC on the transit of natural gas through grids. The Official Journal 
of The European Communities provides the complete list of European high-
pressure transmission grids (EU, 1995).  
It could be argued that despite fluctuations in gas prices throughout 
history, the demand side (buyers) had a reason to improve security of supply 
at an “acceptable” price204, not all buyers were appreciative on pricing. In the 
GFU period, services to the end users were bundled e.g., explore, produce, 
sale, and offshore transportation. Furthermore, the seller owned the gas all 
the way through the system from production until final sale to the wholesale 
market, thus offering security of supply and a high level of nomination rights 
for the buyer. (MPE, 2001) This process supported efficiency and optimised 
assets. The GFU / FU system, SDFI ownership and Statoil, all under the 
control of the MPE, represented the NGF and were national policy 
instruments making it possible to achieve lower costs through economies of 
scope, better resource management and a strengthened market position for 
Norwegian gas production and its sale (Austvik., 2011). 
First Gas directive  
The first energy package was adopted in 1998 and transposed in 2000. 
The main objectives of the first directive concerned obligations related to 
connection and supply of connected (captive) customers; gas quality; safety; 
security and diversification of gas supply; interconnections and new gas 
infrastructure; development and operation of underground gas storage; gas 
balancing; marketing of gas; price equalisation; sustainability; energy 
saving; research and development in the gas sector and the “small fields 
policy”. (EU, 1998) 
                                                   
204 The high prices and the strategic importance of energy in economic and political affairs have raised 
questions about how the liberalization of energy-markets may increase economic efficiency, and thus 
stimulate growth, when at the same time energy security needs to be taken into consideration (Stern, 
2002) (EU, 2006) (Finon, 2008) 
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The second Directive  
The Second Energy Package was adopted in 2003, its directives to be 
transposed into national law by Member States by 2004, with some 
provisions entering into force only in 2007. Industrial and domestic 
consumers were now free to choose their own gas and electricity suppliers 
from a wider range of competitors. proposed changes regarding the market 
opening, TPA and unbundling provisions (Spanjer, 2006) ultimately leading 
the latest round of EU energy market legislation (EU, 2003). 
Third Gas Directive 
In April 2009, a Third Energy Package205 seeking to further liberalise 
the internal electricity and gas markets was adopted, amending the second 
package and providing the cornerstone for the implementation of the 
internal energy market. The third package, which has been enacted to 
improve the functioning of the internal energy market and resolve structural 
problems. It covers five main areas: 
 
• Unbundling energy suppliers from network operators 
• Strengthening the independence of regulators 
• Establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) 
• Cross-border cooperation between transmission system operators 
and the creation of European Networks for Transmission System 
Operators 
• Increased transparency in retail markets to benefit consumers (EU, 
1998) 
 
                                                   
205 (Yfimava, 2013) provides comprehensive work on the third energy package and Gas target model 
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With the establishment of ACER came its work the Gas Target Model 
(GTM). Following the 18th Madrid Forum in 2011, the Council of European 
Energy Regulators (CEER) developed a vision for the European gas market 
the Gas Target Model (ACER, 2015). 
Gas Target Model (2011) 
The GTM was set up for short-term (2014) implementation of internal 
gas markets and a long-term vision of the gas market to 2020 and its 2016-
2017 review to extend this to 2025 and the Internal Energy Market206 (IEM). 
ACER pursued the GTM which is a framework to ensure efficient markets, 
strongly building on access issues and gas demand and supply 
considerations. In addition, implementation of the third energy package 
which included: 
provide investment signals in both gas production 
and in gas network infrastructure, including transmission 
and storage, in order to meet the demands of European gas 
consumers […] shippers to access the gas infrastructure are 
basic requirements for competition to develop and for the 
network to be used efficiently (ACER, 2015). 
GTM2 (2014) 
The function of Gas Target Model 2 is to ensure that a flexible 
regulatory framework for gas wholesale markets and identify appropriate 
measures to develop hub liquidity and improved tools for market 
integration (ACER, 2015). 
                                                   
206 Five key objectives for the Internal Energy Market (IEM) by 2025: 
1) Establishing liquid, competitive and integrated wholesale energy market  
2) Enhancing Europe’s security of supply and channelling the external element of IEM  
3)Moving to a low carbon society with increased renewables and smart, flexible responsive energy supply  
4) Developing a functioning retail market that benefits consumers  
5) Building stakeholder dialogue, cooperation and new governance arrangements 
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Four Network Codes 
The implementation of the Third Energy Package with respect to gas 
markets is consistent with the evolution envisaged in the GTM, and covers 
matters such as the full unbundling of network operators, the establishment 
of congestion management procedures (CMP) and the development of 
Network Codes (NCs), e.g. for capacity allocation mechanisms in gas 
transmission systems (CAM NC), gas balancing (Balancing NC), 
interoperability and data exchange (Interoperability NC) and tariff structure 
harmonisation (Tariff NC). For European energy regulators, the 
implementation of the Third Energy Package, as well as the continuing 
development and implementation of the Framework Guidelines and 
binding Network Codes, remain key priorities. 
Interoperability NC 
The network code on interoperability aligns the complex technical 
procedures used by network operators within the EU, and possibly with 
network operators in the Energy Community and other countries 
neighbouring the EU207. 
Balancing NC 
The Network Code on Gas Balancing of Transmission Networks sets 
out gas balancing rules including the responsibilities of transmission system 
operators and users. This network code208 was applied 1 October 2015. 
Capacity Allocation Management NC 
The Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms209 in Gas 
Transmission Systems requires gas grid operators to use harmonised 
                                                   
207 Commission Regulation establishing a Network Code on interoperability and data exchange rules 
(703/2015/EU) 
208 Commission Regulation establishing a Network Code on Gas Balancing of Transmission Networks 
(312/2014/EU) 
209 Commission Regulation establishing a Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas 
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auctions when selling access to pipelines. These auctions sell the same 
product at the same time and according to the same rules across the EU 
(applied November 2015). 
Congestion Management Procedures (CMP) 
The European Commission's rules on congestion management 
procedures210 aim to reduce congestion in gas pipelines. They require 
companies to make use of their reserved capacity or risk losing it. Unused 
capacity is placed back on the market. 
Transmission Tariff Structures NC 
The network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures211 for 
gas enhances tariff transparency and tariff coherency by harmonising basic 
principles and definitions used in tariff calculation, and via a mandatory 
comparison of national tariff-setting methodologies against a benchmark 
methodology. It also stipulates publication requirements for information on 
tariffs and revenues of transmission system operators.  
EU Regulations table 
1987 Single European Act (OJ L 169/1) 
1988 The Internal Energy Market’ (COM (88) 238)  
1990 price Transparency Directive (90/377/EEC) (Finon & Locatelli, 
2008) 
1991 Gas Transit Directive (91/296/EEC)  
                                                   
Transmission Systems (984/2013/EU) 
210 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/715/EU amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) 715/2009 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks 
Commission Decision on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks [2012/490/EU] 
211 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised 
transmission tariff structures for gas. Regulation on Conditions for Access to the Natural Gas 
Transmission Networks (715/2009/EC). 
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1994 Hydrocarbons Directive (94/22/EC) 
1998 First Gas Directive (98/30/EC) 
2000 Gas market opening begins  
2003 Second Gas (2003/ 55/EC) Directive  
2004 European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) 
established.  
2005 Market opening following the second Directives begins  
2005 Regulation (1775/2005) on conditions for the access to natural 
gas transmission networks  
2007 Publication of Energy Package and final report on the energy 
Sector Inquiry (SEC (2006 1724)  
2007 Full gas and electricity market opening 
2009    P6_TC1-COD (2007)0197 Position of the European Parliament 
adopted at first reading on 18 June 2008 with a view to the 
adoption of Regulation (EC) No …/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
2009 Third Gas Package 
2010 The European energy directives, specifically security of supply 
Regulation 
2011 Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on wholesale energy market integrity and 
transparency (REMIT). 
2011 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No 
1348/2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and 
Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European 
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Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market 
integrity and transparency (implementing acts) 
2013 Commission Regulation (EU) No 984/2013 of 14 October 2013 
establishing a Network Code on Capacity Allocation 
Mechanisms in Gas Transmission Systems and supplementing 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Text with EEA relevance 
2014 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014 of 17 
December 2014 on data reporting implementing Article 8(2) and 
Article 8(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on wholesale energy market 
integrity and transparency Text with EEA relevance 
2014     EN Official Journal of the European Union L 91/15 
COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No 312/2014 of 26 March 
2014 establishing a Network Code on Gas Balancing of 
Transmission Networks Text with EEA relevance 
2014 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
CouncilOf 15 May 2014On Markets in Financial Instruments 
and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC And Directive 
2011/61/EU (Recast) 
2016 Published: 2016-06-30 
 EU law COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) …/… establishing 
a network code on harmonised transmission tariff structures for 
gas 
2016 COMMISSION REGULATION (EU) No …/.. establishing a 
Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms in Gas 
Transmission Systems and repealing Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 984/2013 
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2017 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/89 of 17 
January 2017 on the establishment of the annual priority lists for 
2017 for the development of network codes and guidelines (Text 
with EEA relevance. ) 
Table Appendix-0-5 EU Regulations and Directives 1987-2010  
 
 
 
